358 U.S. 625, 79 S. Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550, 1959 AMC 597 (1959)
On November 24, 1948, the respondent's vessel, the S. S. Oregon, was berthed at a pier in the North River, New York City.1 About noon on that day Joseph Kermarec came aboard to visit Henry Yves, a member of the ship’s crew.2 The purpose of the visit was entirely personal.3 Kermarec intended to pay a social call upon Yves and to give him a package to be delivered to a mutual friend in France.4 In accordance with customary practice permitting crew members to entertain guests aboard the vessel, Yves had obtained a pass from the executive officer authorizing Kermarec to come aboard.5
As he started to leave the ship several hours later, Kermarec fell and was injured while descending a stairway.6 Kermarec brought an action for personal injuries in the District Court for the Southern District of New York.7 He alleged that his fall had been caused by the defective manner in which a canvas runner had been tacked to the stairway.8 He claimed unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligence on the part of its crew.9 Federal jurisdiction was invoked by reason of the diverse citizenship of the parties, and a jury trial was demanded.10
The district judge was of the view that the substantive law of New York was applicable.11 Accordingly, he eliminated the unseaworthiness claim from the case and instructed the jury that Kermarec was a gratuitous licensee who could recover only if the defendant had failed to warn him of a dangerous condition within its actual knowledge, and only if Kermarec himself had been entirely free of contributory negligence.12 The jury returned a verdict in Kermarec’s favor.13
Subsequently the trial court granted a motion to set the verdict aside and dismiss the complaint.14 It ruled that there had been a complete failure of proof that the shipowner had actually known that the stairway was in a dangerous or defective condition.15 A divided Court of Appeals affirmed.16 The opinion of that court does not make clear whether affirmance was based upon agreement with the trial judge that New York law was applicable.17 It also does not make clear whether affirmance rested upon a determination that the controlling legal principles would in any event be no different under maritime law.18 Certiorari was granted to examine both of these issues.19
Whether the substantive law of New York or federal maritime law governs the rights and liabilities arising from conduct aboard a vessel in navigable waters?20
The legal rights and liabilities arising from conduct aboard a ship upon navigable waters are within the full reach of the admiralty jurisdiction and measurable by the standards of maritime law.21 This principle applies even when the plaintiff selects a federal forum on the basis of diversity of citizenship and exercises the right to a jury trial.22
No. The district court committed error by concluding that New York law controlled the outcome of this dispute.23
Kermarec was injured aboard a ship upon navigable waters.24 It was there that the conduct of which he complained occurred.25 As a result, admiralty jurisdiction encompasses the legal rights and liabilities at issue, and maritime law supplies the governing standards by which those rights and liabilities are measured.26 The same conclusion follows when a plaintiff invokes diversity jurisdiction in federal court and requests a jury trial.27 Any prior uncertainty on this point was resolved by prior precedent establishing that the result remains unchanged under maritime standards.28
Federal maritime law governs the rights and liabilities in this case rather than the substantive law of New York.29
Whether admiralty law recognizes the common-law distinctions between invitees and licensees in measuring the duty of care a shipowner owes to a social visitor aboard the vessel?30
A shipowner owes to all who are on board for purposes not inimical to his legitimate interests the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances of each case.31 Admiralty law does not import the common-law distinctions between invitees and licensees, which originated in a land-based feudal system alien to maritime traditions of simplicity and practicality.32
No. The distinctions which the common law draws between licensee and invitee were inherited from a culture deeply rooted to the land.33
In an effort to do justice in an industrialized urban society, modern common-law courts have formulated increasingly subtle verbal refinements and created subclassifications among traditional categories.34 Yet even within a single jurisdiction these classifications have produced confusion and conflict.35 For the admiralty law at this late date to import such conceptual distinctions would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality.36 The incorporation of such concepts appears particularly unwarranted when it is remembered that they originated under a legal system in which status depended almost entirely upon the nature of the individual's estate with respect to real property.37 That legal system is in that respect entirely alien to the law of the sea.38
Admiralty law does not recognize the common-law distinctions between invitees and licensees; the shipowner owes the duty of exercising reasonable care under the circumstances to a social visitor such as Kermarec.39
Whether an erroneous jury instruction on contributory negligence under New York law prejudiced the plaintiff when the jury returned a verdict in his favor?40
Contributory negligence on the part of a plaintiff is to be considered only in mitigation of damages under maritime law.41 An erroneous instruction that contributory negligence operates as a complete bar does not prejudice the plaintiff when the jury returns a verdict in his favor.42 This is because the verdict necessarily establishes that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence even in the slightest degree.43
No. Although the district judge was clearly in error when he instructed the jury that contributory negligence would operate as a complete bar to recovery, the error did not prejudice Kermarec.44 The jury should have been told instead that Kermarec's contributory negligence was to be considered only in mitigation of damages.45 By returning a verdict in his favor, the jury necessarily found that Kermarec had not in fact been guilty of contributory negligence even in the slightest degree.46 The factual issues were therefore resolved in his favor under instructions less favorable to him than should have been given.47
The erroneous jury instruction on contributory negligence did not prejudice the plaintiff because the jury's verdict established the absence of any contributory negligence.48
Whether a claim for unseaworthiness is available to a person aboard a vessel solely to make a social visit to a crew member?49
An action for unseaworthiness is unavailable to a person who is not a member of the ship's company.50 It is also unavailable to that broadened class of workmen to whom the admiralty law has extended the absolute right to a seaworthy ship.51 A social visitor aboard the vessel solely to visit a friend does not qualify for this protection.52
No. Kermarec was not a member of the ship's company, nor of that broadened class of workmen to whom the admiralty law has latterly extended the absolute right to a seaworthy ship.53 Kermarec was aboard not to perform ship's work, but simply to visit a friend.54 The district court therefore correctly eliminated the unseaworthiness claim from the case even though the basis for its action was inappropriate.55 The jury's resolution of the factual issues under the negligence standard entitled Kermarec to judgment once the proper maritime duty of reasonable care was applied.56
A claim for unseaworthiness is not available to a person aboard a vessel solely to make a social visit to a crew member.57