819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991)
In July 1985 twelve-year-old Damechie Mitchell drowned at Lake Gregory while accompanying the Gonzales family on a Fourth of July outing.1 Plaintiffs James and Joyce Mitchell, Damechie's parents, sued Jose L. Gonzales, Matilde Gonzales, and their fourteen-year-old son Luis for negligence and wrongful death, alleging that inadequate supervision and Luis's conduct on a paddleboard caused the death.2 Defendants denied liability and raised comparative negligence by Damechie and his parents.3
Mrs. Mitchell testified that she told Mrs. Gonzales Damechie could not swim and that the children must stay at the shallow edge of the lake.4 Mrs. Gonzales disputed receiving that information.5 At the lake the children rented paddleboards after assuring the rental employee they could swim.6 Luis pushed the board into deep water, rocked it until it tipped, and failed to summon help promptly after Damechie sank.7 Witnesses on a nearby board observed the horseplay and the subsequent quiet period but heard no calls for assistance.8 Damechie's body was recovered several days later approximately 120 feet from shore in eight feet of water.9
The trial court refused plaintiffs' request for BAJI No. 3.76 and instead gave BAJI No. 3.75 at defendants' request.10 By special verdict the jury found defendants negligent but concluded their negligence was not a proximate cause of the death, so it never reached comparative negligence.11 The trial court denied motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict.12 The Court of Appeal reversed, and the Supreme Court granted review.13
Whether BAJI No. 3.75, the proximate cause instruction containing a but for test of cause in fact, should continue to be given in this state or be disapproved in favor of BAJI No. 3.76, the legal cause instruction employing the substantial factor test?14
BAJI No. 3.75 is grammatically confusing and conceptually misleading. The term proximate cause may lead jurors to focus on temporal or spatial proximity rather than cause in fact. The substantial factor test in BAJI No. 3.76 is a superior alternative that subsumes the but for test and avoids the confusion.15
Yes. The established facts show that the trial court gave BAJI No. 3.75 at defendants' request instead of plaintiffs' requested BAJI No. 3.76 in the negligence and wrongful death action arising from Damechie Mitchell's drowning at Lake Gregory.16 In that incident the jury found the Gonzales defendants negligent yet concluded their negligence was not a proximate cause of the death.17 The court determined that BAJI No. 3.75's flaws likely caused the jury to improperly limit their findings on causation by focusing on Damechie's inability to swim as the temporally closest factor rather than the Gonzaleses' failure to supervise and Luis's actions as substantial factors in the death.18
The court reasoned that the instruction's language creates misunderstanding as documented in studies where jurors misinterpreted proximate cause. BAJI No. 3.76 provides a clearer guide for determining cause in fact in cases like this one involving concurrent causes from inadequate supervision at the lake and the paddleboard incident.19
BAJI No. 3.75 should be disapproved and BAJI No. 3.76 should be used instead.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennard dissented. She argued that BAJI No. 3.75 addresses both cause in fact and the social evaluative process element of proximate cause through its language on natural and continuous sequence and the word proximate.21 The majority should not invalidate it without providing a better instruction that covers both elements or giving meaningful guidance on the subject.22
She contended that proximity in time or space can be relevant to the social evaluative process.23 The substantial factor test in BAJI No. 3.76 is essentially only a cause in fact instruction that does not adequately address the limitations on liability.24
Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error when it refused plaintiffs' request to instruct the jury pursuant to BAJI No. 3.76 and instead instructed under BAJI No. 3.75?25
Under article VI section 13 of the California Constitution instructional error requires reversal only when the reviewing court concludes after examining the entire cause that the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. This means it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of error. The determination is guided by factors such as the degree of conflict in the evidence, whether the jury requested a rereading, the closeness of the verdict, the effect of counsel's argument, and the effect of other instructions.26
Yes. In the established facts of the Mitchells' lawsuit against the Gonzaleses for the drowning death of their son at Lake Gregory, the jury found defendants negligent on votes of nine to three and eleven to one but unanimously or nearly unanimously found no causation under the erroneous instruction.27 The evidence showed that the Gonzaleses failed to supervise the children adequately and Luis pushed the board into deep water, rocked it causing it to tip, and delayed calling for help. It is reasonably probable that a properly instructed jury would have found the negligence a substantial factor in the death.28
The defense argument highlighted Damechie's inability to swim and the parents' knowledge, contributing to the misleading effect of the but for instruction. Other instructions like BAJI No. 3.77 did not cure the error by repeating the proximate cause term.29 The court applied the Watson standard and the LeMons factors to conclude prejudice because the conflict in evidence on cause in fact was not great and the verdict on causation was inconsistent with the negligence finding on this record of the Lake Gregory outing and the special verdict.30
The trial court committed prejudicial error requiring reversal of the judgment.31