394 U.S. 459; 395 U.S. 238 (1969)
On April 1, 1966, McCarthy was indicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on three counts of willfully and knowingly attempting to evade income tax payments of $928.74 for 1959, $5,143.70 for 1960, and $1,207.12 for 1961 under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code.1 He was represented by retained counsel and pleaded not guilty to each count at his arraignment two weeks later.2 The court initially scheduled trial for June 30, 1966, but granted the government's motion to postpone due to McCarthy's illness and reset the date for July 15.3
On July 15, 1966, defense counsel moved to withdraw the not guilty plea to count 2 and enter a guilty plea to that count after advising McCarthy of the consequences.4 The district judge asked McCarthy if he understood that the plea waived his right to a jury trial and exposed him to a maximum of five years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.5 McCarthy stated that he understood and wished to plead guilty.6 The government consented and agreed to dismiss counts 1 and 3 if the plea was accepted.7 The judge inquired whether the plea resulted from threats or promises.8 McCarthy replied that it was entered of his own volition.9 The court accepted the plea without personally asking McCarthy whether he understood the nature of the charge and ordered a presentence investigation.10
At the sentencing hearing on September 14, 1966, McCarthy asserted that his failure to pay taxes was not deliberate and would have been paid but for his poor health.11 His counsel emphasized that McCarthy was then 65 years old, suffered from a serious drinking problem, and had used neglectful and inadvertent bookkeeping methods without any disposition to deprive the United States of its due.12 The prosecutor stated that the prime consideration for dismissing the other counts was McCarthy's promise to pay all taxes, penalties, and interest.13 After noting that petitioner possessed sufficient attachable assets to meet these obligations, the court imposed a sentence of one year and a fine of $2,500.14 The judge, after indicating he had examined the presentence report, stated his opinion that the manner in which petitioner’s books were kept was not inadvertent.15 He declined to suspend petitioner’s sentence.16
McCarthy appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.17 He contended that the district court had accepted his plea without personally addressing him to determine that it was made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.18 He also contended that the court had not determined there was a factual basis for the plea.19 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the proper construction of Rule 11 to the administration of criminal law in the federal courts and because of a conflict among the courts of appeals over the effect of a district court's failure to follow the provisions of the Rule.21
Whether Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a district judge to personally address a defendant pleading guilty to determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge?22
Rule 11 expressly directs the district judge to inquire whether a defendant who pleads guilty understands the nature of the charge against him and whether he is aware of the consequences of his plea.23 The 1966 amendment clarified that the court must address the defendant personally to further the rule's purposes of assisting the judge in determining voluntariness and producing a complete record.24
Yes. The district judge did not personally inquire whether McCarthy understood the nature of the charge.25 Counsel for the Government conceded at oral argument that the judge did not directly address the defendant on that subject.26 This noncompliance violated the requirements of Rule 11 as clarified by the 1966 amendment.27
The district court did not comply with Rule 11 because it did not personally address the defendant regarding his understanding of the nature of the charge.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black concurred in the reversal of the judgment though not without some doubt.29 He noted that Rule 11 requires the trial judge to personally address a defendant who pleads guilty to determine whether he understands the nature of the crime of which he has pleaded guilty.30 In this case the trial judge did not personally address the defendant but seems to have accepted the statement of the defendant’s lawyer that he had advised the petitioner of the consequences of a plea of guilty.31
Black based his concurrence in the judgment exclusively on the failure of the judge to first address the defendant personally as required by Rule 11 rather than upon any supervisory power of this Court.32
Whether a defendant is entitled to plead anew if a United States district court accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure provided for in Rule 11?33
A defendant is entitled to plead anew if a United States district court accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure provided for in Rule 11.34 This approach eliminates the need to resort to later fact-finding proceedings in a highly subjective area and ensures that disputes as to the defendant's understanding and voluntariness are resolved at the outset.35
Yes. Because the district court accepted McCarthy's guilty plea without complying with Rule 11's requirement of personal inquiry into his understanding of the nature of the charge, McCarthy is entitled to plead anew.36 This is evident from the record where at the sentencing hearing McCarthy and his counsel asserted that the failure to pay taxes was not deliberate but due to poor health and neglectful bookkeeping.37 Such assertions cast doubt on whether he understood the specific intent required for the offense of willfully and knowingly attempting to evade taxes.38
The approach of remanding for an evidentiary hearing on voluntariness is inadequate because the government would rely on the defendant's statement that he desired to plead guilty.39 The prima facie case for voluntariness would likely be treated as irrebuttable.40 There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge against him.41
McCarthy is entitled to plead anew and the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is reversed with remand for proceedings consistent with the opinion.42