326 Conn. 540, 165 A.3d 1167 (2017)
In the fall of 2006 Cara Munn entered The Hotchkiss School as a fourteen-year-old freshman.1 During the winter of her first year she signed up for Hotchkiss's summer program in Tianjin, China, scheduled from June 25 to July 29, 2007, which included language classes, cultural visits, a homestay, and a week at a language immersion camp.2 As part of the application process Cara and her parents signed a Participant Contract, a Waiver, Release and Indemnity Agreement, and a Parent/Guardian Consent and Release form that referenced general risks of international travel including illness but contained no mention of tick-borne diseases.3
Prior to departure Hotchkiss held a mandatory meeting and distributed a packing list that listed bug spray under miscellaneous items.4 It also distributed a travel handbook containing health advice on blood banks and condoms but no warnings about insect-borne diseases.5 Trip leader Jean Yu sent an email linking to a CDC webpage on Central America rather than China.6 On June 23, 2007 the students hiked Mount Panshan, a forested peak, without instructions to wear long clothing or apply repellent.7 The leader left her bug spray on the bus.8 Cara left the paved path to walk through brush and trees, receiving multiple insect bites.9
Ten days later Cara developed flu-like symptoms that progressed to severe encephalitis.10 She was hospitalized first in China and then airlifted to New York Presbyterian Hospital.11 There she was diagnosed with tick-borne encephalitis that caused permanent brain damage, loss of speech, limited motor control, cognitive deficits, and the need for lifelong care.12 The Munns filed suit in June 2009 alleging that Hotchkiss negligently failed to warn of and protect against insect-borne disease risks.13
After a ten-day jury trial in March 2013 the jury found Hotchkiss solely liable and awarded $450,000 in past economic damages, $9.8 million in future economic damages, and $31.5 million in non-economic damages.14 Hotchkiss filed renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and to alter the judgment, challenging foreseeability, causation, expert testimony, contributory negligence, public policy, and the size of the verdict.15
Whether Hotchkiss owed Cara Munn a duty to warn of and protect against the risk of insect-borne diseases during the 2007 China summer program?16
Yes. Hotchkiss owed Cara Munn a duty because it accepted responsibility for her well-being on the school-sponsored China trip, as shown by the mandatory pre-trip meeting, the packing list, and the representations that the infirmary could serve as a travel clinic.19 The school knew or should have known of the general risk of insect-borne diseases from its own campus practices regarding Lyme disease and from CDC advisories describing such risks in forested regions of northeastern China.20
Hotchkiss owed Cara Munn a duty to warn of and protect against the risk of insect-borne diseases during the 2007 China summer program.21
Whether the risk that Cara Munn would contract an insect-borne disease such as tick-borne encephalitis on Mount Panshan was foreseeable to Hotchkiss?22
Connecticut law limits the bounds of tort liability by restricting liability to those harms that are foreseeable.23 Foreseeability does not turn on the narrow question whether the plaintiff's specific harm was foreseeable to the defendant; it asks whether the ordinary person in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result.24
Yes. The risk of insect-borne disease on Mount Panshan was foreseeable to Hotchkiss because the school had access to CDC advisories warning of tick-borne encephalitis in forested regions of northeastern China.25 Mount Panshan is a forested peak in that region.26 The school already warned students about other serious but remote risks such as HIV from blood transfusions and sexually transmitted diseases from faulty condoms, demonstrating that it understood the need to address low-probability but high-consequence harms.27
The risk that Cara Munn would contract an insect-borne disease such as tick-borne encephalitis on Mount Panshan was foreseeable to Hotchkiss.28
Whether the Munns presented sufficient evidence that Cara Munn contracted tick-borne encephalitis during the hike on Mount Panshan?29
Connecticut requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that two elements exist to meet the standard for legal causation: cause in fact and proximate cause.30 To test for cause in fact, the jury is asked if the injury would have occurred but for the defendant's conduct.31 The test for proximate cause is whether the defendant's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injuries.32
Yes. The Munns presented sufficient evidence that Cara Munn contracted tick-borne encephalitis during the hike on Mount Panshan because she received multiple insect bites there.33 Symptoms began ten days later within the normal incubation period.34 No other location on the trip produced comparable complaints of insect bites.35 The Munns introduced a powerful circumstantial case sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find in their favor.36
The Munns presented sufficient evidence that Cara Munn contracted tick-borne encephalitis during the hike on Mount Panshan.37
Whether the trial court properly admitted or excluded expert testimony on the standard of care and life-care planning?38
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a district judge may admit expert testimony from anyone who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.39 Because expert testimony comes with a powerful imprimatur, district judges have a gatekeeping responsibility to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.40
Yes. The trial court properly admitted the testimony of travel-medicine expert Stuart Rose and life-care planner Lawrence Forman because both possessed relevant specialized knowledge and based their opinions on sufficient facts and data.41 It properly excluded William Fluharty's testimony because he lacked any factual basis for his claimed industry standards and repeatedly offered ipse dixit opinions unsupported by survey data or other reliable sources.42
The trial court properly admitted or excluded expert testimony on the standard of care and life-care planning.43
Whether public policy barred imposition of negligence liability on Hotchkiss for Cara Munn's injuries?44
Under Connecticut law, even if a defendant could have foreseen a risk, the law excuses it from liability when on the basis of a public policy analysis the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct does not extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.45 A public policy exception depends upon four factors: the normal expectations of the participants, the public policy of encouraging participation while weighing safety, the avoidance of increased litigation, and the decisions of other jurisdictions.46
No. Public policy did not bar imposition of negligence liability on Hotchkiss for Cara Munn's injuries because participants in a boarding-school study-abroad program reasonably expect the school to warn and protect against known health risks.4748 Connecticut encourages safe international study rather than exposure to preventable disease.49 Imposing liability will not produce a flood of litigation beyond ordinary tort cases involving children.50
Public policy did not bar imposition of negligence liability on Hotchkiss for Cara Munn's injuries.51
Whether the jury's award of $31.5 million in non-economic damages was excessive as a matter of law?52
A trial court may only reduce an award if it perceives an extraordinary departure from reasonableness in the jury's calculations.53 The ultimate test which must be applied to the verdict by the trial court is whether the jury's award falls somewhere within the necessarily uncertain limits of just damages or whether the size of the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to compel the conclusion that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption.54
No. The jury's award of $31.5 million in non-economic damages was not excessive as a matter of law because the evidence showed Cara Munn suffered a uniquely cruel combination of permanent loss of speech, socially alienating facial expressions, profound isolation, and retained intelligence that prevents her from implementing solutions to everyday problems.5556 Comparable verdicts for similar long-term disabilities have ranged from fifteen to fifty million dollars.57
The jury's award of $31.5 million in non-economic damages was not excessive as a matter of law.58
Whether evidence of the parents' alleged contributory negligence or the signed release should have been admitted at trial?59
Connecticut's doctrine of parental immunity bars an unemancipated minor from suing her parent for injuries inflicted during the child's minority and caused by that parent.60 The doctrine is not limited to negligence liability and extends to all torts in which a minor child suffers personal injuries.61 It also bars defendants from impleading parents as third-party defendants, attempting to apportion negligence liability, and advancing claims or counterclaims regarding parents' alleged comparative negligence.62
No. Evidence of the parents' alleged contributory negligence or the signed release should not have been admitted at trial because the parental-immunity doctrine precludes any attempt to impute parental negligence to the child or to use a waiver to release the school from liability for its sole negligence.6364 The jury found Hotchkiss one hundred percent at fault.65
Evidence of the parents' alleged contributory negligence or the signed release should not have been admitted at trial.66