999 P.2d 207 (2000)
On April 20, 1997, the last day of the ski season, Nathan Hall finished his shift as a ski lift operator on Vail mountain and began skiing down the lower part of Riva Ridge just below its intersection with North Face Catwalk.1
Hall, a former high school ski racer described by his coach as talented and aggressive, skied straight down the fall line at high speed with his weight back on his skis, tips in the air, and arms out for balance.2 He flew off a knoll, saw people below him, but could not stop or regain control because of the moguls, and collided with Allen Cobb, an inexperienced skier traversing the slope below.3
Cobb sustained a single traumatic blow to the head that fractured the thickest part of his skull, caused severe brain injuries including subdural hemorrhage and marked cerebral edema, and led to cardiorespiratory failure.4 Cobb died at Vail Valley Medical Center despite resuscitation efforts.5 Hall came to rest approximately eighty-three feet below Cobb's body; his blood alcohol level was .009 and a drug screen was negative.6
Witnesses including Judge Buck Allen, an expert skier, described Hall traveling three times faster than Allen himself, out of control, and bouncing off bumps rather than managing the terrain.7 The People charged Hall with reckless manslaughter and lesser offenses.8 At the preliminary hearing the county court heard testimony from eyewitnesses, Detective McWilliam, investigator Sandberg, and coroner Dr. Ben Galloway, who testified that the basal skull fracture required significant force consistent with high-speed impact and that Hall must have been traveling at a very high rate of speed.9
The county court characterized the conduct as skiing "too fast for the conditions" and found it did not create a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, dismissing the felony count for lack of probable cause.10 The prosecution appealed to the district court under Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV).11 The district court affirmed, holding that a risk of death is not substantial unless it is at least more likely than not to occur.12
The People petitioned for certiorari under C.A.R. 49.13 The supreme court granted review to examine both the legal standard applied to recklessness and whether the lower courts had properly evaluated the specific evidence presented at the preliminary hearing.14
Whether the district court erred by establishing "more likely than not" as the level of substantial risk of death that a defendant must disregard for a finding of probable cause that he caused the death of another recklessly?15
Under Colorado law a person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a result will occur.16 A risk is substantial when assessed by reviewing the particular facts of the individual case and weighing both the likelihood of harm and the degree of harm that would result if it occurs.17 The risk need not be more likely than not to occur to qualify as substantial.18
Yes. The district court applied an erroneous legal standard when it required that death be at least more likely than not to occur.19 The established facts show that Hall, a trained ski racer, skied straight down the fall line at high speed out of control, flew off a knoll, and struck Cobb with enough force to fracture the thickest part of Cobb's skull and cause fatal brain injuries.20 These facts permit a reasonable inference of a substantial risk even if the probability of death remained below fifty percent.21
The district court erred by imposing a more-likely-than-not threshold for substantial risk.22
Whether the district court reviewed the wrong criteria and neglected the evidence relating specifically to this case in affirming the county court's dismissal of a manslaughter charge at preliminary hearing?23
At a preliminary hearing the prosecution must present evidence sufficient to induce a person of ordinary prudence and caution to entertain a reasonable belief that the defendant committed the crime charged.24 The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and may not substitute its own weighing of the facts for the trier of fact's ultimate determination.25
Yes. The district court focused on a generic characterization of skiing too fast for conditions rather than the specific evidence of Hall's excessive speed, lack of control over a considerable distance, training as a ski racer, and the resulting basal skull fracture that required significant force.26 When the particular facts are examined in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable person could entertain the belief that Hall consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.27
The district court reviewed the wrong criteria and neglected case-specific evidence.28
Whether the prosecution followed authorized appellate procedure when appealing the county court's finding of no probable cause first to the district court and then seeking certiorari review in the supreme court?29
Yes. The prosecution properly invoked the appellate procedures established by Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV) and section 13-6-310(4).32 After the county court dismissed the manslaughter charge for lack of probable cause, the People appealed that ruling to the district court.33 The district court affirmed the dismissal, and the People then petitioned this court for certiorari review under C.A.R. 49.34 The record confirms that each step in this sequence complied with the governing rules and statutes without deviation.35
The prosecution followed authorized appellate procedure.36