488 N.E.2d 1240 (N.Y. 1985)
Robert and Joan McMinn purchased a four-bedroom house in Massapequa in the Town of Oyster Bay in 1973.1 The house is located in a D Residence district under the Town zoning ordinance.2 On June 1, 1976, the McMinns leased the house to four unrelated young men between the ages of 22 and 25 who had grown up in the area and wanted to remain near their families but not reside with them.3
Shortly after the tenants moved in, a criminal information was filed against the McMinns in District Court, Nassau County, charging them with violating the zoning ordinance because the house was occupied by more than one family.4 The McMinns and the tenants commenced this action against the Town of Oyster Bay, the Town Council, its supervisor, and building inspector seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.5 The criminal proceedings have been adjourned pending disposition of the civil action.6
In their complaint, the plaintiffs asserted claims under the due process and equal protection clauses of the State Constitution and Human Rights Law section 296, expressly reserving federal claims.7 Following a trial, Supreme Court concluded that the age requirement for defining two unrelated individuals as a family violated equal protection and that the ordinance violated Executive Law section 296 to the extent it prohibited occupancy by two individuals on the ground of marital status, but upheld the ordinance in other respects.8
On cross appeals, the Appellate Division modified the judgment and declared that the challenged portion of the ordinance was facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the State Constitution insofar as it prohibits occupancy of one-family homes by persons unrelated by blood, marriage or adoption.9 The Appellate Division found the ordinance constitutional insofar as it limits occupancy to a single housekeeping unit.10 The defendants then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.11
During the trial it was disclosed that the McMinns had entered into a contract for sale of the house, that the plaintiff tenants had vacated it, and that a contract vendee, her daughter and an unrelated adult male were now residing there.12 Before the Court of Appeals, the defendants withdrew the contention of mootness and abandoned the challenge to standing.13
Whether the Town of Oyster Bay zoning ordinance's definition of family, restricting occupancy of single-family houses to persons related by blood, marriage or adoption or to two unrelated persons both age 62 or older, violates the due process clause of the New York State Constitution?14
For a zoning ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power it must survive a two-part test.15 The test requires that the ordinance must have been enacted in furtherance of a legitimate governmental purpose. There must also be a reasonable relation between the end sought to be achieved by the regulation and the means used to achieve that end.16 If the ordinance fails either part of this test, it is unreasonable and constitutes a deprivation of property without due process of law under the State Constitution.17
Yes. The ordinance was enacted to further several legitimate governmental purposes.18 These include preservation of the character of traditional single-family neighborhoods, reduction of parking and traffic problems, control of population density and prevention of noise and disturbance. The definition of family contained in the ordinance bears no reasonable relationship to the achievement of these purposes.19 Their accomplishment depends not upon the biological or legal relations between the occupants of a house but generally upon the size of the dwelling and the lot and the number of its occupants.20 The definition is fatally overinclusive in prohibiting a young unmarried couple from occupying a four-bedroom house who do not threaten the purposes of the ordinance.21 It is underinclusive in failing to prohibit occupancy of a two-bedroom home by ten or twelve persons who are related in only the most distant manner.
The ordinance also excludes many households that are the functional and factual equivalent of a natural family.22 Thus it fails the rational relationship test.23
The definition of family in the ordinance is facially unconstitutional under the due process clause of the New York State Constitution.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judges Jasen And Titone
Judge Kaye wrote separately to address why the court could reach facial invalidity even though the trial record showed that the plaintiffs' living arrangements had the look of a rooming house operation rather than a functional family.25 The ordinance could constitutionally be applied to them. She explained that the unconstitutional feature of the statute cannot be eliminated without rewriting the statute.26
The court cannot determine what the legislature's wish would be regarding severability because surrounding communities have taken different approaches to serve the same general objective.27
Whether that definition of family violates the equal protection clause of the New York State Constitution?28
No. The Court of Appeals did not reach or decide the equal protection issue because the due process holding was dispositive of the appeal. The trial court had concluded that the age requirement for defining two unrelated individuals as a family violated equal protection.31 The Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals resolved the case solely on due process grounds.32
The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the definition of family violates the equal protection clause of the New York State Constitution.33
Whether the ordinance violates Executive Law § 296?34
No. The Court of Appeals did not reach or decide the statutory claim under Executive Law § 296 because the due process holding was dispositive of the appeal. The trial court had found that the ordinance violated Executive Law § 296 to the extent it prohibited occupancy of a single-family house by two individuals on the ground of marital status.37 The higher courts resolved the case on constitutional due process grounds alone.38
The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the ordinance violates Executive Law § 296.39