174 U.S. 47 (1899)
Kirby was indicted in the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the District of South Dakota under the act of Congress of March 3, 1875.1
The first count of the indictment stated that on June 7, 1896, at Highmore, Thomas J. Wallace, Ed. Baxter and Frank King feloniously broke into a post office of the United States and stole 3750 two-cent postage stamps, 1266 one-cent postage stamps, 140 four-cent postage stamps, 250 five-cent postage stamps, 80 eight-cent postage stamps, and United States Treasury notes, national bank notes, silver certificates, gold certificates, silver, nickel and copper coins of the value of $58.19.23
The count further alleged that Wallace, Baxter and King were severally indicted and convicted of that offense and had been duly sentenced.4 The indictment charged that on June 9, 1896, at Sioux Falls, Kirby feloniously received and had in his possession a portion of those postage stamps with intent to convert the same to his own use and gain, knowing they had been stolen.5
Wallace and Baxter each pleaded guilty and was sentenced to four years in the penitentiary at hard labor. King pleaded not guilty, was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary at hard labor.6 At Kirby's trial the government offered in evidence the record of the convictions of Wallace, Baxter and King.7 The court admitted the record over Kirby's objection that the 1875 act was unconstitutional insofar as it made those convictions conclusive evidence that the property had been stolen.8
The court instructed the jury that the record made a prima facie case that the property was stolen from the post office at Highmore and that, in the absence of contrary evidence, the jury could find the property was stolen as alleged.9 The jury returned a verdict of guilty against Kirby.10
Whether the act of March 3, 1875, is unconstitutional to the extent it makes the conviction of the principal felons conclusive evidence in the prosecution of the receiver that the property of the United States had been embezzled, stolen or purloined?11
The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him.12 This guarantee prohibits a statute from authorizing the use of a judgment from a separate prosecution, to which the accused was not a party and in which he had no right to participate, as conclusive or prima facie evidence of an essential fact against him.13
Yes. The act of March 3, 1875, violates the Confrontation Clause because it permitted the record of Wallace, Baxter, and King's convictions to serve as conclusive evidence that the postage stamps were stolen from the United States in Kirby's separate trial.14 Kirby was not present when Wallace and Baxter pleaded guilty or when King was tried, had no right to cross-examine the witnesses against them, and could not introduce evidence of their innocence.15 The government introduced only that record to prove the stamps had been stolen, and the trial court instructed the jury that the record established a prima facie case on that element with no contrary evidence presented.16
The presumption of innocence required the government to prove every element, including that the property was stolen, beyond a reasonable doubt through witnesses confronting Kirby, yet the statute and the court's application relieved the government of that burden by shifting the proof to the prior record alone.17
The provision of the act of March 3, 1875, declaring that the judgment against the principal felons shall be conclusive evidence in the prosecution against the receiver is unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause.18
Whether the record of the convictions of Wallace, Baxter and King was admissible in evidence against Kirby to establish that the property described in the indictment had been stolen from the United States?19
A judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution is admissible only against the parties to that proceeding.20 It cannot be received in a separate prosecution against a non-party to prove an essential fact such as the theft of property.21 The non-party had no opportunity to confront the witnesses or participate in the prior trial.22
No. The record of Wallace, Baxter, and King's convictions was not admissible against Kirby to prove the stamps were stolen because Kirby had no connection to their case, was not entitled to be represented there, and could not cross-examine any witnesses or challenge their pleas of guilty.23 With that record excluded, the government presented no other evidence that the property had been stolen from the United States, yet the trial court admitted the record over Kirby's constitutional objection and instructed the jury that it made a prima facie case on the theft element.24
The fundamental error was treating the prior convictions as competent proof of the underlying fact in Kirby's distinct prosecution for receiving stolen property, which the Confrontation Clause forbids.25
The record of the convictions of Wallace, Baxter and King was not admissible against Kirby to establish that the property had been stolen from the United States.26
Whether the indictment sufficiently alleged that the United States owned the postage stamps at the time they were received by Kirby?27
An indictment charging receipt of stolen property of the United States is sufficient if it alleges that the property belonged to the United States when stolen.28 The defendant received it knowing it had been stolen.29 The larceny does not change ownership.30 The pleading need not separately aver continued ownership at the moment of receipt.31
Yes. The indictment alleged that the postage stamps were the property of the United States when Wallace, Baxter, and King feloniously stole them on June 7, 1896, and that Kirby received those same stamps on June 9, 1896, knowing they had been stolen.32 The two-day interval and the explicit reference to the stamps as the same ones previously stolen sufficiently showed they remained outside the possession of the United States when Kirby received them.33
Ownership at the time of the theft plus the allegation that Kirby received the stolen stamps with knowledge of the theft adequately charged the federal ownership element required by the statute.34
The indictment sufficiently alleged that the United States owned the postage stamps at the time they were received by Kirby.35
Whether the indictment was required to state from whom Kirby received the stamps or that the name of such person was unknown to the grand jury?36
Under a statute that makes receiving stolen property of the United States with knowledge and intent to convert a distinct substantive felony triable independently of the principal's conviction, the indictment need not name the person from whom the property was received.37 It need not allege that the name is unknown.38 The offense is defined by the knowing receipt of stolen property rather than by receipt from any particular individual.39
No. The indictment was not required to state from whom Kirby received the stamps or that the name was unknown to the grand jury.40 The 1875 act punishes the substantive act of receiving or possessing the stolen property with the requisite knowledge and intent, regardless of the identity of the transferor.41 The statute expressly permits trial of the receiver before or after the principal felons and even if the principals are never tried.42 The source of the property is not an essential element that must be pleaded.43
If the identity of the transferor became necessary for Kirby's defense preparation, the trial court could have ordered a bill of particulars.44 Its absence from the indictment did not render the pleading defective.45
The indictment was not required to state from whom Kirby received the stamps or that the name of such person was unknown to the grand jury.46