508 U.S. 656 (1993)
In 1984, respondent Jacksonville enacted an ordinance entitled Minority Business Enterprise Participation, which required that 10% of the amount spent on city contracts be set aside each fiscal year for so-called Minority Business Enterprises.1 An MBE was defined as a business whose ownership was at least 51% minority or female, and a minority was defined as a person who is or considers himself to be black, Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or handicapped.2 Petitioner, the Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, is an association of individuals and firms in the construction industry whose members do business in Jacksonville and most of whom do not qualify as MBEs under the ordinance.3
On April 4, 1989, petitioner filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on its face and as applied and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.4 The complaint alleged that many of petitioner's members regularly bid on and perform construction work for the City of Jacksonville and that they would have bid on designated set-aside contracts but for the restrictions imposed by the ordinance.5 On April 6, 1989, the District Court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the city from implementing the MBE ordinance, and on April 20 it issued a preliminary injunction.6
Respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the issuance of the preliminary injunction for lack of demonstrated irreparable injury and remanded for an expedited disposition on the merits.7 Both petitioner and respondents then moved for summary judgment. On May 31, 1990, the District Court entered summary judgment for petitioner.8 Respondents appealed again, and the Court of Appeals held that petitioner lacked standing to challenge the ordinance because it had not demonstrated that but for the program any AGC member would have bid successfully for any of the contracts; the court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.10 On October 27, 1992, the city repealed its MBE ordinance and replaced it with a new ordinance entitled African-American and Women's Business Enterprise Participation, which applies only to women and blacks, establishes participation goals ranging from 5 to 16 percent, and provides five alternative methods for achieving the goals, one of which is a Sheltered Market Plan that reserves certain contracts for the exclusive competition of certified black- and female-owned businesses.11 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot, which the Court denied on December 14, 1992.12
Whether the repeal of the challenged ordinance and its replacement with a new ordinance renders the case moot?
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor dissented arguing that the case should be dismissed as moot because the new ordinance is more narrowly drawn having been written to remedy the constitutional defects alleged with changes like limiting groups adding an expiration varying goals and multiple compliance methods making it a substantially different controversy as in Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church of Miami Inc. She would vacate the judgment and remand to allow challenge to the new ordinance.
Whether an association of contractors has standing to challenge a minority business set-aside ordinance without demonstrating that one of its members would have received a contract but for the ordinance?