407 U.S., at 241
The prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida, initiated a proceeding in a Florida court seeking to close the appellant's bookstore on the ground that it constituted a public nuisance under Florida law.1 The state court promptly entered a preliminary order prohibiting continued operation of the bookstore.2
Following additional inconclusive proceedings in the state courts, the appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.3 In the complaint, he alleged that the actions of the state judicial and law enforcement officials were depriving him of rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.4
Relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he asked for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court proceedings on the ground that Florida laws were being unconstitutionally applied by the state court so as to cause him great and irreparable harm.5 A single federal district judge issued temporary restraining orders.6 A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.7
After a hearing, the three-judge court dissolved the temporary restraining orders and refused to enjoin the state court proceeding.8 The court held that the injunctive relief sought here as to the proceedings pending in the Florida courts does not come under any of the exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2283.9 An appeal was brought directly to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253.10 The Court noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 comes within the expressly authorized exception of the anti-injunction statute so as to permit a federal court in a § 1983 suit to grant an injunction to stay a proceeding pending in a state court?12
The anti-injunction statute provides that a federal court may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.13 To qualify under the expressly authorized exception of the anti-injunction statute, a federal law need not contain an express reference to that statute.14 A federal law need not expressly authorize an injunction of a state court proceeding to qualify as an exception.15 An Act of Congress must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding.16
Yes. The prosecuting attorney of Bay County, Florida, initiated a proceeding in a Florida court seeking to close the appellant's bookstore on the ground that it constituted a public nuisance under Florida law. The state court promptly entered a preliminary order prohibiting continued operation of the bookstore. Following additional inconclusive proceedings in the state courts, the appellant filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. In the complaint, he alleged that the actions of the state judicial and law enforcement officials were depriving him of rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Relying upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he asked for injunctive and declaratory relief against the state court proceedings. After a hearing, the three-judge court dissolved the temporary restraining orders and refused to enjoin the state court proceeding. The court held that the injunctive relief sought here as to the proceedings pending in the Florida courts does not come under any of the exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2283. Section 1983 was enacted for the express purpose of enforcing the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against State action, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.17 The legislative history makes evident that Congress clearly conceived that it was altering the relationship between the States and the Nation with respect to the protection of federally created rights.18 Congress believed that state courts might be in league with those bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.19 Thus, Section 1983 creates a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court proceeding.20
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mr. Justice White And Mr. Justice Blackmun
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the opinion of the Court.22 He emphasized that the holding does nothing to question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.23 In the context of pending state criminal proceedings, the principles set forth in Younger v. Harris allow a federal court to issue an injunction in only a narrow class of circumstances.24
On remand in this case, the District Court should properly consider whether general notions of equity or principles of federalism, similar to those invoked in Younger, prevent the issuance of an injunction against the state nuisance abatement proceedings in the circumstances of this case.25