538 U.S. 500 (2003)
Joseph Massaro was indicted on federal racketeering charges, including murder in aid of racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Fiorito.1 He was tried in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.2 The day before Massaro’s trial was to begin, prosecutors learned of what appeared to be a critical piece of evidence: a bullet allegedly recovered from the car in which the victim’s body was found.3 They waited for several days, however, to inform defense counsel of this development.4 Not until the trial was underway and the defense had made its opening statement did they make this disclosure.5 After the trial court and the defense had been informed of the development, but still during the course of trial, defense counsel more than once declined the trial court’s offer of a continuance so the bullet could be examined.6 Massaro was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.7
On direct appeal, new counsel for Massaro argued the District Court had erred in admitting the bullet in evidence, but he did not raise any claim relating to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.8 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.9 Judgt. order reported at 57 F.3d 1063 (1995).10
Massaro later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, seeking to vacate his conviction.11 As relevant here, he claimed that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in failing to accept the trial court’s offer to grant a continuance.12 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found this claim procedurally defaulted because Massaro could have raised it on direct appeal.13 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.14 The court acknowledged that ineffective-assistance claims usually should be excused from procedural-default rules because an attorney who handles both trial and appeal is unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against himself.15 Nevertheless, it adhered to its decision in Billy-Eko v. United States, 8 F.3d 111 (1993).16 Under Billy-Eko, when the defendant is represented by new counsel on appeal and the ineffective-assistance claim is based solely on the record made at trial, the claim must be raised on direct appeal; failure to do so results in procedural default unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.17 Finding that Massaro was represented by new counsel on appeal, that his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness was evident from the record, and that he had failed to show cause or prejudice, the Court of Appeals held him procedurally barred from bringing the ineffective-assistance claim on collateral review.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.19 536 U.S. 990 (2002).
Whether an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal?20
The general rule is that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.21 The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources and to respect the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments.22 Requiring a criminal defendant to bring ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal does not promote these objectives.23 An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the claim on direct appeal.24
Yes. In this case new counsel represented Massaro on direct appeal and chose not to raise any ineffective-assistance claim even though the claim rested on trial counsel’s refusal of the offered continuance to examine the bullet.25 The Second Circuit applied its Billy-Eko rule and held the claim procedurally defaulted for failure to raise it on direct appeal.26 Under the rule adopted by the Court, however, the claim is not subject to procedural default and may be litigated in the first instance through the § 2255 motion in the district court, the forum best suited to develop the facts necessary to determine whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudicial.27
Massaro’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may therefore be brought in the collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.28