463 U.S. 745 (1983)
In 1976, Richard Butts was robbed at knifepoint by four men in the lobby of an apartment building; he was badly beaten and his watch and money were taken.1 Butts informed a Housing Authority detective that he recognized one of his assailants as a person known to him as “Froggy,” and gave a physical description of the person to the detective. The following day the detective arrested respondent David Barnes, who is known as “Froggy.”2
Respondent was charged with first- and second-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and third-degree larceny.3 The prosecution rested primarily upon Butts’ testimony and his identification of respondent.4 During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Butts whether he had ever undergone psychiatric treatment; however, no offer of proof was made on the substance or relevance of the question after the trial judge sua sponte instructed Butts not to answer. At the close of trial, the trial judge declined to give an instruction on accessorial liability requested by the defense. The jury convicted respondent of first- and second-degree robbery and second-degree assault.5
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department, assigned Michael Melinger to represent respondent on appeal. Respondent sent Melinger a letter listing several claims that he felt should be raised. Included were claims that Butts’ identification testimony should have been suppressed, that the trial judge improperly excluded psychiatric evidence, and that respondent’s trial counsel was ineffective. Respondent also enclosed a copy of a pro se brief he had written.6 In a return letter, Melinger accepted some but rejected most of the suggested claims, stating that they would not aid respondent in obtaining a new trial and that they could not be raised on appeal because they were not based on evidence in the record. Melinger then listed seven potential claims of error that he was considering including in his brief, and invited respondent’s “reflections and suggestions” with regard to those seven issues. The record does not reveal any response to this letter.7 Melinger’s brief to the Appellate Division concentrated on three of the seven points he had raised in his letter to respondent: improper exclusion of psychiatric evidence, failure to suppress Butts’ identification testimony, and improper cross-examination of respondent by the trial judge.8 In addition, Melinger submitted respondent’s own pro se brief.9 Thereafter, respondent filed two more pro se briefs, raising three more of the seven issues Melinger had identified.10 At oral argument, Melinger argued the three points presented in his own brief, but not the arguments raised in the pro se briefs.11 On May 22, 1978, the Appellate Division affirmed by summary order. The New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.12
On August 8, 1978, respondent filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Respondent raised five claims of error, including ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The District Court held the claims to be without merit and dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.13 In 1980, respondent filed two more challenges in state court, including a petition in the New York Court of Appeals for reconsideration of that court’s denial of leave to appeal in which respondent for the first time claimed that his appellate counsel, Melinger, had provided ineffective assistance. The New York Court of Appeals denied the application.14 Respondent then returned to United States District Court for the second time, with a petition for habeas corpus based on the claim of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. The District Court concluded that respondent had exhausted his state remedies, but dismissed the petition. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.15
Whether defense counsel assigned to prosecute an appeal from a criminal conviction has a constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant?16
The Constitution does not require appointed appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant.17 Counsel exercises professional judgment in selecting issues after examining the record, researching the law, and marshaling arguments, and a per se rule compelling counsel to press all colorable claims suggested by the client would undermine effective advocacy.18
No.19
In 1976 Richard Butts was robbed at knifepoint by four men in an apartment lobby and identified his assailant to police as a person known as Froggy, leading to the arrest of respondent David Barnes.20 Barnes was charged with first- and second-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and third-degree larceny; the prosecution relied primarily on Butts's testimony and identification.21 At trial the judge excluded psychiatric evidence and declined to instruct on accessorial liability, and the jury convicted Barnes on three counts.22
The Appellate Division assigned Michael Melinger to represent Barnes on appeal.23 Barnes sent Melinger a letter listing claims including suppression of the identification, improper exclusion of psychiatric evidence, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and enclosed a pro se brief.24 Melinger rejected most suggested claims as not supported by the record, proposed seven issues of his own, and ultimately filed a brief addressing three of them while submitting Barnes's pro se brief; at oral argument Melinger presented only the three issues in his brief.25 The Appellate Division affirmed, the New York Court of Appeals denied leave, and Barnes's first federal habeas petition was dismissed.26
In 1980 Barnes filed a second habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance by appellate counsel.27 The district court dismissed the petition.28 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that counsel must argue every colorable point requested by the client to the full extent of professional ability.29 Applying the rule to these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that Melinger's selective presentation reflected reasonable professional judgment rather than a constitutional violation, because forcing counsel to raise every requested nonfrivolous issue would dilute stronger arguments and contradict the advocate's role recognized in Anders v. California.30
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that appointed appellate counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment without joining the opinion of the Court.32 He agreed that counsel's performance satisfied the constitutional standard of competence and provided an adequate opportunity to present claims fairly.33 He observed that as an ethical matter an attorney should argue all nonfrivolous claims the client insists upon after receiving counsel's best advice, yet this ethical preference does not attain constitutional dimension.34
He added that counsel's refusal to raise insisted-upon nonfrivolous claims would constitute cause and prejudice excusing procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes.35
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall.36 He maintained that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel encompasses the defendant's personal authority to decide which nonfrivolous issues to present on appeal.37 Relying on Faretta v. California and Anders v. California, he reasoned that counsel assists the client in making choices that belong to the client rather than making those choices for him.38
He would have remanded for a factual determination whether Barnes had timely insisted that Melinger brief the nonfrivolous issues identified by the Court of Appeals.39