749 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
Kelsey-Hayes Company manufactures brake assemblies sold to automobile manufacturers including Chrysler and Ford.1 For several years prior to 1987, Galtaco Redlaw Castings Corporation supplied castings to Kelsey-Hayes for incorporation into those assemblies.2 In 1987, the parties signed a three-year requirements contract.3 Under the contract, Galtaco was to serve as the sole source of specific types of castings through April 1990 at fixed prices for 1987 and scheduled reductions for 1988 and 1989.4 Galtaco also supplied additional castings under indefinite-duration blanket purchase orders.5
By spring 1989, Galtaco had experienced continued monetary losses, including $2,410,000 in foundry operations for the seven months ending April 1989.6 On May 10, 1989, Galtaco's board decided to discontinue foundry operations. Galtaco offered its customers, including Kelsey-Hayes, to keep the foundries operating for several months in return for a 30 percent price increase effective May 15, 1989.7 Kelsey-Hayes determined that it would require 18 to 24 weeks to secure alternative sources.8 Refusing the offer would shut down Chrysler and Ford assembly plants, with Ford likely halting a vehicle line after five to ten days without parts.9
On May 12, 1989, Kelsey-Hayes accepted the 30 percent increase without reserving rights under the 1987 contract.10 On June 9, 1989, Galtaco demanded a further 30 percent increase to offset rising fixed costs after other customers had secured alternatives. Kelsey-Hayes accepted this second increase without reserving rights, as it still lacked an alternate supply.11
Between May 15 and August 30, 1989, Galtaco made 282 shipments to Kelsey-Hayes before closing its foundries.12 Kelsey-Hayes accepted all shipments and paid for the first 197 according to the 1989 terms but did not pay for 84 of the remaining shipments, the price of which approximated $2 million in increases.13 Kelsey-Hayes strenuously protested Galtaco's actions as a breach of the 1987 contract but did not explicitly state it would sue.14
Kelsey-Hayes sued Galtaco for breach of the 1987 contract and for a declaratory judgment that it need not pay the 1989 price increases.15 Galtaco moved for summary judgment on Kelsey-Hayes' claims and on its own counterclaim for the unpaid amounts.16 Kelsey-Hayes moved for leave to file a second amended complaint to address the purchase orders.17
Whether Kelsey-Hayes presented sufficient evidence that the 1989 agreements were executed under duress?18
Under Michigan law, entering a superseding, inconsistent agreement covering the same subject matter rescinds an earlier contract and operates as a waiver of any claim for breach of the earlier contract not expressly reserved.19 However, a subsequent contract or modification is invalid and therefore does not supersede an earlier contract when the subsequent contract was entered into under duress.20 A contract is voidable if a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by another party that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative.21 Economic duress can exist in the absence of an illegal threat; the threat must merely be wrongful.22
Yes. Galtaco threatened to breach its 1987 contract with Kelsey-Hayes and go out of business, stopping production and delivery of castings, unless Kelsey-Hayes agreed to significant price hikes of 30 percent and then another 30 percent.23 Kelsey-Hayes contacted six other casting manufacturers but none were able to immediately provide an alternate source of castings to meet its delivery requirements, and it would require 18 to 24 weeks to secure alternatives.24 Kelsey-Hayes strenuously protested Galtaco's actions as a breach of the 1987 contract, putting Galtaco on notice that the 1989 agreements were agreed to under duress.25
Kelsey-Hayes has presented sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of the facts to conclude the 1989 agreements were executed under duress.26
Whether Galtaco is entitled to summary judgment on Kelsey-Hayes' claims and its counterclaim?27
Summary judgment is denied when the nonmoving party presents sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on a dispositive defense such as duress that would render the superseding agreements invalid.28
No. Kelsey-Hayes presented sufficient evidence creating a triable issue on whether the 1989 agreements were executed under duress. The evidence showed Galtaco threatened to stop shipments unless price increases were accepted. Kelsey-Hayes had no reasonable alternative because alternative sources would take 18 to 24 weeks and its customers would be forced to shut down production. Because the 1989 agreements may be invalid due to duress, they do not supersede the 1987 contract.29
Therefore, Galtaco is not entitled to summary judgment on Kelsey-Hayes' claims for breach of the 1987 contract or on Galtaco's counterclaim for the unpaid price increases.30
Galtaco's motion for summary judgment is denied.31
Whether Kelsey-Hayes should be granted leave to file a second amended complaint?32
Leave to amend a complaint shall be freely given when justice so requires, particularly where both parties overlooked the terminable nature of the purchase orders and no prejudice to the opposing party has been shown.33
Yes. It appears that in negotiating the 1989 agreements both parties overlooked the terminable nature of the purchase orders and failed to distinguish castings covered by the 1987 contract and castings covered by the purchase orders. Galtaco opposed the amendment on grounds that it was not based on newly discovered facts, that it was an attempt to delay adjudication, and that it would be prejudiced by additional discovery. None of these contentions have merit.34
Therefore, Kelsey-Hayes should be granted leave to file a second amended complaint.35
Kelsey-Hayes' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is granted.36