487 U.S. 450 (1988)
North Dakota is a sparsely populated State with many people living on isolated farms and ranches.1 As late as the mid-20th century some children attended one-room schools where a single teacher instructed twenty or more pupils in all primary grades under crowded conditions.2 Beginning in 1947 the legislature authorized and encouraged thinly populated districts to reorganize into larger units so education could be provided more efficiently.3 Reorganization proposals must include provisions for transporting students, and once adopted those transportation provisions can be changed only with voter approval.4
Appellee Dickinson Public Schools serves a relatively populous area and has chosen not to reorganize.5 Until 1973 it provided free bus service with pickup points often at considerable distances from students' homes.6 After a plebiscite of bus users, the district instituted door-to-door service.7 The district began charging $97 per year for one child or $150 per year for two children.8 Such fees covered approximately 11 percent of the cost with the remainder from state and local tax revenues.9 In 1979 the legislature enacted a statute expressly authorizing nonreorganized districts to charge fees for bus service not exceeding the estimated cost to the district.10
Appellants are Sarita Kadrmas, a Dickinson schoolchild, and her mother Paula.11 The family lives about 16 miles from Sarita's school.12 Mr. Kadrmas works sporadically in the oil fields and the family's annual income at the time of trial was at or near the poverty level.13 Until 1985 the family paid the annual bus fee.14 After falling behind on bills the family refused to sign a contract for the 1985 school year.15 The bus no longer stopped for Sarita.16 The family arranged private transportation at a cost exceeding $1,000.17 Sarita continued to attend school.18 In the spring of 1987 Paula Kadrmas signed contracts and made partial payments for the remainder of the 1986 year and for 1987.19
In September 1985 appellants filed an action in state court against Dickinson Public Schools and district officials seeking to enjoin collection of any fee for bus service.20 The action was dismissed on the merits.21 After rejecting a state-law challenge, which is not at issue here, the court considered appellants’ claim that the busing fee violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.23
Whether the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State to allow some local school boards, but not others, to assess a fee for transporting pupils between their homes and the public schools?24
Unless a statute provokes strict judicial scrutiny because it interferes with a fundamental right, or discriminates against a suspect class, it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.25 The Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the statute's classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.26 Social and economic legislation carries a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.27
No. The court applied rational basis review because the statute is purely economic legislation that does not interfere with a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class.28 The fee is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of allocating limited resources.29 The distinction between reorganized and nonreorganized districts serves the legitimate objective of promoting reorganization by alleviating parental concerns regarding the cost of student transportation in the reorganized district.30
The Equal Protection Clause does not forbid a State to allow some local school boards, but not others, to assess a fee for transporting pupils between their homes and the public schools.31
Whether a school district's user fee for bus service unconstitutionally deprives those who cannot afford to pay it of minimum access to education?32
Unless a statute provokes strict judicial scrutiny because it interferes with a fundamental right, or discriminates against a suspect class, it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Education is not a fundamental right and classifications based on wealth alone do not trigger strict scrutiny.33 The court has not extended Plyler v. Doe beyond its unique circumstances.34
No. The court declined to apply strict or heightened scrutiny because the user fee does not penalize illegal conduct by parents and does not create a subclass of illiterates.35 Sarita Kadrmas continued to attend school during the time that she was denied access to the school bus. The family found a private alternative although it cost more than ten times the district fee.36 The fee is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of allocating limited resources and encouraging local districts to provide optional bus service without requiring general revenues to subsidize it for all users.37
The user fee does not unconstitutionally deprive those who cannot afford to pay it of minimum access to education.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the case involves state action that places a special burden on poor families in their pursuit of education.39 For children living far from school imposing a fee for transportation is no different in practical effect from imposing a fee directly for education.40 The fee necessarily fell more heavily upon the poor than upon wealthier members of the community.41
The state's rationale based entirely on fiscal considerations is insubstantial and does not justify the discrimination.42
Whether the distinction drawn by the 1979 statute between reorganized and nonreorganized school districts violates the Equal Protection Clause?43
The Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the statute's classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. Social and economic legislation carries a presumption of rationality that can only be overcome by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality. The court will not overturn such a statute unless the varying treatment is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that the legislature's actions were irrational.44
No. The court held that appellants failed to carry the heavy burden of demonstrating that the challenged statute is both arbitrary and irrational.45 The distinction reflects voluntary agreements made during the history of North Dakota's reorganization process.46 The one established difference is that in nonreorganized districts local school boards may impose a bus service user fee on their own authority while voter approval would be required in reorganized districts.47 Even if the state forbade reorganized districts to charge fees.
The legislature could conceivably have believed that such a policy would serve the legitimate purpose of fulfilling the reasonable expectations of those residing in districts with free busing arrangements imposed by reorganization plans.48
The distinction drawn by the 1979 statute between reorganized and nonreorganized school districts does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.49
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the state supreme court had identified the actual purpose of the geographic discrimination as encouraging reorganization.50 After voters in a school district have had a fair opportunity to decide whether or not to reorganize, there is no longer any justification for allowing the nonreorganized districts to place an obstacle in the paths of poor children seeking an education in some parts of the State that has been removed in other parts of the State.51