484 N.E.2d 1315 (Mass. 1985)
Marian Hovey died in 1898, survived by her brother Henry S. Hovey, her sister Fanny H. Morse, and two nephews, John Torrey Morse, Third, and Cabot Jackson Morse.1 By her will, she left the residue of her estate in trust with the income payable in equal shares to her brother and sister during their lives.2 Upon her brother’s death in 1900, his share of the income passed to her sister. Upon her sister’s death in 1922, the income was paid in equal shares to her two nephews.3 John Torrey Morse, Third, died in 1928 unmarried and without issue, so his share passed to Cabot Jackson Morse, who remained the sole income beneficiary until his death in 1946.4
At the death of Cabot Jackson Morse, the will directed the trustees to divide the trust fund into two equal parts. It directed transfer of one part to the use of the wife and issue of each nephew as he may have appointed by will.5 This was subject to limitations that only income could be appointed to a widow living at Marian Hovey’s death.6 If either nephew left no such appointees then living, the whole fund was to be paid to the appointees of his brother.7 If neither nephew left such appointees then living, the whole trust fund was to be paid in equal shares to the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College, with a proviso regarding the medical school admitting women.8
Cabot Jackson Morse was survived by his wife Anna Braden Morse, who was living at Marian Hovey’s death, and by his son Cabot Jackson Morse, Jr., who died in 1948.9 In his will, Cabot Jackson Morse appointed to his wife the right to the income during her lifetime from the property subject to the power under Marian Hovey's will.10 He left the residue of his estate to her.11 Anna Braden Morse received the trust income until her death in 1983.12
In 1951, the court held in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring that the charities had no interest in the trust.13 Following Anna Braden Morse’s death, the trustees brought this complaint for instructions as to the disposition of the trust principal.14 The complaint identified possible recipients including the estate of Cabot Jackson Morse, Jr., the estate of Anna Braden Morse, the intestate takers of Marian Hovey’s estate, and the three charities.15 A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case for determination of the proper distribution.16
Whether the terms of Marian Hovey's will direct that the trust principal be paid to the named charities upon the death of the last income beneficiary?17
The will is construed according to its plain language to determine whether the condition triggering the gift to the charities occurred.18 Absent specific language creating an express gift in default of appointment, when a special power of appointment is not exercised the property goes in equal shares to the members of the class to whom the property could have been appointed.19
No. The will provides that the charities receive the trust principal only if neither nephew leaves such appointees then living.20 Cabot Jackson Morse appointed income to his wife Anna Braden Morse, who was living at the time of his death.21 Because an appointee was living, the condition for the gift to the charities was not met.22
The terms of Marian Hovey's will do not direct that the trust principal be paid to the named charities upon the death of the last income beneficiary.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Hennessey
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Hennessey, dissents from the majority's conclusion regarding the charities' entitlement.24 He maintains that the event specified in Marian Hovey's will as triggering the charities' right to the trust principal occurred.25 Marian Hovey's nephews died without leaving living appointees of the trust principal.26
Therefore the trustees should be instructed to pay the principal to the charities in equal shares.27 The dissent contends that the majority's construction interferes with Marian Hovey's manifest testamentary plan to benefit the charities with any remaining funds after appointments to family members.28
Whether the 1951 decision in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring bars the charities from claiming the trust principal under res judicata?29
Under normal principles of res judicata a prior judgment on the merits is binding on the parties who brought the earlier action.30
Yes. The charities themselves brought the 1951 action in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring and the court held they had no interest in the trust fund.31 The same arguments advanced by the charities in this case were considered and rejected in 1951.32 Principles of res judicata therefore bind the charities here.33
The 1951 decision in Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring bars the charities from claiming the trust principal under res judicata.34
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Hennessey
Justice O'Connor dissents on the res judicata point.35 Normal principles of res judicata should not be applied in the circumstances of this case.36 The court must now determine for the first time the proper disposition of the trust fund after considering numerous possibilities advanced by many contenders.37
Neither judicial economy nor the prevention of cost and vexation is achieved by precluding the charities and the Attorney General from advancing their views.38 The dissent further contends that the Attorney General was not a party to the 1951 case and that the doctrine should yield to allow full consideration of the public interest.39
Whether the Attorney General, who was not a party to the 1951 proceeding, may assert that the charities are entitled to the trust principal?40
The Attorney General represents the public interest in charitable trusts. Where the prior decision fully accommodated that interest the Attorney General is not entitled to relitigate the issue.41
No. Although the Attorney General was not a party to the 1951 proceeding, the public interest in protecting the charities' rights was fully accommodated by the Justices of this court in its prior decision.42 The court declines to conclude that the Attorney General's involvement was indispensable to a valid determination in the 1951 action.43
The Attorney General, who was not a party to the 1951 proceeding, may not successfully assert that the charities are entitled to the trust principal.44
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Hennessey
Justice O'Connor argues that the Attorney General is not barred by res judicata.45 He was not a party to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Loring case.46 He alone represents the public interest in the proper application of funds given to public charities.47
The dissent states that the Attorney General has not been heard before on the substantive issue presented by this case. Principles of res judicata do not bar the Attorney General from contending that the charities are entitled to the trust principal. The public will have been denied a forum unless the Attorney General is heard.48
When a special power of appointment is not exercised and absent specific language indicating an express gift in default of appointment, the property not appointed goes in equal shares to the members of the class to whom the property could have been appointed.51
Yes. There is no specific language in the will which indicates a gift in default of appointment in the event Cabot Jackson Morse should fail to appoint the principal.52 The claim of the executors of the estate of Anna Braden Morse must fail because Marian Hovey's will specifically limits such a widow's potential stake to a life interest.53 The claim that the trust principal should pass to Marian Hovey's heirs as intestate property is disfavored.54
The trust principal should be distributed to the estate of Cabot Jackson Morse, Jr.
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Hennessey
Justice O'Connor would overrule the 1951 decision.55 The critical language disclosing the testatrix's intent to benefit the charities in default of appointment to living appointees is present in the will.56 The dissent would instruct the plaintiff trustees to distribute the remainder of the trust fund in equal shares to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and the President and Fellows of Harvard College.57
The rule of construction should not be applied to defeat the testatrix's intent when specific language indicating a gift in default of appointment to the charities is present.58