463 U.S. 38, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 77 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1983)
Minnesota law, originally enacted in 1955 and revised in 1976 and again in 1978, permits state taxpayers to claim a deduction from gross income for expenses for tuition, textbooks, and transportation incurred in educating their children.1 The deduction covers tuition, textbooks, and transportation and is limited to a maximum of $500 per dependent child in grades K through 6 and $700 per dependent child in grades 7 through 12.2 In the most recent school year referenced in the record, approximately 820,000 students attended Minnesota's public elementary and secondary schools while about 91,000 students attended some 500 privately supported schools located in the state, and about 95 percent of those private-school students attended schools considering themselves to be sectarian.3
Petitioners, Minnesota taxpayers who challenged the statute, sued in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.4 They named as defendants the Commissioner of the Department of Revenue of Minnesota and several parents who had taken advantage of the tax deduction for expenses incurred in sending their children to parochial schools.5 The complaint alleged that the deduction provision violated the Establishment Clause by providing financial assistance to sectarian institutions.6
The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment.7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment, concluding that the statute substantially benefited a broad class of Minnesota citizens.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the question presented had been reserved in an earlier decision and because of a conflict between the Eighth Circuit's decision and a decision of the First Circuit.9
Whether Minnesota's statute permitting taxpayers to deduct expenses for tuition, textbooks, and transportation incurred in providing for the education of their children violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?10
Under the Establishment Clause, a statute must satisfy the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman: it must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.11
No. The Minnesota statute satisfies all three prongs of the Lemon test when applied to the established facts.12 The deduction is available to all parents regardless of whether their children attend public schools or private sectarian or nonsectarian schools.13 The benefit flows only through the independent choices of individual parents rather than through direct payments to schools.14 The statute forms part of a broader system of tax deductions and does not require state monitoring of religious content in schools.15
The Minnesota statute does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan, Blackmun, And Stevens, Jj.
Justice Marshall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissented.17 He argued that the tax deduction provides direct financial support to sectarian schools in practical effect because the vast majority of tuition payments under the statute go to religious institutions.18
Marshall viewed the deduction as the functional equivalent of the tuition grants struck down in Nyquist.19 Both programs provide public funds to parents to defray the cost of sending children to private schools, the overwhelming majority of which are sectarian.20 The economic effect is identical regardless of whether the benefit takes the form of a deduction or a direct grant.21
He concluded that the statute has the primary effect of advancing religion by providing financial support to religious institutions.22 Marshall further found excessive entanglement because determining eligibility for the deduction requires the State to examine the nature of expenses incurred to distinguish educational from religious uses, which involves monitoring the curriculum and operations of religious schools.23
Whether the Minnesota tax deduction statute has a secular legislative purpose?24
A statute has a secular legislative purpose when its aim is to ensure that the state's citizenry is well educated and to relieve the burden on public schools, without any motivation to aid religious institutions.25
Yes. The statute's purpose of assisting parents with educational expenses is secular.26 It promotes an educated populace and reduces the load on public schools.27 This purpose appears from the statute's placement among other neutral tax deductions such as those for medical expenses and charitable contributions.28
The Minnesota tax deduction statute has a secular legislative purpose.29
Whether the Minnesota tax deduction statute has the primary effect of advancing religion?30
A statute does not have the primary effect of advancing religion when the benefit is neutrally available to a broad class of citizens, flows only through private parental choices, and does not single out religious schools for special treatment.31
No. The deduction is available for expenses incurred by all parents.32
This includes those whose children attend public schools, nonsectarian private schools, or sectarian schools.33 Any benefit to religious schools arises only indirectly from the independent decisions of individual taxpayers rather than from direct state payments.34
The Minnesota tax deduction statute does not have the primary effect of advancing religion.35
Whether the Minnesota tax deduction statute fosters excessive government entanglement with religion?36
A statute does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion when state officials need only determine whether particular expenses qualify under neutral criteria without monitoring the religious content or curriculum of schools.37
No. The statute requires only that state officials disallow deductions for books used to inculcate religious tenets.38 This determination is comparable to the review of secular textbooks upheld in prior cases such as Board of Education v. Allen.39 It occurs without ongoing surveillance of religious schools or their religious content.40 The risks of entanglement are substantially reduced because the aid is provided indirectly through tax benefits to individuals.41
The Minnesota tax deduction statute does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.42
Whether the Minnesota tax deduction statute is distinguishable from the programs invalidated in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist?43
A tax deduction available to all parents for a range of educational expenses is distinguishable from direct tuition grants or tax benefits limited to parents of children in nonpublic schools when the aid is indirect, neutral on its face, and does not involve the transfer of public funds directly to sectarian institutions.44
Yes. Unlike the New York programs in Nyquist that provided direct grants or thinly disguised tuition benefits only to parents of children in private schools, the Minnesota deduction is available to all taxpayers for expenses at public or private schools.45
It channels any benefit through private parental choices rather than direct payments to schools.46
The Minnesota tax deduction statute is distinguishable from the programs invalidated in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist.47