312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977)
Cincinnati Corporation manufactured and sold a press brake to Hutchinson Manufacturing and Sales, Inc. in 1967.1 The machine used a vertical ram controlled by a single foot pedal to bend metal strips placed between matching dies.2
On April 25, 1972, plaintiff Lambertson assisted a coemployee operating the press brake at Hutchinson.3 As the ram rose after one cycle, a bent piece fell to the opposite side, and Lambertson reached through the jaws to retrieve it while the coemployee kept his foot on the pedal, causing the ram to descend and crush his arm.4
Lambertson had never operated the press brake before and did not know it was capable of double cycling without stopping at the top.5 He suffered broken bones in his forearm requiring two operations, multiple cast changes, a year away from work, and approximately $8,600 in medical and wage losses.6
Prior to the accident, in 1969 Cincinnati offered Hutchinson two safety modifications at Hutchinson's expense: operation by multiple palm buttons or foot switches, and automatic stoppage of the ram at the top of each cycle.7 In 1971 Cincinnati sent a pamphlet describing a Waveguard electronic sensing device, but Hutchinson installed neither.8
After recovering workers' compensation benefits from Hutchinson, Lambertson sued Cincinnati in district court.9 The jury returned a special verdict finding the parties 15 percent, 25 percent, and 60 percent causally negligent respectively and awarding $40,000 in damages.10 The district court entered judgment against Cincinnati for $34,000 and denied any contribution or indemnity from Hutchinson.11 Cincinnati appealed to the Supreme Court of Minnesota.12
Whether the trial court erred in admitting the 1960 American Standard Safety Code section and excluding later standards?13
Trial courts possess broad discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence. Their evidentiary rulings will stand unless a clear showing establishes that the chosen approach was so plainly erroneous as to amount to an abuse of that discretion.14
No. The trial court excluded all standards promulgated after 1967, the date of manufacture of the press involved in the instant case, on the theory that Cincinnati could not be held accountable for later standards.15 The manufacturer made no offer of proof below nor any argument on appeal demonstrating that the trial court's consistent approach was clearly wrong.16
The trial court did not err in its rulings admitting and excluding the safety regulations.17
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct on assumption of risk?18
In cases governed by comparative negligence, assumption of risk is not submitted as a separate defense but is instead merged into the apportionment of fault, and requires proof that the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk, appreciated the risk, and voluntarily chose to encounter it.19
No. There is no evidence in the record that the employee voluntarily chose to encounter a known risk.20 The employee testified that he did not know his coemployee's foot remained on the pedal and did not know the machine could double cycle without stopping at the top.21 While the employee exclaimed after the injury that he should not have reached through the machine, no evidence permits an inference that he was fully aware of the machine's operation and yet chose to reach in anyway.22
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct on assumption of risk.23
Whether the jury’s award of $40,000 damages was excessive?24
The trial court enjoys broad discretion when deciding whether a new trial should be granted on grounds of excessive damages, and its determination will be upheld when supported by evidence of special damages, multiple operations, extended work absence, pain, and lasting disability.25
No. There were between eight thousand and nine thousand dollars of special damages, two operations, a year’s absence from work, evidence of extreme pain, and evidence of a continuing fifteen percent disability despite current employment.26 In light of these facts the trial court reasonably concluded that forty thousand dollars was not excessive.
The jury’s award of forty thousand dollars in damages was not excessive.27
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant contribution or indemnity to Cincinnati?28
A third-party tortfeasor may obtain contribution from a negligent employer in proportion to the employer’s percentage of causal negligence. The contribution may not exceed the employer’s total workers’ compensation liability to the plaintiff. This limited remedy secures equitable loss allocation while preserving the employer’s statutory interest in paying no more than the compensation schedule.29
Yes. Cincinnati sought indemnity chiefly because it had offered safety devices that Hutchinson declined, yet the jury’s unchallenged finding that Cincinnati was twenty-five percent negligent precludes shifting the entire loss through indemnity.30 The prior rule denying contribution for lack of common liability lacks continuing persuasive force because contribution is a flexible equitable remedy designed to accomplish fair allocation of loss among parties.31 The equitable merit of Cincinnati’s claim is plain: it has been forced to bear the entire burden of the thirty-four thousand dollar judgment despite being only twenty-five percent negligent while the sixty-percent negligent employer remains available.32
Contribution is therefore required in an amount proportional to Hutchinson’s percentage of negligence but not exceeding its total workers’ compensation liability.33
The trial court erred in refusing contribution to Cincinnati, and the judgment must be reversed with instructions to grant limited contribution from Hutchinson.34