548 U.S. 399 (2006)
After the 2000 census the Texas Legislature did not enact a congressional districting plan.1 A three-judge district court upheld Plan 1151C against one-person one-vote and Voting Rights Act challenges in Balderas v. Texas.2 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed that decision.3
In 2003 the Republican-controlled legislature convened a special session and enacted Plan 1374C.4 The Department of Justice precleared the plan under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.5
Appellees including the League of United Latin American Citizens and other interested parties challenged Plan 1374C in federal court.6 They alleged that the plan was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.7 They also alleged that the changes to District 23 diluted Latino voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.8 They further alleged that the plan was enacted with a discriminatory purpose in violation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.9 Finally they alleged that the configuration of District 25 amounted to racial gerrymandering under the Fourteenth Amendment.10
A three-judge district court that included one member of the Balderas court rejected the statewide political gerrymandering claims.11 The court concluded that the redistricting of District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.12 It also concluded that the configuration of District 25 constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander.13 The court ordered the State to redraw the lines for those districts and any affected districts.14 The State appealed the district court's judgment to the Supreme Court.15
Whether appellees' statewide claim of political gerrymandering presents a justiciable controversy?16
In Vieth v. Jubelirer a plurality concluded that claims of political gerrymandering present nonjusticiable political questions.17 No manageable standard for measuring a burden on representational rights has emerged in the lower courts or in this Court.18 There is an absence of any agreed upon substantive principles for evaluating such claims.19 Justice Kennedy concurred that the claim in that case was not justiciable.20 He left open the possibility that a manageable standard might emerge in a future case for a challenge to a specific district or specific aspect of a redistricting plan.21
No. Appellees brought a statewide challenge to Plan 1374C.22 They have not identified any manageable standard for evaluating their claim.23 Their expert witness proposed a symmetry standard that would measure the fairness of a redistricting plan by comparing the number of seats each party would receive if it received the same share of the statewide vote.24 Yet that standard is not a reliable measure of partisan fairness.25
It does not take into account the geographic distribution of voters or the State’s interest in creating compact districts.26 It also does not account for the fact that the two major political parties may have different distributions of support across the State.27 The absence of any agreed upon substantive principles for evaluating political gerrymandering claims leads to the conclusion that the statewide claim is nonjusticiable.28 This conclusion is reinforced by the lack of a manageable standard for measuring the burden on representational rights.29
Appellees' statewide claim of political gerrymandering is nonjusticiable.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia would dismiss appellants' political-gerrymandering claims as nonjusticiable.31 No party or judge has put forth a judicially discernible standard by which to evaluate them.32 The opinion concludes that appellants have failed to state a claim without ever articulating what the elements of such a claim consist of.33
This disposition provides no guidance to lower court judges and perpetuates a cause of action with no discernible content.34 He would simply dismiss the claims as nonjusticiable rather than reach the merits of any standard.35
Chief Justice Roberts agrees with the determination that appellants have not provided a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders.36 He takes no position on whether a challenge to a political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy.37 That question has not been argued in these cases.
He therefore joins the Court’s disposition in Part II without specifying whether appellants have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted or have failed to present a justiciable controversy.38
Justice Alito joins the Chief Justice’s opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.39 He agrees that partisan gerrymandering claims should be justiciable only in extreme cases.40 He also agrees that the District Court’s judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed in part.41
His position emphasizes that such claims warrant judicial review solely when the circumstances are most extreme rather than in routine redistricting disputes.42
Justice Breyer concludes that the plan in its entirety violates the Equal Protection Clause.43 The timing of the redistricting between census periods, the radical departure from traditional boundary-drawing criteria, and other evidence make clear that a desire to maximize partisan advantage was the sole purpose behind Plan 1374C.44 The plan entrenches the Republican Party.45
The State cannot successfully defend it as an effort simply to neutralize the Democratic Party’s previous political gerrymander.46 No justification other than party advantage can be found.47
Whether the redistricting of District 23 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?48
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any voting practice or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color.49 To establish a violation a plaintiff must show that the political processes leading to nomination or election are not equally open to participation by members of a protected class.50 Its members must have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.51 The Gingles decision established three preconditions for a Section 2 claim in a single-member district case.52 The minority group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.53 The minority group must be politically cohesive.54 The white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.55
Yes. The District Court found that all three Gingles preconditions were satisfied in District 23.56 Latinos in the district were sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in an alternative district.57 Latinos were politically cohesive.58
The Anglo majority voted sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat the Latino-preferred candidate.59 The District Court also considered the totality of the circumstances.60 The history of official discrimination in Texas, the lingering effects of that discrimination, the use of racial appeals in political campaigns, and the lack of success of Latino candidates in District 23 all supported a finding of vote dilution.61 The evidence showed that the 2003 redistricting of District 23 reduced the Latino citizen voting-age population from 57.5% to 45.7%.62
The new district was therefore no longer an effective Latino opportunity district.63 The District Court correctly concluded that this change violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.64
The redistricting of District 23 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.65
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens joins Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion.66 He agrees that appellees’ statewide claim of political gerrymandering is nonjusticiable.67 He also agrees that the redistricting of District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.68
He dissents from the remainder of the Court’s opinion.69 On the Section 2 claim he concurs with the majority that the reduction in Latino citizen voting-age population from 57.5 percent to 45.7 percent eliminated an effective opportunity district.70
Justice Souter joins Justice Stevens’ opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.71 He agrees that the District Court correctly found a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in District 23.72 He also agrees that the configuration of District 25 was an impermissible racial gerrymander.73
His concurrence emphasizes that the District Court’s findings on vote dilution in District 23 were supported by the totality of the circumstances including Senate factors.74 He would affirm the District Court on both the Section 2 claim and the racial gerrymandering claim regarding District 25.75
Justice Ginsburg joins Parts I, II, and III of the Court’s opinion.76 She agrees that the statewide political gerrymandering claim is nonjusticiable.7778 She agrees that the redistricting of District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.7980
She dissents from the Court’s decision to reverse the District Court’s judgment as to District 25.81 On District 23 she concurs fully with the majority’s application of the Gingles preconditions and totality analysis.82 She would affirm the District Court’s finding of vote dilution under Section 2.83
Justice Scalia joins the Court’s opinion except as to Parts III and IV.84 He would hold that the claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act regarding District 23 is not cognizable.85 The Voting Rights Act does not authorize race-based redistricting.86
The creation of majority-minority districts is not required by the Act and in fact raises serious constitutional questions.87 He would dismiss the Section 2 claim entirely rather than affirm the District Court on the ground that the statute provides no basis for such race-conscious districting.88
Chief Justice Roberts joins Parts I, II, III, and IV of the Court’s opinion.89 He agrees that the statewide political gerrymandering claim is nonjusticiable. He agrees that the redistricting of District 23 violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
He also agrees that the configuration of District 25 did not constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander.90 He writes separately to emphasize that claims of partisan gerrymandering should be justiciable only in the most extreme circumstances.91
Justice Breyer joins Parts II-A and III of the Court’s opinion.92 He also joins Parts I and II of Justice Stevens’ opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.93 He concludes that the plan in its entirety violates the Equal Protection Clause because the timing of the redistricting, the radical departure from traditional boundary-drawing criteria, and other evidence make clear that a desire to maximize partisan advantage was the sole purpose behind Plan 1374C.94
He concurs in the Section 2 holding for District 23.95
Whether the configuration of District 25 constitutes an impermissible racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?96
No. The District Court found that race was the predominant factor in the drawing of District 25.99 It based this finding on evidence that the State divided the City of Austin to connect two Latino communities in different parts of the State.100 The court concluded that the bizarre shape of the district could only be explained by the State’s desire to create a Latino opportunity district.101
The evidence showed instead that the State’s primary motivation in drawing District 25 was to create a compact district that connected two communities with similar interests.102 The district’s shape while irregular was not so bizarre as to compel the conclusion that race predominated over traditional districting principles.103 The State’s interest in creating a Latino opportunity district was a legitimate one and the district was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.104
The configuration of District 25 does not constitute an impermissible racial gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.105
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissents from the remainder of the Court’s opinion.106 In his view the District Court correctly concluded that the configuration of District 25 constituted an impermissible racial gerrymander.107 The evidence showed that race was the predominant factor in drawing the district’s lines.108
The bizarre shape of the district which connects two Latino communities separated by hundreds of miles can only be explained by the State’s desire to maximize the number of Latino voters in the district.109 The State has not shown that the district is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.110
Justice Souter joins Justice Stevens’ opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agrees that the District Court correctly found a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in District 23. He also agrees that the configuration of District 25 was an impermissible racial gerrymander.
His view is that the District Court’s finding of predominant racial motivation in District 25 was amply supported by the record and should have been affirmed.111 He would affirm the District Court’s racial gerrymandering holding in full.112
Justice Ginsburg dissents from the Court’s decision to reverse the District Court’s judgment as to District 25.113 The evidence amply supports the District Court’s finding that race predominated in the drawing of that district.114 The State’s creation of a bizarrely shaped district to connect two distant Latino communities cannot be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment.115
She would affirm the District Court’s racial gerrymandering holding in full because the record demonstrates that traditional districting principles were subordinated to racial considerations.116
Justice Scalia disagrees with the Court’s conclusion that the District Court’s judgment as to District 25 should be reversed.117 The District Court correctly found that race was the predominant factor in drawing the district.118 The bizarre configuration of the district cannot be explained by traditional districting principles.119
He would affirm the District Court’s judgment in its entirety including the racial gerrymandering ruling on District 25 rather than apply a less demanding standard to the State’s use of race.120
Chief Justice Roberts joins Parts I and IV of the plurality opinion.121 With regard to Part II he agrees with the determination that appellants have not provided a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders.122 He must however dissent from Part III of the Court’s opinion.123
According to the District Court’s factual findings the State’s drawing of district lines in south and west Texas caused the area to move from five out of seven effective Latino opportunity congressional districts to six out of seven effective Latino opportunity districts.124 He would reverse the Section 2 holding but affirm on District 25.125
Justice Alito joins the Chief Justice’s opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment. He agrees that the District Court’s judgment should be affirmed in part and reversed in part including reversal of the racial gerrymandering claim as to District 25.126 He concurs that the District Court erred in concluding race predominated over traditional districting principles in the configuration of District 25.127
Justice Breyer joins Justice Stevens’ opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part on the racial gerrymandering claim regarding District 25.128 He also joins Parts II-A and III of the Court’s opinion.129 He concludes that the plan in its entirety violates the Equal Protection Clause because the timing of the redistricting the radical departure from traditional boundary-drawing criteria and other evidence make clear that a desire to maximize partisan advantage was the sole purpose behind Plan 1374C.130
He would affirm the District Court on District 25.131