527 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1988)
James Barrow owned title to and built a residence on four and one-half acres of land prior to his marriage to Donna Barrow.1 This property became their residence for the ten years they were married.2 In a dissolution proceeding, the final judgment awarded an undivided one-half interest in the property as alimony to Donna Barrow.3 The final judgment made no provision for possession by either party and made no direction regarding the sale or disposition of the property.4
Donna Barrow moved her family to Idaho immediately after separating from the petitioner.5 Several years later, she initiated this proceeding with a complaint seeking partition of the former marital home.6 James Barrow counterclaimed for one-half the amounts expended by him for taxes, insurance, and other services necessary to maintain and improve the property.7 Donna Barrow responded by seeking one-half the fair rental value for the period James Barrow had occupied the home after the parties' dissolution.8
Before the trial court, James Barrow asserted that his former wife did not object to his sole occupancy.9 He stated that she was not excluded from the premises.10 He further asserted that he did not hold the premises adversely or hostilely to her title.11 He also claimed that he had never refused her access to the property.12 Donna Barrow responded that James Barrow had occupied the home throughout the dissolution proceedings.13 She noted that he had changed the locks on the doors.14 She further stated that he had obtained a new telephone number.15 She also indicated that he had declined to respond to her letters.16
In considering Donna Barrow's claim that she was entitled to fair rental value of the property, the trial court concluded that the Second District's decision in Adkins required approval of her claim.17 The trial court found Donna Barrow entitled to $8,254.50.18 This sum represented one-half of the determined fair rental value of the property for the period beginning August 5, 1983, the date of entry of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage, and ending January 15, 1986, the date of the nonjury trial in this partition proceeding.19 The trial court further found James Barrow entitled to $2,591.00.20 This sum represented one-half the property taxes and insurance premiums.21 The trial court considered the claim of the respondent as an independent claim and not solely as a setoff.22 The record establishes that the trial judge based his ruling on the Second District's decision in Adkins, even though he apparently did not agree with it.23
On appeal, the district court, in a simple three-line opinion, stated its affirmance was on the authority of Adkins v. Edwards.24 In so doing, the district court noted its conflict with Vandergrift v. Buckley.25 The Supreme Court granted review of the petition to resolve the acknowledged conflict with Coggan v. Coggan, Vandergrift v. Buckley, and Seesholts v. Beers.26
Whether in partition actions the rules regarding notice of ouster from a former marital home must be applied differently for cotenants who are former spouses than for other cotenants?27
No. The established facts show that James Barrow owned the property prior to the marriage and Donna Barrow received an undivided one-half interest as alimony in the dissolution judgment that made no provision for possession or sale.28 Donna Barrow moved to Idaho immediately after separation, James Barrow remained in sole occupancy, and he asserted without contradiction that she was never excluded, never refused access, and did not object to his occupancy.29 The trial court expressly found voluntary relinquishment with no demand for rent or possession and no communication of an adverse claim.30
The rules regarding notice of ouster apply identically to former spouses and other cotenants; no special exception is created for former marital property.31
Whether a cotenant out of possession may obtain an accounting of rental value from the cotenant in possession of the former marital home without evidence that the adverse holding was communicated to the cotenant out of possession?32
No. Under the established facts Donna Barrow sought one-half the fair rental value of $8,254.50 as an independent claim rather than solely as a setoff.33 Yet the record contains no evidence that James Barrow ever communicated an exclusive or adverse claim.34 The trial judge found only voluntary relinquishment and the absence of any demand for rent or possession.35
A cotenant out of possession may not obtain an accounting of rental value absent evidence that the adverse holding was communicated to the cotenant out of possession.36
Whether a claim by a cotenant in possession for contribution toward maintenance and improvement expenses may be offset by the reasonable rental value of the property?
Yes. The established facts reflect that James Barrow counterclaimed for one-half of taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses totaling $2,591.00.37 Donna Barrow asserted a rental-value claim of $8,254.50.38 Under the established exception the rental value may offset the contribution claim even though no ouster occurred.39
A claim by a cotenant in possession for contribution toward maintenance and improvement expenses may be offset by the reasonable rental value of the property to the extent it exceeds the cotenant's proportionate share.40