410 U.S. 656 (1973)
Appellants Ortwein and Faubion were recipients of public welfare benefits administered by Oregon agencies.1 Ortwein sustained a reduction of approximately $39 per month in his Oregon old-age assistance after his county welfare agency determined that he shared shelter and expenses with another person.2 Faubion claimed that expenses related to work training under a federal program, including clothing, lunches, and other items, should have been deducted in calculating her income, but most of these deductions were disallowed after hearing by the Public Welfare Division, resulting in smaller welfare payments over a five-month period.3
Both appellants received hearings before the Oregon Public Welfare Division, which upheld the respective agency decisions reducing their benefits.4 Faubion was receiving over $210 per month through a state-administered AFDC program in addition to a training allowance.5
Judicial review of the agency decisions is authorized under Oregon law, with jurisdiction in contested cases conferred upon the Oregon Court of Appeals.6 All appellants in civil cases in Oregon pay a $25 filing fee in appellate courts.7 Each appellant alleged that he or she was an indigent unable to pay the filing fee and moved to proceed in forma pauperis in the Oregon Court of Appeals.8
The motions to proceed in forma pauperis were denied without opinions.9 Appellants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Oregon for an alternative writ of mandamus ordering the Court of Appeals to accept their cases without payment of fees.10 The Supreme Court of Oregon requested supplemental briefs and then issued its opinion denying the petition for mandamus.11
From this denial of the petition for mandamus, the present appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court.12
Whether Oregon’s $25 appellate court filing fee, as applied to indigents seeking to appeal adverse welfare decisions, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?13
The Due Process Clause does not require states to provide appellate review in civil cases involving economic interests such as welfare benefits.14 Due process does not mandate an appellate system even in criminal matters.15 Such interests lack the fundamental character of rights like marriage dissolution.16
No. The appellants seek increased welfare payments, an interest that, like the bankruptcy discharge in Kras, has far less constitutional significance than the marital interests in Boddie.17 Each appellant received a hearing before the Oregon Public Welfare Division that upheld the respective agency decisions reducing benefits.18 The Court has long recognized that due process does not require a State to provide an appellate system.19 Under these facts, the filing fee does not deny due process to the indigent appellants.20
Oregon’s $25 appellate court filing fee does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to indigents appealing adverse welfare decisions.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart dissents, believing that the doctrine of Boddie v. Connecticut requires reversal of this judgment.22 He references his dissenting opinion in United States v. Kras to support this view.23 He is convinced, however, that the Court is so resolutely firm in its contrary view that it would serve no useful purpose to set this case for oral argument.24
Stewart maintains that Boddie controls the question of access to judicial review for indigents and would have required reversal rather than summary affirmance.
Justice Brennan states that he is in substantial agreement with Justices Douglas and Marshall that this case is distinguishable from Kras.25 He sees no reason to set this case for argument in light of the majority's firmly held view that Kras is controlling.26 On the merits, he would reverse for the reasons stated in his separate opinion in Boddie v. Connecticut.27
Brennan emphasizes that the distinctions from Kras warrant a different outcome on the question of filing-fee barriers to review of welfare reductions.
Justice Marshall adheres to his dissenting opinion in Kras but emphasizes important differences requiring argument.28 Unlike Kras, where no constitutional right to a bankruptcy discharge exists, appellants here seek judicial review of an administrative agency action that deprived them of a pre-existing right.29 He argues that due process at least requires some court opportunity to decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied or whether proceedings were conducted regularly.30
The case should not be decided summarily without full briefing and argument.31 Marshall stresses that the absence of any prior judicial examination of the administrative action distinguishes this case and implicates core due-process concerns about shielding agency decisions from review.
Whether the filing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against the poor?32
No. This litigation deals with welfare payments and therefore lies in the area of economics and social welfare.36 No suspect classification such as race, nationality, or alienage is present.37 The purpose of the filing fee is to produce some revenue to assist in offsetting the expenses of the Oregon court system.38 Appellants do not contend that the fee is disproportionate or ineffective, so the requirement of rationality is met.39
The filing fee does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against the poor.40
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissents on equal protection grounds, viewing the fee as invidious discrimination against the poverty-stricken that is proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause.41 He maintains that this classification based upon wealth cannot stand.42 He argues that the state’s interest in offsetting court expenses falls far short of the compelling interest required to justify a suspect classification or discrimination infringing fundamental rights.43
Justice Douglas concludes that justice remains a luxury for the wealthy under the Oregon scheme of judicial review.44 Douglas further notes that the lack of any installment option or alternative nonjudicial remedy makes the fee an unconstitutional barrier to initial court access for review of administrative welfare decisions.
Whether the filing fee violates the First Amendment right to petition for redress as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment?45
A claim that a filing fee violates the First Amendment right to petition for redress is fully satisfied when the Due Process Clause analysis demonstrates that the appellants have received all process that is due.46
No. Appellants also claim a violation of their First Amendment right to petition for redress.47 The discussion of the Due Process Clause demonstrates that appellants’ rights under the First Amendment have been fully satisfied by the agency hearings already provided.48 The evidentiary hearings meet the minimal requirements of due process and provide a procedure not conditioned on payment of any fee.49
The filing fee does not violate the First Amendment right to petition for redress as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.50