481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)
General Motors Corporation, a Delaware corporation whose principal place of business is in Michigan, has set up an employee benefit plan subject to the provisions of ERISA for its salaried employees. The plan pays benefits to salaried employees disabled by sickness or accident and is insured by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.1
General Motors employed Michigan resident Arthur Taylor as a salaried employee from 1959 until 1980. In 1961 Taylor was involved in a job-related automobile accident and sustained a back injury. Taylor filed a workers’ compensation claim for this injury, and he eventually returned to work. In May 1980, while embroiled in a divorce and child custody dispute, Taylor took a leave of absence from his work on account of severe emotional problems. Metropolitan began paying benefits under General Motors’ employee benefit plan, but asked Taylor to submit to a psychiatric examination by a designated psychiatrist. He did so and the psychiatrist determined that Taylor was emotionally unable to work. Six weeks later, after a followup examination, however, Metropolitan’s psychiatrist determined that Taylor was now fit for work; Metropolitan stopped making payments as of July 30, 1980.2
Meanwhile, Taylor had filed a supplemental claim for benefits alleging that his back injuries disabled him from continuing his work. Metropolitan again sent Taylor to be examined, this time by an orthopedist. The physician found no orthopedic problems and Metropolitan subsequently denied the supplemental disability claim. On October 31, General Motors requested that Taylor report to its medical department for an examination. That examination took place on November 5 and a General Motors physician concluded that Taylor was not disabled. When Taylor nevertheless refused to return to work, General Motors notified him that his employment had been terminated.3
Six months later Taylor filed suit against General Motors and Metropolitan in Michigan state court praying for judgment for compensatory damages for money contractually owed Plaintiff, compensation for mental anguish caused by breach of this contract, as well as immediate reimplementation of all benefits and insurance coverages Plaintiff is entitled to. Taylor also asserted claims for wrongful termination of his employment and for wrongfully failing to promote him in retaliation for the 1961 worker’s compensation claim.4
General Motors and Metropolitan removed the suit to federal court alleging federal question jurisdiction over the disability benefits claim by virtue of ERISA and pendent jurisdiction over the remaining claims. The District Court found the case properly removable and granted General Motors and Metropolitan summary judgment on the merits. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the District Court lacked removal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.5
Whether state common law claims asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan are not only preempted by ERISA but also displaced by ERISA's civil enforcement provision, so that complaints filed in state court purporting to plead such claims are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)?6
Under ERISA, state common law claims for improper processing of benefits under an employee benefit plan are preempted by § 514(a). These claims fall within the exclusive federal cause of action provided by the civil enforcement provision of § 502(a)(1)(B). This provision has the same complete preemptive force as § 301 of the LMRA. Therefore, such claims are converted into federal questions removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). This is confirmed by the parallel jurisdictional language in § 502(f) and the legislative history stating that such actions are to be regarded as arising under federal law.7
Yes. Taylor filed suit in Michigan state court against General Motors and Metropolitan seeking compensatory damages for benefits contractually owed under the ERISA plan, compensation for mental anguish from breach of contract, and reimplementation of benefits. This constitutes a suit by a beneficiary to recover benefits from a covered plan that falls directly within the exclusive federal cause of action of § 502(a)(1)(B).8
The defendants removed the action to federal court. Because Congress clearly manifested an intent in the legislative history of ERISA to treat such claims as arising under federal law in the same manner as LMRA § 301 claims, the well-pleaded complaint rule does not bar removal. The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the action.9
The state common law claims are displaced by ERISA's civil enforcement provision and the case is removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).10
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan wrote separately to stress that the holding is narrow. It rests on Congress's clear intent to make causes of action within § 502(a) removable rather than on whether preemption was obvious at the time of filing.11
He cautioned that in future cases involving other statutes, federal courts should remand unless they find a clear congressional intent to create removal jurisdiction. He noted that ERISA's preemption provisions are not a model of legislative drafting.12