138 S. Ct. 897 (2018)
The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians traces its relationship with the United States to treaties negotiated as early as 1795.1 The Secretary of the Interior did not formally recognize the Band until 1999.2
After obtaining formal recognition, the Band identified a 147-acre parcel of land in Wayland, Michigan, known as the Bradley Property, where it wanted to build a casino.3 The Band asked the Secretary to take the Bradley Property into trust under the Indian Reorganization Act.4
In 2005, the Secretary agreed and posted a notice informing the public that the Bradley Property would be taken into trust.5 The Michigan Gambling Opposition sued, alleging violations of federal environmental and gaming laws.6 After several years of litigation, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.7 In January 2009, the Secretary formally took the Bradley Property into trust.8 In February 2011, the Band opened its casino.9
Before the Secretary formally took the land into trust, nearby landowner David Patchak filed suit against the Secretary under the Administrative Procedure Act.10 Patchak alleged that the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the Bradley Property into trust for the Band because the Band was not under federal jurisdiction when the Indian Reorganization Act was enacted in 1934.11
The District Court dismissed Patchak's suit on sovereign immunity and standing grounds.12 The D.C. Circuit reversed.13 In 2012, the Supreme Court affirmed that Patchak had standing and the Secretary lacked immunity, concluding that Patchak's suit may proceed and remanding for further proceedings.14
While Patchak's suit was back in the District Court after remand, Congress enacted the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act in September 2014.15 Section 2(a) of the Act states that the Bradley Property is reaffirmed as trust land and the Secretary's actions are ratified and confirmed.16 Section 2(b) provides that an action relating to the land shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.17
Based on section 2(b), the District Court entered summary judgment against Patchak and dismissed his suit for lack of jurisdiction.18 The D.C. Circuit affirmed.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act violates Article III of the Constitution?21
Congress violates Article III when it compels findings or results under old law, but does not violate Article III when it changes the law, including by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over a class of cases.22
No. Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act changes the law by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over actions relating to the Bradley Property.2324 Before the Gun Lake Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.25 The statute uses jurisdictional language stating that an action relating to the Bradley Property shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed, applies notwithstanding any other provision of law, and cannot plausibly be read as anything other than jurisdictional.26 When Congress strips federal courts of jurisdiction over a class of cases, it exercises a valid legislative power under Article I and Article III that does not infringe the judicial power, as confirmed by precedents such as Ex parte McCardle.27
The facts establish that section 2(b) was enacted while Patchak's suit was pending in the District Court after the remand in Patchak I, and the District Court applied the new jurisdictional rule to dismiss the suit.28 Section 2(b) does not direct courts to reach a particular outcome under old law or attempt to exercise a power vested in another branch, unlike the statute in Klein; instead, it supplies a new legal standard that courts interpret and apply.29 Because section 2(b) changes the law, it does not violate Article III even though it was a response to Patchak I and effectively ends Patchak's suit.30
Section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Act does not violate Article III of the Constitution.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer concurred on the ground that the Gun Lake Act must be read in context as first ratifying the Secretary's actions in taking the Bradley Property into trust and then adding a jurisdictional provision that seeks the same real-world result.32 He emphasized that no one challenged the constitutionality of the ratification in section 2(a).33 The jurisdictional language in section 2(b) merely eliminates the cost of litigating a suit that will inevitably uphold the land's trust status without altering legal standards Congress is powerless to prescribe, distinguishing the case from Klein.34
Joined by Justice Sotomayor
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurred in the judgment on the ground that Congress' authority to forgo or retain the Government's sovereign immunity suffices to decide the case.35 She explained that with Patchak I in mind, Congress acted to displace the Administrative Procedure Act's waiver of immunity for suits against the United States with a contrary command applicable to the Bradley Property, and that retraction of consent to be sued extends to pending litigation.36
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment on the ground that section 2(b) is most naturally read as having restored the Federal Government's sovereign immunity from Patchak's suit challenging the trust status of the Bradley Property.37 She noted that in Patchak I the sole disagreement concerned whether the United States had waived sovereign immunity, and that Congress was free to reinstate immunity, avoiding the separation-of-powers concerns raised by jurisdiction stripping.38 She concluded that this reading avoids the separation-of-powers concerns raised here about jurisdiction stripping.39
Joined by Justice Kennedy And Justice Gorsuch
Chief Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that section 2(b) impermissibly exercises the judicial power by targeting a single pending case and directing its precise disposition without preserving any adjudicative role for the courts.40 He argued that the practical operation of the statute confirms it concerns solely Patchak's suit.41 He contended that it goes beyond precedents upholding jurisdiction-stripping statutes by dictating the outcome without applying any new legal standard.42
He concluded that Congress cannot achieve through jurisdiction stripping what it cannot permissibly achieve outright.43