438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978)
Sandra Lockett was charged in Ohio with aggravated murder with two aggravating specifications and with aggravated robbery after a pawnbroker was killed during a robbery in which she participated.1 The State's primary evidence came from the testimony of coparticipant Al Parker.2 Parker had pleaded guilty to murder in exchange for dismissal of the robbery charge and the specifications that would have exposed him to the death penalty.3
Lockett had become acquainted with Parker and Nathan Earl Dew in New Jersey before they traveled together to her hometown of Akron, Ohio, where Parker and Dew needed money for their return trip.4 After Lockett rejected suggestions to pawn a ring, the group discussed robbing a grocery store and a furniture store.5 Lockett warned about the grocery operator's size and weapon and offered to retrieve a gun from her father's basement.6 When those stores closed, someone suggested robbing a pawnshop instead.7 Lockett's brother and Dew would enter pretending to pawn a ring.8 Parker would enter with bullets, load a gun, and rob the shop.9 Lockett would guide them to the location but remain outside because she knew the owner.10
The next day the four gathered at a friend's apartment, confirmed they were proceeding with the plan, drove by the pawnshop several times, and parked.11 Parker entered the pawnshop, announced a stickup, and the gun discharged when the pawnbroker grabbed it, killing him.12 Parker returned to the waiting car where Lockett had the engine running.13 She took the gun, placed it in her purse, and later hid it under the taxicab seat when police stopped them.14 After release, Lockett hid Parker and Dew in the attic when police arrived at her home.15 Parker later testified against her at trial.16
Lockett rejected three plea offers, including one to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery carrying a twenty-five-year maximum and one to aggravated murder without specifications carrying a mandatory life sentence.17 At trial the defense presented no witnesses after Lockett followed her mother's advice not to testify.18 The court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting.19 It also instructed on the presumption that participants in a robbery acquiesce in whatever is reasonably necessary to accomplish it. This included that an intent to kill could be found if the robbery was reasonably likely to produce death.20 The jury convicted Lockett of aggravated murder with specifications.21
Before sentencing the trial judge received a presentence report and psychiatric and psychological reports describing Lockett as a twenty-one-year-old with low-average or average intelligence, no psychosis or mental deficiency, a favorable prognosis for rehabilitation, a juvenile and adult record of only minor offenses, and progress in drug treatment at a clinic.22 The Ohio death penalty statute required the judge to impose death unless he found by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim induced or facilitated the offense, that the offender acted under duress, coercion, or strong provocation, or that the offense was primarily the product of psychosis or mental deficiency.23 After reviewing the reports the judge concluded none of the three statutory mitigating circumstances existed and sentenced Lockett to death.24 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence.25 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.26
Whether the Ohio death penalty statute violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by limiting the mitigating factors a sentencing judge may consider to three specific circumstances?27
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer in a capital case not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.28 The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due the individual is far more important than in noncapital cases.29 A statute that prevents the sentencer in capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and record and to the circumstances of the offense is invalid.30
Yes. The Ohio death penalty statute permitted consideration of only three mitigating circumstances.31 All three related to the circumstances of the offense or the defendant’s degree of participation in it.32 Lockett proffered her character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to cause death, and her relatively minor part in the crime as independent mitigating factors.33
The trial judge could not consider those factors because they did not fit within the three statutory categories.34 The presentence and psychiatric reports detailed Lockett's intelligence, background, favorable rehabilitation prognosis, and minor record, yet the judge imposed death after finding none of the three statutory factors present.35 This limitation precluded the individualized consideration required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.36
The judgment is reversed insofar as it upheld the death sentence, and the case is remanded.37
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment on narrower grounds than the plurality.38 He emphasized that the Ohio statute allowed the death penalty for a defendant who only aided and abetted a murder without permitting consideration of the extent of her involvement or the degree of her mens rea.39 Blackmun also identified a Jackson issue arising from the disparity between guilty pleas and trials in the availability of judicial discretion to dismiss specifications.40
He argued that the sentencing authority must have discretion to consider the degree of the defendant's participation and the character of the defendant's mens rea.41 This approach would require that the sentencing authority weigh evidence concerning the defendant's degree of participation in the homicide and the nature of his mens rea.42
Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment but adhered to his view that the death penalty is under all circumstances a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.43 He further concluded that imposing death on a twenty-one-year-old woman convicted under a vicarious liability theory for a killing she did not commit or intend to commit violates the principle of proportionality.44 Marshall noted that the imposition of the death penalty for this crime totally violates the principle of proportionality embodied in the Eighth Amendment's prohibition.45
He observed that the Ohio statute with its blunderbuss approach wholly fails to recognize the unique individuality of every criminal defendant.46
Justice White concurred in the judgment but dissented from the plurality's holding on mitigating factors.47 He concluded that the death penalty may not be imposed without a finding that the defendant possessed a purpose to cause the death of the victim.48 Imposition of death upon those lacking intent to kill is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime and fails to contribute significantly to acceptable goals of punishment.49
White reasoned that the value of capital punishment as a deterrent to those lacking a purpose to kill is extremely attenuated.50 He maintained that society has made a judgment, distinguishing at least for the purpose of the imposition of the death penalty, between the culpability of those who acted with and those who acted without a purpose to destroy human life.51
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the reversal of the death sentence.52 He argued that the Ohio statute satisfies the requirements of the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Gregg v. Georgia and its companion cases.53 Rehnquist maintained that the plurality's decision unduly restricts the ability of States to enact death penalty statutes that provide for guided discretion.54
He contended that the Court has gone from pillar to post with the result that reasonable predictability has been sacrificed.55 Rehnquist concluded that he would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio.56
Whether the prosecutor's closing remarks referring to the evidence as unrefuted violated the defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by commenting on her failure to testify?57
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's failure to testify. Comments do not violate the Constitution when the defense counsel has already focused the jury's attention on the defendant's silence.58
No. Lockett's own counsel had clearly focused the jury's attention on her silence by outlining her contemplated defense in his opening statement.59 Counsel also stated to the court and jury near the close of the case that Lockett would be the next witness.60 When viewed against this background, the prosecutor's closing remarks referring to the evidence as unrefuted added nothing to the impression that had already been created by Lockett's refusal to testify.61
The prosecutor's closing remarks did not violate Lockett's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.62
Whether the exclusion of four prospective jurors who stated they could not take an oath to follow the law, in a case where capital punishment was possible, violated the defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under Witherspoon v. Illinois?63
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit exclusion of veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty. Exclusion is proper when veniremen make it unmistakably clear that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt or from following the law.64
No. Each of the four excluded veniremen specifically stated twice that he or she would not take the oath to follow the law knowing that a possibility exists in regard to capital punishment.65 They were thus properly excluded under Witherspoon because they made it unmistakably clear that they could not be trusted to abide by existing law and to follow conscientiously the instructions of the trial judge.66
The exclusion of the four prospective jurors did not violate Lockett's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.67
Whether the Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the complicity statute deprived the defendant of fair warning of the charged crime in violation of due process?68
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires fair warning of the crime charged. No violation occurs when the state court's construction of the statute is consistent with both prior state law and the legislative history of the statute.69
The Ohio Supreme Court's interpretation of the complicity statute did not deprive Lockett of fair warning in violation of due process.72