519 U.S. 433, 117 S. Ct. 891, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997)
In 1986 petitioner Lynce pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and received a sentence of 22 years, or 8,030 days, in prison.1 By 1992 the Florida Department of Corrections released him after determining that he had accumulated 5,668 days of early release credits, of which 1,860 days consisted of provisional credits awarded because of prison overcrowding.2
Shortly after the release the state attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as retroactively canceling all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder or attempted murder.3 Lynce was rearrested and returned to custody with a new release date of May 19, 1998.4 The 1992 statute resulted in the cancellation of credits for 2,789 inmates still in custody and the issuance of rearrest warrants for 164 offenders who had already been released, including Lynce.5
In 1994 Lynce filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court alleging that the retroactive cancellation violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.6 The magistrate judge recommended dismissal, the district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the petition, and the Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of probable cause.7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the Tenth Circuit had reached a contrary result on similar facts in Arnold v. Cody.8
Beginning in 1983 the Florida Legislature enacted a series of statutes authorizing early release credits when the prison population exceeded set percentages of capacity.9 The 1983 Correctional Reform Act created emergency gain-time procedures triggered at 98 percent capacity.10 The 1987 statute introduced administrative gain-time at a 98 percent threshold with a maximum of 60 days.11 The 1988 statute replaced it with a provisional credits system triggered at 97.5 percent capacity while expanding the list of ineligible offenses.12
Lynce had received overcrowding credits under both the administrative gain-time and provisional credits statutes in addition to basic and incentive gain-time.13 The 1992 legislation canceled provisional credits for inmates convicted of attempted murder, directly affecting Lynce and the other released offenders.14
Respondents later contended that Lynce was not entitled to relief because his provisional credits had been awarded under statutes enacted after his 1986 offense rather than under the original 1983 statute.15
Whether a 1992 Florida statute that retroactively canceled provisional early release credits previously awarded to inmates convicted of attempted murder, after those credits had resulted in their release from custody, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause?16
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits laws that retroactively increase the punishment for a crime. A law is retrospective if it applies to events occurring before its enactment, and it violates the Clause if it disadvantages the offender by increasing the punishment. The inquiry is objective, focusing on whether the law lengthens the period that someone in the prisoner's position must spend in prison.17
Yes. The 1992 statute is retrospective because it canceled provisional credits that Lynce had accumulated and used to secure his release in 1992. It disadvantaged Lynce by canceling his 1,860 days of provisional credits, resulting in his rearrest and extending his imprisonment until May 19, 1998.18 This objective effect of lengthening the period of incarceration violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, as in Weaver v. Graham where retroactive changes to gain-time credits made the punishment more onerous.
The fact that the credits were for overcrowding relief rather than good behavior does not change the analysis, as the focus is on the effect on the sentence length rather than the legislature's motivation.19
The 1992 statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas concurred in part and in the judgment.21 He agreed that the retroactive cancellation of provisional credits after they had been used to gain freedom violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because the increase in punishment was neither speculative nor attenuated.22 Thomas noted that the present case involves the retroactive elimination of credits already earned and used, unlike Morales where the risk was speculative.23
He did not join the majority's discussion of Weaver v. Graham because it was unnecessary to the resolution of this case.24
Whether the fact that some of the canceled overcrowding credits were awarded under statutes enacted after the date of the offense rather than under the 1983 statute precludes relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause?25
The core elements of the overcrowding gain-time system remained the same across the successive statutes, providing for reductions in a prisoner's sentence when the population exceeded a specified percentage of lawful capacity.26 Changes in the specific procedures or thresholds do not affect the central ex post facto claim if the basic mechanism is consistent with the statute in effect at the time of the offense.27
No. Some of Lynce's credits were awarded under the 1987 and 1988 statutes enacted after his 1986 offense. The basic elements of the system remained the same as the 1983 emergency gain-time statute that was in effect at the time of his offense.28 Lynce could have accumulated gain-time under the 1983 statute in much the same manner. The differences may have affected the precise amount of gain-time. They do not preclude relief on the core ex post facto claim.29
The fact that some credits were awarded under post-offense statutes does not preclude relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause.30