386 U.S. 547 (1967)
In 1961, fifteen white and Negro Episcopal clergymen including the petitioners undertook a prayer pilgrimage from New Orleans to Detroit to promote racial equality and integration.1
Letters from the leader of the group indicated that the clergymen intended from the beginning to go to Jackson and attempt to use segregated facilities at the bus terminal there.2 They fully expected to be arrested for doing so. The group made plans based on the assumption that they would be arrested if they attempted peacefully to exercise their right as interstate travelers to use the waiting rooms.3
After staying one night in Jackson, the ministers went to the bus terminal the next morning to depart for Chattanooga, Tennessee.4 They entered the waiting room disobeying a sign that announced White Waiting Room Only By Order of the Police Department.5 They were stopped by officers Griffith and Nichols who ordered them to move on.6 After they refused, officer Ray arrived and the ministers were placed under arrest and taken to jail.7
All witnesses agreed that the ministers entered the waiting room peacefully and engaged in no boisterous or objectionable conduct.8 There was conflicting testimony on the number of bystanders present and their behavior.9 Petitioners testified that there was no crowd at the station and no one uttered threatening words.10 The police testified that some twenty-five to thirty persons followed the ministers into the terminal and were in a very dissatisfied and ugly mood.11
The ministers were charged with violating section 2087.5 of the Mississippi Code and were convicted by respondent Spencer, a municipal police justice.12 Each received the maximum sentence of four months in jail and a fine of two hundred dollars.13 On appeal petitioner Jones was accorded a trial de novo in the County Court.14 After the city produced its evidence the court granted his motion for a directed verdict. The cases against the other petitioners were then dropped.15
The ministers then brought an action for damages in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi alleging violations of section 1983 and common law false arrest and imprisonment.16 A jury returned verdicts for respondents on both counts.17 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that respondent Spencer was immune from liability and addressed the claims against the police officers.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the petitions to consider the liability issues.19 At the federal trial the officers testified that they arrested the ministers solely for the purpose of preventing violence.20 A crowd had gathered with imminent violence likely, in contradiction to the ministers' testimony.21
Whether a local judge is liable for damages under § 1983 for an unconstitutional conviction?22
Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction.23 This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.24 It is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. Section 1983 did not abolish this common-law immunity because the legislative record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common-law immunities.25 The Court presumes that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished to abolish the doctrine.26
No. The record is barren of any proof or specific allegation that Judge Spencer played any role in these arrests and convictions other than to adjudge petitioners guilty when their cases came before his court.27 The common law immunity protects judges acting within their jurisdiction to ensure they can decide controversial cases without fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound them with litigation charging malice or corruption.28 Imposing liability would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.29 The Court finds no indication that Congress intended to abolish this settled principle when it enacted section 1983.30
Judge Spencer is immune from liability for damages under section 1983 for his role in the convictions because his only involvement was adjudging the petitioners guilty within his judicial jurisdiction.31
Related opinions on this issue
The statute provides that every person who under color of state law subjects any citizen to the deprivation of any rights secured by the Constitution shall be liable to the party injured.32 Congress intended to provide a remedy for the wrongs being perpetrated in states where people were being denied their civil rights.33 Members of Congress were aware that some members of the judiciary were implicated in the state of affairs the statute was intended to rectify.34 Many members of Congress objected to the statute precisely because it imposed liability on judges.35 Yet the section remained as proposed and applied to any person with no exception for the judiciary.36
The immunity the Court grants today is not necessary to preserve an independent judiciary.37 A judge who knowingly and intentionally deprives a person of civil rights should not be immune from suit under the statute.38
Whether the ministers should be denied recovery against the police officers if they acted with the anticipation that they would be illegally arrested?39
The principle of volenti non fit injuria does not apply to deny recovery where the petitioners peacefully exercised their rights as interstate travelers to use the waiting rooms and other facilities at the bus terminal.40 There is no proof or allegation that they in any way tricked or goaded the officers into arresting them.41 Their deliberate exercise of that right in a peaceful, orderly, and inoffensive manner does not disqualify them from seeking damages under section 1983.42
No. The petitioners had the right to use the waiting room of the Jackson bus terminal as interstate travelers.43 The case contains no proof or allegation that they tricked or goaded the officers into arresting them even assuming they went to the terminal for the sole purpose of testing their rights to unsegregated public accommodations.44 The Court of Appeals erred in holding that anticipation of an illegal arrest somehow constituted consent under the principle of volenti non fit injuria.45
The ministers should not be denied recovery against the police officers on the ground that they anticipated being illegally arrested because their peaceful exercise of constitutional rights does not constitute consent to the arrest.46
Whether police officers can assert the defense of good faith and probable cause to an action under § 1983 for unconstitutional arrest?47
The defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under section 1983.48 Monroe v. Pape presented no question of immunity, however, and none was decided.49 In rejecting this argument we in no way intimated that the defense of good faith and probable cause was foreclosed by the statute.50 Part of the background of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause.51
Yes. The officers claimed and attempted to prove that they did not arrest the ministers for the purpose of preserving the custom of segregation in Mississippi, but solely for the purpose of preventing violence.52 They testified, in contradiction to the ministers, that a crowd gathered and that imminent violence was likely.53 If the jury believed the testimony of the officers and disbelieved that of the ministers, and if the jury found that the officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, then a verdict for the officers would follow even though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional.54
The jury did resolve the factual issues in favor of the officers, but its verdict was influenced by irrelevant and prejudicial evidence.55 The case must be remanded for a new trial at which the defense may be asserted.56