26 P.3d 357 (2001)
Examining the same case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed: "In this case, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the ultimate fact that Santamaria used a knife for the weapon enhancement in the first trial. However, to convict him of murder under California law, the State is not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Santamaria used a knife. [Citation.] Therefore, the use of a knife is not an ultimate fact for the retrial, and the State cannot be precluded from presenting evidence that Santamaria stabbed the victim." (Santamaria v. Horsley (9th Cir.1998) 133 F.3d 1242, 1247; see also People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 821-822, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305 [the trier of fact's finding at a prior trial that a felony-murder special circumstance was not true did not collaterally estop the retrial of the murder charge on a felony-murder theory].) As with the not true finding on the knife-use allegation in Santamaria, and the felony-murder allegation in Memro, the not true finding on the murder for financial gain special-circumstance allegation in the trial for Glenna's murder merely established that the state in the prior proceeding had been unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had murdered Glenna for financial gain as charged in the murder for financial gain special circumstance. In the present case, however, the prosecution was not required to establish that fact beyond a reasonable doubt or, indeed, to prove it at all.
Defendant claims that special circumstance allegations necessarily are part of the prosecutor's burden of proof in a capital case, unlike the personal use of a knife in a prosecution for murder. He contends that "determination of a special circumstance is an ultimate fact" and that the financial-gain special-circumstance allegation relating to the murder of Glenna could not be relitigated. His contention is unpersuasive, because although the financial-gain special-circumstance allegation formed part of the prosecutor's burden of proof in the trial for the murder of Glenna, there was no special circumstance allegation in the present case that defendant had murdered Glenna for financial gain. Such an allegation relating to the murder of Glenna was not charged and was not part of the prosecutor's burden of proof at the guilt phase in the present case and, indeed, it was not being relitigated at all in this proceeding.
Defendant relies upon Bullington v. Missouri (1981) 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 in support of his claim that once a special circumstance allegation is found not true, it may not be retried.
The court in Bullington determined on double jeopardy grounds that the prosecution could not seek the death penalty on retrial of a case in which the jury originally had imposed a life sentence. Under Missouri law, the prosecution was required to prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty hearing, and the jury's penalty determination had "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence." (Bullington v. Missouri, supra, 451 U.S. at p. 439, 101 S.Ct. 1852.) Accordingly, the defendant could not be subject to retrial as to penalty after the trial court granted his motion for new trial on the basis of guilt phase error.
The Bullington case does not assist defendant's present claim, because the court in that case did not determine that in a trial for different capital crimes, evidence regarding a crime of which the defendant was convicted but for which the death penalty was not imposed could not be admitted. The case merely established that factual findings favorable to the defendant made at the penalty phase of a capital trial barred retrying the penalty determination in that case. The Bullington case does not stand for the proposition that evidence relevant to a special circumstance allegation that was found not true—and also relevant to the underlying murder, of which a defendant was convicted—cannot be admitted for the purpose of establishing guilt of different crimes in a separate trial.
Defendant maintains, however, that it was "inherently unfair" to admit evidence of financial gain related to the murder of Glenna after the not true finding on the financial-gain special-circumstance allegation in the trial for Glenna's murder. He continues: "Although, technically appellant was not being tried a second time for Glenna's murder, the introduction of the Glenna financial gain evidence had that effect. The prosecution's sole purpose for introducing financial gain evidence from appellant's Monterey County trial [involving Glenna's murder] into appellant's Kern County case was to support the prosecution's theory that Joyce was murdered, rather than died of natural causes, and that the financial gain special circumstance charged in Count II, Martha's homicide, was true."
Defendant's own argument rebuts the claim that the introduction of evidence of financial gain constituted a retrial of the charge involving the murder of Glenna. The evidence was admitted to establish facts regarding the murders of Joyce and Martha, not to relitigate defendant's responsibility for murdering Glenna for the purpose of financial gain. Defendant claims that when, in the present case, the jury learned that defendant had received a sentence of life without possibility of parole for Glenna's murder, they decided to punish him more severely. This claim is speculative and is unrelated to defendant's claim that the evidence at the trial for Glenna's murder should have been excluded at the guilt phase. We observe additionally that this argument was not raised below as a basis for excluding the evidence at the guilt phase, and is waived on appeal. (See People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 973, fn. 10, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.)
Defendant objects to the manner in which the prosecutor employed evidence of defendant's financial motivation to kill Glenna. Defendant refers to the prosecutor's use of this evidence to support the claim that defendant also murdered Joyce and Martha in part for financial reasons. Defendant contends that the evidence was irrelevant to the charge that defendant murdered Joyce, because no financial gain special circumstance was alleged as to her. This claim is not persuasive, because evidence of defendant's motive for killing Joyce was relevant to the charge that defendant had murdered her, even without a financial gain special circumstance. He makes the additional claim that the evidence regarding defendant's receipt of life insurance proceeds on Glenna's death "lent undue weight" to the "weak" evidence that defendant killed Martha for financial gain. Defendant's claim goes to the weight, and not to the admissibility, of the evidence. As long as the evidence properly was admitted, as we have determined it was, the weight to be accorded the evidence was for the jury to decide.
Defendant also notes that the jury was not instructed at the guilt phase of the present case that the financial-gain special-circumstance allegation in the trial for Glenna's murder had been found not true. Defendant did not request such an instruction and, indeed, made every effort not to disclose to the jury that he had been tried for Glenna's murder. An instruction that the special circumstance allegation that he had murdered Glenna for financial gain had been found not true could give rise to an inference that, despite the not true finding on the special circumstance allegation, he previously had been tried and convicted of the murder of Glenna. Because of the potential for prejudice arising from the instruction which defendant now claims should have been given, no sua sponte duty to give such an instruction should be imposed. (See § 190.1, subd. (b) [providing for trial of a prior murder conviction special-circumstance allegation only after a guilty verdict has been reached on the charged crimes].)
Defendant claims that as part of the guaranty against cruel and unusual punishment provided by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, any evidence is unreliable that relates to a crime as to which the defendant has been acquitted. He cites in support Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392. That opinion does not support his claim. In Beck, the high court disapproved a state rule limited to capital cases, that prohibited the fact finder from considering a lesser included offense within the capital charge, thereby forcing an all-or-nothing choice between the death penalty and acquittal. (Id. at p. 637, 100 S.Ct. 2382; see also People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 736, fn. 15, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46; People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 166-167, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Although the high court in that case observed that it has "invalidated procedural rules that tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination" and of the guilt determination (Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 638, 100 S.Ct. 2382), defendant has not produced any authority suggesting that otherwise admissible evidence relating to an allegation found not true necessarily must be excluded as unreliable at the guilt phase of a capital trial for a different crime. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1044, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044 [discussing the scope of the reliability requirement under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution].)
Defendant contends that, under the collateral estoppel doctrine of the state and federal Constitutions, rulings by the trial court at his Monterey County trial for the murder of Glenna should have barred the trial court in the present case from admitting evidence concerning the murders of Martha and Joyce. As we shall explain, this contention clearly lacks merit.
Defendant alleges that in the Monterey County trial, the court had before it the preliminary hearing transcripts for the charged murders of Joyce and Martha, and the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of both of those murders at the guilt phase of the Monterey proceedings, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). According to defendant, the trial court excluded from the guilt phase of the Monterey County trial all evidence suggesting that defendant had murdered Joyce, on the ground that the prosecution had not established defendant's commission of that crime even by a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant further alleges that although the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of Martha's murder at the guilt phase of the Monterey County trial, the court subsequently refused to permit the prosecution to rely upon that murder as a factor in aggravation at the penalty phase, on the ground that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's culpability for murdering Martha.
As noted, defendant contends that these alleged rulings by the trial court in the Monterey County proceeding operated, by virtue of the collateral estoppel doctrine, to preclude the trial court in the present proceeding from admitting evidence concerning the murders of Martha and Joyce. In essence, defendant claims that the charges should have been dismissed, because without evidence of the murder of Martha and Joyce the prosecution would be unable to carry its burden of proof.
Defendant did move at trial in the present case to dismiss count one, involving the murder of Joyce, on collateral estoppel grounds. He did not move to dismiss count two, involving the murder of Martha. His claim as to that count may not be raised for the first time on appeal. (See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1201, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354 [plea of once in jeopardy cannot be raised for the first time on appeal except in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel]; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 824, fn. 1, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280.) To the extent any failure on the part of counsel to raise a meritorious claim below could have constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we reach the merits of the claim as to each count. (See People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 824, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280, fn. 1.)
The record in the present case does not contain the hearing in the Monterey County trial court with respect to the evidence of the murders of Martha and Joyce, so we cannot comment on the basis for the Monterey trial court's determination. Even if we assume that defendant's assertions regarding the Monterey trial court's ruling are correct, however, it is clear that defendant's guilt or innocence of the crimes of murdering either Martha or Joyce was not an issue of ultimate fact to be determined in the Monterey County trial for the murder of Glenna. Defendant was not acquitted of the murders of Joyce and Martha in Monterey County. (See Gikas v. Zolin (1993) 6 Cal.4th 841, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 500, 863 P.2d 745; see also People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 514, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) Further, just as the trial court in the present case, involving defendant's prosecution for the murder of Joyce and Martha, properly could admit evidence supporting the inference that defendant had killed Glenna for financial gain despite the finding of the trial court in a separate trial for the murder of Glenna that the murder for financial gain special circumstance had not been proved, the trial court properly could permit defendant's prosecution for the murders of Martha and Joyce despite the circumstance that in another trial on a different charge, a court had determined that the evidence then before the court at a hearing on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes did not establish defendant's guilt of the murders of Martha and Joyce. Defendant does not provide authority, and our research has not produced support, for the claim that a murder may not be prosecuted if in a prior prosecution for a different crime, evidence regarding that murder was not considered strong or reliable enough to be admitted as evidence of guilt or as evidence supporting a factor in aggravation.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of Edith Ballew recounting that defendant had told her that his parents previously had threatened to disinherit him when they were displeased with his conduct. Defendant, asserting that he was married to Ballew at the time of this communication, contends that the court should have excluded this testimony as a confidential marital communication pursuant to the marital privilege. (Evid.Code, § 980.)
Defendant and Ballew were not legally married at the time of the communication, because defendant's divorce from his second wife was not final when he and Ballew went through a marriage ceremony. The marital privilege applies only in the case of a valid marriage. (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 363, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) This court specifically has held that the privilege does not apply when a person enters into a second marriage before his or her first marriage legally is dissolved. (People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 176-177, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169.)
Defendant requests that we reconsider our holding in People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d 115, 276 Cal.Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169. He acknowledges that there are two strands to the marital privilege and that it may be appropriate to deny the privilege not to testify against a spouse when the purported marriage is void, because that element of the privilege is based upon the common law rule that spouses are incompetent to testify against each other. He claims, however, that a different rule should apply to that element of the spousal privilege protecting confidential marital communications. In order to promote marital harmony and free communication, he asserts, the privilege should extend to void and voidable marriages. In addition, he claims that our decision in People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d 115, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169, erroneously fails to distinguish between intentional bigamy and bigamy entered into in a good faith but mistaken belief that a prior marriage has been dissolved legally.
We do not believe that defendant has offered persuasive grounds for reconsidering the rule that the marital privilege applies only in the case of a valid marriage. The rule expressed in the Gallego opinion is the rule in most, if not all, other jurisdictions (see 81 Am.Jur.2d (1992) Witnesses, § 300, pp. 285-286; Note, "Honey, the Judge Says We're History": Abrogating the Marital Privileges via Modern Doctrines of Marital Worthiness (1992) 77 Cornell L.Rev. 843, 850), and defendant has not provided authority to support his contrary claim. Defendant also has not provided authority directing that a bona fide belief in the validity of a marriage constitutes a basis for the application of the marital privilege. Further, defendant did not claim at trial that he had a good faith belief in the validity of his marriage that should support application of the marital privilege, and in any event, even if he could establish error, any error was harmless given the relative insignificance of the challenged testimony.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting unqualified witnesses to give expert opinion testimony. He claims that Dr. John Ford, a clinical toxicologist employed at the Chevron Environmental Health Center, with a Ph.D. in physiology and pharmacology, was not qualified to testify regarding the cause of Joyce's death or regarding the effect that hypertension and age would have had on Martha's kidney function. He also contends Dr. Ford was unqualified to testify as an expert regarding the time at which Glenna might have ingested paraquat in order to produce the symptoms she displayed. He maintains that because Dr. Ford was not a medical doctor and did not have training in pathology, he was unqualified to render an opinion on these subjects.
"A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates." (Evid.Code, § 720, subd. (a).) An expert witness's testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to a subject "that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact...." (Evid.Code, § 801, subd. (a).) A claim that expert opinion evidence improperly has been admitted is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1207, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.)
Qualifications other than a license to practice medicine may serve to qualify a witness to give a medical opinion. (People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1142, 219 Cal.Rptr. 371 ["Because of the dramatic growth of diverse interdisciplinary studies in recent times, often individuals of different nonphysician professions are called upon to give medical opinions or at least opinions involving some medical expertise"]; see People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 224, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302; Brown v. Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 645, 114 Cal.Rptr. 128, 522 P.2d 688 [referring to an "unmistakable general trend in recent years ... toward liberalizing the rules relating to the testimonial qualifications of medical experts"].)
We are persuaded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Ford was qualified to testify on the points disputed by defendant. Dr. Ford had advanced training in occupational medicine, physiology, and pharmacology, and had worked in the area of agricultural poison toxicology for 18 years. He had specialized experience in paraquat toxicology, having been employed at a health center operated by the sole distributor of paraquat in the United States, having consulted and advised physicians in many cases of paraquat poisoning, having participated in many research projects and in biannual conferences on the subject of paraquat toxicology, and having provided laboratory services to analyze human tissue samples connected with incidents of paraquat poisoning.
Defendant raises a similar claim with respect to the testimony of Dr. Armand Dollinger, a medical doctor who specialized in pathology and who conducted the autopsy on Martha. Defendant contends that because Dr. Dollinger had no previous experience with the particular field of paraquat poisoning, he had no basis for stating an opinion, based on a toxicology report disclosing the presence of paraquat in Martha's lungs and liver, that she had died of paraquat poisoning. "Permitting Dr. Dollinger to so testify," defendant asserts, "is analogous to permitting a psychiatrist to testify as an expert on oncology, based on a third party report stating his patient had cancer. In neither instance does the third party report confer expert status on the doctor so as to qualify him to render a valid opinion on cause of death."
We believe that the analogy drawn by defendant is flawed. Whether or not psychiatrists, by virtue of their medical training, might be qualified to interpret laboratory reports relating to cancer, a pathologist commonly has expertise in interpreting both the clinical evidence of disease or tissue damage and laboratory results showing the presence of disease agents or toxic materials in human tissue. (See People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 766, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [the pathologist who conducts an autopsy generally is permitted to testify as to cause, means, and time of death].) Dr. Dollinger testified that he had performed in excess of 11,000 postmortem examinations or autopsies and that he had studied the medical and scientific literature regarding paraquat toxicology. We do not believe that Dr. Dollinger's reliance upon laboratory results performed by other professionals required the trial court to find him unqualified to offer an expert opinion on the cause of Martha's death. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Opinion Evidence, § 331, p. 564 ["A doctor may base an opinion on a diagnosis or examination made by another doctor"].) Dr. Dollinger had sufficient specialized training, in addition to the particular experience of having performed the autopsy on Martha, to have reached an informed conclusion as to the cause of her death, despite the circumstance that he had not previously performed an autopsy in a case in which the cause of death was paraquat poisoning.
Defendant contends that there was a break in the chain of custody of the tissue that was removed from Joyce's body during the autopsy. He contends that this break cast doubt on the origin of the tissue ultimately analyzed by Dr. Stephens and relied upon by him to support the conclusion that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning. He asserts that although the tissue blocks were labeled when they were removed, prepared for analysis, and deposited in the hospital safe after the autopsy in 1976, some of the tissue received at Stanford Hospital in 1984 and thereafter transmitted to Dr. Stephens for analysis was not marked with the coroner's label. Defendant also contends that the prosecution failed to fulfill its duty properly to preserve material evidence, but he fails to offer any authority or argument in support of this claim, so it is not considered here. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.)
At trial, defendant objected to testimony by Dr. Stephens that the slides analyzed by him reflected that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning, on the ground that there was an inadequate foundation for this opinion testimony. On each occasion, the trial court overruled the objection without prejudice to renewal if further prosecution witnesses were unable to supply links in the chain of custody. Defendant does not assert that the objection was renewed, and our reading of the record does not disclose further objection. Respondent contends that defendant waived his chain of custody claim because, at the close of the prosecutor's case-in-chief, defendant stipulated that although the medical records relied upon by the various expert witnesses would not be presented to the jury, the jury could rely, for the truth of that testimony, upon the expert witnesses' testimony characterizing the contents of the medical records. We do not believe that this stipulation clearly constituted a waiver of the chain of custody claim. The trial court already had rejected defendant's objection to Dr. Stephens's opinion testimony on chain of custody grounds. The stipulation merely served to relieve the jury of the burden of examining voluminous medical records, and did not constitute a withdrawal of the previous chain of custody objection.
Whether or not there was a waiver, either because of the stipulation or because of defendant's apparent failure to renew the objection after the prosecution supplied additional chain of custody witnesses, we reject on the merits defendant's contention that Dr. Stephens's opinion testimony that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning should have been excluded on chain of custody grounds.
In a chain of custody claim, "`[t]he burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration. [¶] The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was not the evidence originally received. Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. [Citations.] Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight.' [Citations.]" (People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 559, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; see also Méndez, Cal. Evidence (1993) § 13.05, p. 237 ["While a perfect chain of custody is desirable, gaps will not result in the exclusion of the evidence, so long as the links offered connect the evidence with the case and raise no serious questions of tampering"].) The trial court's exercise of discretion in admitting the evidence is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. (County of Sonoma v. Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1448, 232 Cal.Rptr. 471.)
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection to Dr. Stephens's testimony based on chain of custody. The tissue was removed at the autopsy and immediately was labeled with the autopsy number—A-26-76. It was cut into pieces and placed in a cassette marked A-26-76 and transmitted to a technician who processed it into slides that also were labeled with the autopsy number. The labeled tissue blocks were placed in a container in a drawer and went into storage at Mercy Hospital.
In 1984, a labeled box of slides was transferred from Mercy Hospital storage to the Kern County Coroner's Office storage safe. A Kern County Coroner's Office investigator obtained a box labeled A-26-76 from the safe and mailed the labeled box to a physician at the Stanford School of Medicine's Department of Pathology. The package contained 10 tissue blocks, two of which were missing their labels. Each of the 10 tissue blocks received at Stanford was assigned a Stanford number. A technician at Stanford prepared two sets of slides from tissue from each of the 10 blocks. The tissue was sent to Dr. Boyd Stephens in San Francisco. Dr. Stephens examined one or more slides from each of the 10 tissue blocks. It was based upon the examination of these slides that Dr. Stephens testified that he believed that Joyce died by paraquat poisoning.
We do not agree with defendant that Dr. Stephens's opinion was based upon tissue samples of unknown origin. Although some of the tissue blocks prepared at the time of the autopsy lost their identifying labels while they were stored at Mercy Hospital, all of the blocks were contained in a box bearing the label A-26-76, and there is no indication of tampering. We note that the storage area had some security in that it required persons entering to sign in. In addition, Dr. Stephens examined slides from all the tissue blocks—most of which were labeled properly—and formed the opinion not only that the tissue indicated paraquat as a cause of death, but that all the slides came from the same person. Dr. Stephens reached the latter opinion not because of anything distinctive about the tissue itself, but because of the matching shape and outline of the samples as they had been cut from the tissue blocks. The circumstance that Dr. Swinyer and Dr. Kilburn testified that unlabeled tissue slides could not be identified as coming from the same person, at least without DNA testing, went to the weight of Dr. Stephens's opinion, not the admissibility of the evidence.
Dr. Stephens's opinion was based upon an examination of the slides, the great majority of which came from tissue blocks that at all times had been properly labeled. All the tissue blocks, including the unlabeled ones, were stored together at Mercy Hospital and arrived in a container labeled A-26-76. The trial court could conclude with reasonable certainty that no alteration of evidence had occurred.
In addition, Dr. Stephens's opinion was not based solely on the tissue analysis, but also on the hospital records of the clinical course of Joyce's illness as well as autopsy observation of pulmonary fibrosis.
Finally, we note that the cause of Joyce's death was not established solely through examination of the tissue sent to Dr. Stephens, as to which there was a chain of custody objection. Other tissue obtained by Dr. Swinyer at the time of Joyce's autopsy was sent in 1976 to Dr. Kilburn, an expert on lung pathology, and he too formed the opinion that the cause of death was paraquat poisoning.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in overruling hearsay objections to testimony by Dr. Kilburn and Dr. Ford.
In 1976, Dr. Kilburn, a specialist in lung pathology, received lung tissue gathered by Dr. Swinyer at Joyce's autopsy, which he caused to be prepared into slides. He also received lung tissue slides from Dr. Stephens in 1986. Both samples of Joyce's tissue revealed the same structural damage to the lungs—destruction of the alveolar structure and replacement of alveolar spaces with dense collagenous connective tissue. He testified: "The predominant process was that the alveoli, the alveolar spaces were filled with this exuberant scarring, and in some places the alveolar walls themselves were scarring in this manner. And what this ... did was totally exclude the possibility of air going into those areas. Air must go into the alveoli for gas exchange, for oxygen to be taken up out of the air to go into the blood. There are almost no areas in any of the sections I looked at, whether they were from those that I had made in my laboratory or that Dr. Stephens had made, that showed air spaces, and none of the air spaces, even when they were present, were normal. They had lost their lining. They had lost their normal blood vessels and instead were replaced by this gristly, dense, connective tissue." He had observed this kind of damage in cases of known paraquat poisoning. When asked his opinion of what caused the fibrosis in Joyce's lungs, he answered: "Well, the clinical course, the appearance of the tissue and the time after her illness, the failure to see any regeneration or repair or anything, really, in the way of inflammation bespeaking infection, all pointed to this being chemical in its origin, and of the chemicals, paraquat is the only one that produces this kind of fibrotic proliferative change and does it cataclysmically, I mean does it within days...."
When asked whether he consulted any other persons regarding Joyce's tissue, he stated that a few days after he received the tissue in 1976 and prepared the slides, he showed the slides to a colleague. Without ever telling this expert, Dr. Thurlbeck, anything about their origin, Dr. Kilburn asked him to examine the slides. Dr. Kilburn testified that Dr. Thurlbeck examined them for two minutes and said, "You've got a perfect example of paraquat poisoning here." Dr. Thurlbeck stated that he had experience with cases of paraquat poisoning in England, and that he did not have any doubt that the slides of Joyce's tissues exhibited such poisoning. Defendant's hearsay objection was overruled, the court observing that the hearsay was elicited for the purpose of explaining Dr. Kilburn's opinion testimony. When the prosecutor asked Dr. Kilburn what effect Dr. Thurlbeck's opinion had on his own opinion, the witness stated: "I was already convinced from my experience, but, you know, it's comforting to know that another person ... comes to the same conclusion and comes to it without any prompting or without any additional information."
We have explained that "[a]n expert may generally base his opinion on any matter' known to him, including hearsay not otherwise admissible, which may reasonably ... be relied upon' for that purpose. [Citations.] On direct examination, the expert may explain the reasons for his opinions, including the matters he considered in forming them. However, prejudice may arise if, "under the guise of reasons," the expert's detailed explanation "[brings] before the jury incompetent hearsay evidence."'" (*People v. Montiel* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 918, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; see Evid.Code, § 801, subd. (b); *People v. Gardeley* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 618-619, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) In this context, the court may "exclude from an expert's testimony any hearsay matter whose irrelevance, unreliability, or potential for prejudice outweighs its proper probative value.'"
(People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 403, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.)
Nonetheless, "[b]ecause an expert's need to consider extrajudicial matters, and a jury's need for information sufficient to evaluate an expert opinion, may conflict with an accused's interest in avoiding substantive use of unreliable hearsay, disputes in this area must generally be left to the trial court's sound judgment." (People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 919, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.)
Although it is appropriate for a physician to base his or her opinion in part upon the opinion of another physician (People v. Campos (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 304, 308, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 113; see also Whitfield v. Roth (1974) 10 Cal.3d 874, 895, 112 Cal.Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B Pt. 3 West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foil. § 801, p. 19 ["A physician may ... rely on reports and opinions of other physicians"]), it generally is not appropriate for the testifying expert to recount the details of the other physician's report or expression of opinion. (People v. Campos, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 308, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 113; see People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92, 211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189; Whitfield v. Roth, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 894-895, 112 Cal. Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588; 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (3d ed.1997) §§ 29.42-29.43, pp. 597-598; Mendez, supra, Cal. Evidence, § 16.03, pp. 312-313; Wegner et al, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 1999) ¶ 8.763.)
In the present case, we need not determine whether Dr. Kilburn's account of the comments of a nontestifying physician went beyond the proper purpose of permitting the jury to evaluate the basis for Dr. Kilburn's testimony, because even if error occurred it was not prejudicial. The court twice stated that the evidence was being received only for the purpose of indicating the basis for the witness's opinion. Dr. Kilburn's reference to Dr. Thurlbeck was brief and, moreover, other reliable expert witnesses testified consistently and explained that in their opinion, the slides of Joyce's lungs reflected paraquat poisoning. The prosecutor did not refer to Dr. Thurlbeck's opinion in his argument to the jury, and even Dr. Kilburn's testimony was relied upon only to a limited degree. It is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the absence of the admission of this evidence. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)
Defendant claims perfunctorily that the trial court should have sustained his hearsay objection to Dr. Kilburn's statement that Kilburn had been informed by Dr. Stephens that the slides Kilburn received from Stephens were from Joyce. We readily reject this claim. The testimony was permissible under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (b), and even if that were not the case, any error would be harmless, because the chain of custody was established satisfactorily through other testimony.
Defendant also contends that Dr. Ford should not have been permitted to testify that he based his opinion regarding the time that Glenna had ingested paraquat in part on her statements, as recorded in her medical records, that she had vomited violently and had tarry stools on February 20, 21, and 22, 1984, after her return from a trip to Las Vegas that was made without defendant. Dr. Ford's testimony explaining the basis for his opinion clearly was permissible under Evidence Code section 801, subdivision (a). (See People v. Wilson (1944) 25 Cal.2d 341, 348, 153 P.2d 720; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Opinion Evidence, § 33, pp. 564-565; 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook, supra, § 29.41, p. 596.) His ability, as a nonphysician, to interpret medical records and patient symptoms went to the weight, and not the admissibility, of his testimony. As we have determined above, Dr. Ford was qualified to give opinion testimony of a medical nature.
Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the murders of Martha and Joyce, and to support the true finding on the multiple-murder special circumstance. His conviction, he asserts, constituted a violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. Defendant asserts that "for both Joyce's and Martha's deaths, the crucial link between appellant, victim and poison at the time of the crime simply did not exist."
A reviewing court faced with such a claim determines "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, italics omitted; see also People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) We examine the record to determine "whether it shows evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 640, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) Further, "the appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved. "Although it is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] `"If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment."'" (Id. at pp. 1053-1054, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) As we shall explain, we conclude that the evidence clearly is sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for the murder of both Joyce and Martha.
The elements of a charge of murder are an unlawful killing with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Murder perpetrated by means of poison is murder of the first degree. (§ 189.)
With respect to the murder of Joyce, we believe that there was evidence that is "reasonable, credible and of solid value" that defendant perpetrated an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, and that he did so by means of poison. Credible evidence established that in 1970 he made statements indicating his awareness of the extreme toxicity of paraquat and its danger to human life. He said he kept his parents' garden attractive with herbicides he obtained at work, and he displayed to a witness a poison defendant stated would achieve the "perfect murder" because it could not be detected in the victim's body and there was no antidote. In the summer of 1975, he warned his stepson, Joyce's child, about agricultural poisons, including paraquat, and stated that he had been acquainted with a person who sprayed nearby fields with such poisons, including paraquat, for a couple of years. He told the child not to enter the garage because of the dangerous chemicals stored in it. Credible evidence also established that defendant had access to paraquat when he worked for Superior Farming from February to July 1976 and from November 1976 to April 1977. Defendant had access to Joyce, with whom he was living at the time of the murder. In 1985, a bottle of paraquat (dated after Joyce's murder) bearing his fingerprint was found in a garage to which he had access, although he denied knowingly possessing the substance.
Although defendant's possible motive was not an element of the prosecution's burden of proof, prosecution evidence disclosed that defendant had engaged in extramarital affairs while married to Joyce, that the couple had argued over his infidelity, and that he received several thousand dollars in insurance proceeds upon Joyce's death. There was evidence of consciousness of guilt in that defendant exhibited grief at Joyce's funeral but seemed lighthearted immediately thereafter. A jailhouse informant also testified that defendant, after his 1985 arrest, had stated that he had "killed the bitches."
Substantial, reliable, and credible expert opinion testimony, based upon the clinical course of Joyce's illness and the results of an autopsy, supported the conclusion that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning, despite the circumstance that, in light of the tests available at the time of Joyce's death, it had not been possible to detect the presence of paraquat in her tissue. Her symptoms, from the vomiting and diarrhea that characterized the early phase of her illness, to fever, kidney dysfunction, respiratory distress, and ultimately respiratory failure due to extensive fibrosis in the lungs, constituted a typical progression of paraquat poisoning. The appearance and weight of her lungs after death, and the appearance of lung tissue slides examined by several experts, also were typical of paraquat poisoning and, indeed, were not consistent with any other cause of death, in the view of several experts.
Finally, other-crimes evidence demonstrated that defendant also had killed Martha and Glenna pursuant to the same scheme or plan, a circumstance that, we have concluded, legitimately could be considered by the jury in finding guilt.
Defendant points to evidence that assertedly demonstrates Joyce did not die of paraquat poisoning, including her death certificate indicating that she died of respiratory failure caused by undetermined microorganisms, the failure of any laboratory or physician to find paraquat in her tissue, the lack of direct evidence of paraquat administration by defendant or anyone else, and the testimony of a defense expert that Joyce's death could have had a cause other than paraquat poisoning. He also asserts that there was no direct evidence that he possessed paraquat, and he points out that the container of paraquat that bore his fingerprint was manufactured or filled in April 1977, almost a year after Joyce's death, and was seized after his 1985 arrest. He contends that testimony concerning his statements indicating his familiarity with paraquat was unreliable due to the passage of time and the youthful age of the witness, and that the statements did not constitute direct evidence that he possessed or administered paraquat. He also notes some inconsistencies in testimony regarding the timing of his statements suggesting financial gain as one motive for the murder of Joyce. Finally, he stresses that Dr. Stephens, a prosecution expert, testified that he would be unable to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that paraquat caused Joyce's death without relying in part on the evidence that Martha and Glenna also died of paraquat poisoning, and that Drs. Einstein and Kilburn had testified only that paraquat was the likely cause of Joyce's death, with Dr. Kilburn retaining some doubt as to the cause of death.
Defendant's contentions essentially constitute an effort to relitigate the question of his guilt. Although defendant presented some evidence and arguments in his favor at trial, the record discloses substantial credible evidence in support of the jury's verdict. Our examination of the record discloses that Dr. Kilburn testified that he believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Joyce died from ingesting paraquat. Dr. Einstein was strongly of the opinion that she died of paraquat poisoning. Dr. Stephens stated that the tissue slides alone would not have demonstrated the cause of Joyce's death but, properly relying upon clinical evidence regarding the course of her disease and upon the paraquat poisoning of defendant's mother and another of defendant's wives, he expressed the opinion, held beyond a reasonable doubt, that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning. The experts' reliance upon evidence of other paraquat poisonings attributed to defendant does not demonstrate that their opinion that Joyce died of paraquat poisoning did not constitute credible evidence of solid value, or that the opinion of the experts was based upon conjecture and speculation. (See Evid.Code, § 801.) The expert opinion testimony did not constitute, nor did it rely upon, character or propensity evidence, nor did it go to any question of defendant's intent or mens rea. (Cf. People v. McFarland (2000) 78 Cal. App.4th 489, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 884 [it is error for an expert to testify, based on defendant's prior convictions, that in the current case the defendant was motivated by abnormal sexual interest].) Rather, it was reasonable to conclude that the probability was exceptionally low that Joyce's death, which bore the clinical signs of paraquat poisoning, was not actually a paraquat poisoning, when defendant had murdered another wife and his mother by means of paraquat.
Defendant's insistence that there was no direct evidence that he possessed paraquat at the time of Joyce's death, or that he administered it to her, is misplaced. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence of guilt. (See People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 132, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996.) A defendant's responsibility for administering poison most frequently must be proved circumstantially (see People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 530, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; People v. Archerd, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 621, 638, 91 Cal.Rptr. 397, 477 P.2d 421 [evidence that defendant had killed relatives by insulin poisoning was admissible to prove that he murdered other relatives by insulin poisoning]; People v. Cuff (1898) 122 Cal. 589, 591, 55 P. 407), and in the case of the murder of a spouse, it is particularly likely that the evidence will be circumstantial. (See People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854 [the abrupt disappearance of defendant's third wife under suspicious circumstances indicating foul play would be admissible to establish the identity of the perpetrator of the murder of defendant's fifth wife, who disappeared under similar circumstances]; People v. Helwinkel (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 207, 217-218, 18 Cal.Rptr. 685.)
With respect to the murder of Martha, there was evidence that defendant had tired of caring for his mother, that she had expressed disapproval of his many marriages and had threatened to disinherit him, and that he had secured funds from her for the purpose of purchasing her a new residence but had not used the funds for that purpose. It was established by overwhelming evidence that she had received a toxic dose of paraquat. Other-crimes evidence also indicated that it was defendant who had administered the paraquat.
Defendant contends that inconsistencies between the testimony of the prosecution's experts at his Monterey County trial for the murder of Glenna and in the present case regarding the time at which the paraquat would have had to have been administered in order to produce the symptoms displayed by Martha, and to have caused her death at the time it occurred, demonstrate that there was not substantial evidence that it was defendant who administered the poison.
Defendant was able to cross-examine the prosecution experts with respect to any inconsistencies in their testimony. Evidence admitted only at the prior trial is not before us. Inconsistent testimony by defendant's employee regarding defendant's presence or absence from Fresno during the week preceding his mother's death was fully explored at trial. The question whether he was present at work in Fresno during those days was not of the greatest significance, however, because Fresno and Bakersfield are less than two hours' drive apart, and defendant could have visited his mother, who lived alone, at various times during the week. The exact method of paraquat administration was not determinative—the poison could have been administered in many different ways, including by placing it in a medicine bottle, the contents of which Martha would administer to herself. Indeed, the poison could have been introduced into Martha's cough syrup on the Sunday preceding her murder, when defendant visited her.
Defendant claims that the sole evidence against him was his fingerprint on the bottle of paraquat found in his shop/garage, and that a fingerprint alone does not constitute sufficient evidence of guilt unless the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant placed the fingerprint on the bottle at the time of the murders.
As our discussion above demonstrates, defendant is mistaken in his premise that the sole evidence against him was the fingerprint. The fingerprint evidence may have been equivocal in some respects, because defendant's fingerprint could have been placed on the bottle at any time, even after the crimes, and in any event the bottle was filled after Joyce's death, but these points were made to the jury by the defense. Moreover, the presence of the fingerprint was significant with respect to the issue of defendant's credibility, even without proof of the time at which the fingerprint had been applied, because defendant denied that he ever had possessed paraquat "that I have known of."
In sum, we conclude that there was credible evidence of solid value from which a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the charged crimes.
Defendant contends that the testimony of Dr. Buteau, a prosecution expert witness at the Monterey County trial for the death of Glenna, was substantially different from the testimony of Dr. Ford, a prosecution expert witness who testified at the trial in the present case. He complains that at the first trial and at the preliminary hearing in the present case, Dr. Buteau suggested that Glenna and Martha would have exhibited symptoms of paraquat poisoning within 12 to 24 hours of ingestion of paraquat. Under facts developed by defendant in the present case, it would have been unlikely or less likely that defendant could have administered the poison if the 12 to 24 hour timeframe were accurate. At trial in the present case, Dr. Ford, another expert, testified that Martha's symptoms were consistent with an earlier administration of the poison, and Glenna's with a later administration of the poison—in each instance times at which defendant had the opportunity to administer the poison. Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in violation of defendant's right to a fair trial by prosecuting the present case under a different theory and with different evidence than was presented at the earlier trial for the murder of Glenna.
To the extent defendant's claim is based upon inconsistencies between the testimony of Dr. Ford in the present case and that of Dr. Buteau at a different trial, those inconsistencies could be explored on cross-examination and through the presentation of defense evidence. In fact, Dr. Ford was cross-examined regarding these inconsistencies, and defendant called Dr. Buteau as a defense witness. With respect to the possibility that separate trials relating to the same crime improperly may have been tried under inconsistent theories, we examined a similar claim in People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152. In that case, we determined that a contention that inconsistent theories of prosecution give rise to a claim that the prosecution wrongfully has employed different theories at two separate trials best is examined in connection with a petition for writ of habeas corpus, where the record of the prior trial may be examined and the reasons for the discrepancies may be analyzed and explained. (Id. at pp. 635-636, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) For the same reason, we determine that the issue is not appropriate for resolution on direct appeal in the present case.
Defendant contends the court erred in instructing the jury that it could consider other-crimes evidence in determining the cause of death in the charged crimes, particularly with respect to the murder of Joyce.
The trial court instructed the jury, regarding their evaluation of other-crimes evidence, according to a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50. Over defense objection, the trial court granted the prosecutor's request that the instruction be modified to state that other-crimes evidence may be considered not only for the purpose of establishing the identity of the person responsible for the charged offenses, but also for the purpose of determining the cause of death of the victims in the charged offenses.
Defendant contends that he was "convicted of a capital offense on evidence which would not satisfy the reasonable doubt standard." In support, he claims that uncharged crimes evidence that he killed Glenna improperly was admitted in the present case. We already have determined that the evidence properly was admitted.
Defendant also contends that the court violated his right to a fair trial and to a reliable penalty determination by giving the modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50, because the modified instruction "lessened the prosecution's burden of proof on the crucial issue of cause of death." If defendant means that the prosecutor's burden of proof was lightened because the instruction entitled the jury to consider improperly admitted evidence of cause of death, it suffices to note that we already have rejected the contention that this evidence was admitted improperly.
Defendant's principal contention seems to be that other-crimes evidence may be admitted only for the purpose of proving intent, identity, motive, knowledge, and conspiracy. Cause of death, he claims, is not an appropriate object of proof for other-crimes evidence. Rather, he asserts, cause of death may be proved only by expert opinion testimony.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), permits the admission of other-crimes evidence against defendant "when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." Section 1101 prohibits the admission of other-crimes evidence for the purpose of showing the defendant's bad character or criminal propensity. It recognizes, however, that there are facts other than criminal propensity to which other-crimes evidence may be relevant. (People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 393, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757.) The categories listed in section 1101, subdivision (b), are examples of facts that legitimately may be proved by other-crimes evidence, but contrary to defendant's contention the list is not exclusive. (People v. Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 894, 203 Cal.Rptr. 144; see also People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 315, fn. 14, 165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, Circumstantial Evidence, § 75, p. 411.) As we have explained, the admissibility of other-crimes evidence depends upon the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or disproved, the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or disprove the material fact, and the existence of any policy requiring exclusion of the evidence. (People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, 315, 165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883.) In order to be material, the fact in dispute "may be either an ultimate fact in the proceeding or an intermediate fact `from which such ultimate fact[ ] may be ... inferred.'" (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Defendant's not guilty plea put in issue all the elements of the charged offenses. (People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777.) Evidence tending to demonstrate the cause of death was relevant to demonstrate that a murder—and not a natural death—had occurred. (See People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 171, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 15, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) Evidence that defendant previously had murdered his wife Glenna by poisoning her with paraquat was relevant to the issue of the cause of death in the charged crimes, because it tended to corroborate the other evidence establishing that Joyce and Martha died of paraquat poisoning. (See People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 561-562, 11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854; People v. Montalvo (1971) 4 Cal.3d 328, 332, 93 Cal. Rptr. 581, 482 P.2d 205 [evidence that defendant previously injected a young girl with heroin, causing certain reactions, was relevant to prove that in the charged crime, a substance that caused the same reactions when injected also was heroin].)
We are not persuaded by defendant's contention that the cause of death may be established only through expert opinion testimony and not through other-crimes evidence. Cases he cites in support declare only that expert opinion testimony on the question of cause of death also is admissible. (See People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 766, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103-104, 301 P.2d 854.) Other evidence relevant to cause of death also is admissible. (See, e.g., People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 171, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v. Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 15, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748; People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 561-562, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171.)
Defendant complains that the instruction informed the jurors that in the event they found that Glenna died of paraquat poison, they could find from that fact alone that both Joyce and Martha died of paraquat poison. We do not believe, however, that the instruction conveyed that impression. It directed the jury to consider "if the other-crimes evidence "tends" to demonstrate cause of death and identity, and directed the jury to weigh the evidence in the same manner as it would weigh all other evidence in the case.
Defendant claims that the giving of the instruction violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and to a fair trial. He contends that by permitting the jury to convict him on the basis of evidence of his criminal propensity, the instruction relieved the prosecution of its full burden of proof on the issue of the cause of the victims' deaths. We have concluded already, however, that the instruction did not permit the jury to rely on evidence of defendant's criminal propensity, and that it did not direct that the jury could determine the cause of Joyce's and Martha's deaths solely from evidence establishing that the cause of Glenna's death was paraquat poisoning.
Defendant also complains that the modified instruction failed to explain exactly what type of other-crimes evidence could be considered. In support, he cites People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771. In that case this court stated that when evidence of a prior conviction has been admitted for impeachment purposes and other-crimes evidence also has been admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), the trial court should instruct the jury as to which evidence is referred to in the CALJIC No. 2.50 instruction, in order to avoid confusion. (Rollo, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 123, fn. 6, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771.) In the present case, in addition to the other-crimes evidence, evidence that defendant had suffered a prior forgery conviction was admitted for impeachment purposes. Even if we consider this claim as invoking the federal Constitution, with its exacting standard of prejudice, we conclude that any error in failing to modify CALJIC No. 2.50 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that the evidence of a prior conviction could be considered only for the purpose of impeachment. We believe there is no reasonable possibility that the jury considered the prior forgery conviction in making its determinations, in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.50, on the issues of cause of death and the identity of the perpetrator. (See Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.)
Defense counsel requested that the court delete reference to express malice in CALJIC No. 8.11. Apparently, defense counsel believed there was no evidence of express malice, and the prosecutor, although he pointed to some potential evidence of express malice, concurred in the request to delete the reference in this instruction to express malice. Accordingly, a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.11 was read to the jury, as noted in the margin.
The court also gave CALJIC No. 8.20, which began: "All murder which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first degree." (Italics added.)
Defendant complains that despite the agreement of the parties, the jury was instructed in CALJIC No. 8.20 that express malice aforethought was required to find murder in the first degree. "To reach a first degree murder verdict, jurors were instructed to make a determination about a concept left completely undefined by the court's instructions.... A reasonable juror would have been confused by this lapse. Due to this confusion, the jury could not have found first degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. For Joyce, in particular, for whom the prosecutor proceeded on a theory of premeditated and deliberate murder, based on the court's instructions, the jury could not properly have found appellant guilty of first degree murder." Defendant claims that confusion over elements of the charged offenses constituted a violation of his constitutional right to due process of law and that the asserted error also violated his constitutional right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
As we understand defendant's contention, he claims that a jury that does not know the meaning of the term "express malice" could not properly have determined that defendant was guilty of first degree murder on a premeditated murder theory, because such a theory requires proof of express malice. Alternatively, defendant may mean that because there was no evidence of express malice, it was error not to delete the term express malice from CALJIC No. 8.20, and that the alleged error deprived defendant of the chance that the jury would find only implied malice.
It is difficult to understand why the prosecutor and the court agreed to omit the definition of express malice contained in CALJIC No. 8.11, because there was ample evidence of express malice. The prosecutor's agreement is particularly perplexing, because implied malice murder normally constitutes only murder in the second degree (See People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 102-104, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969.) We surmise that the prosecutor agreed with the proposal because for each count, the prosecution was attempting to prove murder by poison, which constitutes a first degree murder whether malice is express or implied. (See People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 538, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; People v. Mattison (1971) 4 Cal.3d 177, 182-183, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Crimes Against the Person, § 130, p. 748 ["Killing by poison may be criminally negligent and amount only to manslaughter ... or may be second degree felony-murder.... But killing with malice aforethought, when perpetrated by means of poison, is first degree murder"].)
To the extent defendant claims that the giving of CALJIC No. 8.20 without modification constituted error, we observe that defendant did not request a modification of this standard instruction, an instruction that was appropriate under the facts of this case. "`Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language.'" (People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 570, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928; see also People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 328, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 223, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; but see People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976-977, fn. 7, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171 [instructional error affecting the defendant's substantial rights may be reviewed on appeal in the absence of an objection].)
To the extent defendant claims that the jury should have been instructed on express malice if they were to be instructed on premeditated murder, the Attorney General contends that any error was invited. It was defendant's proposal, with which the prosecutor somewhat reluctantly agreed, to omit the definition of express malice from CALJIC No. 8.11. When defense counsel makes a "`conscious, deliberate tactical choice'" to request an instruction, any error in the giving of the instruction is invited and cannot be raised on appeal. (People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 657, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; see also People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 723-724, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) Counsel's choice appears to have been deliberate.
Even if the claim is not barred, defendant's claim clearly is untenable on the merits. Defendant's premise that there was no evidence of express malice is faulty. The evidence was strong that defendant had formed an intent to kill Joyce, Glenna, and Martha unlawfully through the common scheme of administering paraquat. (See § 188; People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 601, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994.) Indeed, as noted below, the jury's special circumstance finding constituted an express determination that defendant possessed a deliberate intent to kill Martha unlawfully.
Further, even if for some reason defendant was entitled to the removal of the term "express malice" from CALJIC No. 8.20, any error under California law was harmless (see People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 [applying a standard posing the question whether there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome, when instructional error under California law is found]), because defendant would be guilty of first degree murder whether the jury found express or implied malice. The evidence established as to each charge that if defendant committed murder, he committed it by means of poison. With respect to Martha, the jury specifically found that the murder was intentional, and that it was committed by means of poison, when it returned a true finding on the murder-by-poison special circumstance. The evidence was equally compelling that if defendant murdered Joyce, he did so by means of poison. As noted above, whether the jury found express or implied malice, as long as it found one or the other form of malice, the murders were in the first degree. As noted, all murder that is committed by means of poison is murder in the first degree. (People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 538, 568, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; People v. Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pp. 182-184, 93 Cal.Rptr. 185, 481 P.2d 193; see also People v. Cooler (1934) 2 Cal. App.2d 375, 380, 37 P.2d 869; 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law, supra, Crimes Against the Person, § 130, p. 748; id., § 190, p. 800.) In fact, the question whether defendant acted with express or implied malice did not figure in either party's closing arguments to the jury.
Defendant complains that the jury was faced with determining whether express malice had been established without ever having received an instruction on express malice. This problem, of course, was caused by the request on the part of defense counsel, with the concurrence of the prosecution, to delete the definition of express malice.
Considering the instructions as a whole, we do not find any reasonable likelihood that the omission would confuse the jury or relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof (People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 981, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171; see People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 35-36, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224), because the instruction on premeditation adequately informed the jury of the state of mind required for first degree premeditated murder. As noted, "proof of unlawful `intent to kill' is the functional equivalent of express malice" (People v. Swain, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 601, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994), and the premeditation instruction included a requirement that the jury find a "killing ... preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill." (CALJIC No. 8.20.) The jury would understand the requirements of express malice under the instructions as a whole.
Further, even assuming that the alleged error constituted an improper description of or an omission of an element of the offenses in violation of the federal Constitution, as defendant contends, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 490, 502-503, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 [harmless error]; see also People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 676-677 & fn. 6, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189 [harmless error]; People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 625, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152 [same].) Even if the jury relied upon a premeditation theory of first degree murder rather than a murder-by-poison theory as to Joyce, it could not find premeditation and deliberation without determining that defendant had a state of mind constituting express malice. If the jury believed the prosecution had proved only implied malice, and that the prosecution had failed to prove that the murder was committed by means of poison, it is nonetheless significant that the jury was properly instructed on implied malice and was given a second degree murder instruction. That instruction directed that if the jury found only implied malice, it should return a verdict of second degree rather than first degree murder. It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that any error did not contribute to the verdict.
Defendant requested that the court instruct the jury as follows: "The prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the cause of death of Joyce Catlin was paraquat poisoning. If the evidence introduced in this case relating to the cause of death of Joyce Catlin fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the cause of death ... was paraquat poisoning, you must give Mr. Catlin the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty of Count One." The prosecutor objected on the ground that the instruction was cumulative. He stated: "The jury is instructed that they have to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Catlin did intentional acts that resulted in the death of Joyce Catlin, and that's covered in the instructions defining murder and reasonable doubt." The trial court declined to give the instruction requested by defendant.