352 U.S. 249 (1957)
In 1950, two antitrust actions were filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.1 Rohlfing involved 87 plaintiffs, all operators of independent retail shoe repair shops, suing six named defendants consisting of manufacturers, wholesalers, and retail mail order houses and chain operators.2 Shaffer involved six plaintiffs, all wholesalers of shoe repair supplies, suing six defendants including manufacturers, wholesalers of such supplies, and a retail shoe shop chain operator.3 Both complaints charged conspiracy to monopolize and fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act together with price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act.4 Both complaints prayed for injunctive relief, treble damages, and an accounting.5
The cases proved burdensome to District Judge La Buy.6 In Rohlfing alone, 27 pages of the record consisted of docket entries showing that the judge had conducted many hearings on preliminary pleas and motions.7 The original complaint had been twice amended following orders on misjoinder and severance, 14 defendants had been dismissed with prejudice, summary judgment hearings had been held, over 50 depositions had been taken, and multiple hearings had addressed compelling testimony and production of records.8 Several hearings included oral argument and briefs and resulted in the filing of opinions and memoranda by the judge.9
On February 23, 1955, the cases were called on a motion to reset them for trial, with Rohlfing holding the number one position below the black line on the trial list.10 All parties sought an early trial, though plaintiffs requested an adjournment until May.11 The judge observed that it had taken a long time to get the case at issue and that he had heard more motions in this case than any other.12 After plaintiffs estimated a six-week trial, the judge inquired whether the parties could agree to have a master hear it.13 The next day in chambers the judge entered orders of reference sua sponte, declaring that the court was confronted with an extremely congested calendar and that exceptional conditions existed for this reason.14
The orders referred each case to a master to take evidence and report findings of fact and conclusions of law, directed the master to commence trial on a specified date, and required the parties to supply security for costs.15 All parties objected to the references and filed motions to vacate them.16 Upon the judge's refusal to vacate, petitions for mandamus were filed in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit seeking writs ordering the judge to vacate the references.17 The Court of Appeals unanimously concluded it possessed power to issue the writs and, by a divided court, determined that the circumstances required their issuance.18 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.19
Whether the Courts of Appeals possess power to issue writs of mandamus compelling a District Judge to vacate orders referring antitrust cases for trial before a master under Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?20
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), confers on the Courts of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in aid of their jurisdiction, and this power extends to review of interlocutory orders in proper circumstances where the court could at some stage entertain appeals.21
Yes. The Court of Appeals could at some stage of the antitrust proceedings entertain appeals in these cases.22 The references were interlocutory orders entered under Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.23 The power to issue mandamus has long been settled by this Court as a discretionary remedy in aid of jurisdiction.24
The recodification of the All Writs Act in 1948 did not affect the power of the Courts of Appeals to issue writs of mandamus in aid of jurisdiction.25
The Courts of Appeals possess power to issue writs of mandamus to compel a District Judge to vacate such orders of reference.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan dissented, maintaining that the issue was not whether Judge La Buy’s order was reviewable by the Court of Appeals but whether review should have awaited final decision in the cause or whether the order was reviewable before final decision by way of a petition under the All Writs Act for the issuance of a writ of mandamus addressed to it.27 He did not agree that the writ directing Judge La Buy to vacate the order of reference was within the bounds of the discretionary power of the Court of Appeals to issue an extraordinary writ under the All Writs Act.28 The case before the Court of Appeals was not a case where a court had exceeded or refused to exercise its jurisdiction.29
Nor did Judge La Buy’s order of reference present the Court of Appeals with a case where appellate review would be defeated if a writ did not issue.30 The litigants may suffer added expense and possible delay in obtaining a decision as a consequence of the reference, but that inconvenience is one which Congress contemplated in providing that only final judgments should be reviewable.31
Whether the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit properly exercised that power by issuing writs of mandamus in these consolidated cases?32
Mandamus should issue only in exceptional circumstances showing a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power, and references to masters under Rule 53(b) are not to displace the court but to aid in specific judicial duties, with calendar congestion alone insufficient to justify reference of entire antitrust cases including liability issues.33
Yes. The references amounted to little less than an abdication of the judicial function depriving the parties of a trial before the court on the basic issues involved in the litigation.34 The judge referred both suits to a master on the general issue even though he was well informed as to the nature of the antitrust litigation from numerous prior hearings.35 Neither the existence of the alleged conspiracy nor the question of liability had been determined in either case, and these issues were included in the references.36
The exceptional circumstances here warrant the use of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.37
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit properly exercised its power by issuing the writs of mandamus in these consolidated cases.38