314 U.S. 556 (1942)
In February 1922, Helena Day Snyder executed an instrument on stationery of the Savoy Hotel in London two days before her marriage to John J. McGlone.1 The instrument stated that she renounced all right, title and interest in any estate of her husband to be.2
On August 21, 1930, McGlone executed a will that recited Helena’s waiver but nevertheless made a bequest of $2,000 to her.3 Section 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law had been enacted on March 29, 1929, but did not become effective until September 1, 1930.4
McGlone executed a codicil on July 6, 1934, which had the effect of bringing his will within the provisions of the new law.5 Helena sought to exercise the right of election under the statute, precipitating litigation in which the instrument was pleaded as a bar.6
The Surrogate held that the instrument was not a contract.7 The Appellate Division held that it was.8 The New York Court of Appeals assumed without deciding that it was a binding contract but held that section 18 conferred a right of election upon Helena.9 Helena died in the course of the litigation.10
Whether § 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law works an impairment of the obligation of contract, forbidden by Article I, § 10 of the Constitution?11
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.12
No. The rule is applied to the ESTABLISHED FACTS as follows. The instrument was executed by Helena in 1922, but McGlone's codicil in 1934 brought the will under the new law effective in 1930. The statute required acknowledgment for waiver, which was not present. Therefore, the statute did not impair any obligation because the testator voluntarily triggered its application through his codicil.13
Section 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law does not work an impairment of the obligation of contract forbidden by Article I, § 10 of the Constitution.14
Whether § 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law works a deprivation of property without due process, forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment?15
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property within its jurisdiction.
No. Applying the rule to the ESTABLISHED FACTS, the right of election was conferred by statute and could be conditioned on formalities such as acknowledgment. The codicil executed by McGlone after the effective date made the statute applicable, and no property right was deprived without due process because the legislature has broad power over testamentary disposition.16
Section 18 of the New York Decedent Estate Law does not work a deprivation of property without due process forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.17