110 Mich. 676, 68 N.W. 990 (1896)
The petitioner is serving his second term in the state prison at Jackson.1 His first term expired April 19, 1893.2 His second term began February 10, 1894, and was for three years.3
Act No. 118, Pub. Acts 1893, took effect May 26, 1893.4 Section 33 of that act provides that convicts who have no infractions of the rules of the prison against them shall be entitled to a reduction from their sentences according to the scale set forth in the statute.5 The statute includes a proviso that a convict serving a second term in the prison shall be entitled to a less favorable reduction.6
If the provisions of this act are applied to the petitioner as now serving his second term, his term will not expire until November 16 of the year in question.7 If he is treated as though serving his first term, he is now entitled to his release.8 The petition reaches the Supreme Court of Michigan before Justice Moore, with the other justices concurring.9
Whether regarding the petitioner as serving his second term under Act No. 118, Pub. Acts 1893, for purposes of good-time sentence reductions, when the second offense occurred after the act took effect, constitutes ex post facto legislation?10
An ex post facto law is one which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.11 The legislature may establish rules for the maintenance of good order in the prison.12 Denying the benefits of good-time reductions to offenders serving second terms does not constitute ex post facto legislation when the law was in effect before the second offense.
No. The act took effect before the petitioner's second conviction, and the penalty imposed is for the offense committed after the act's effective date.13 Because the petitioner is presumed to have known the provisions when committing the second offense, applying the less favorable reduction scale to his second term does not increase the punishment for a prior expiated crime.14 The distinction in good-time benefits is a rule for prison order rather than additional punishment for the first offense.15
The provisions of Act No. 118 do not constitute ex post facto legislation as applied to the petitioner, and he is therefore remanded to continue serving his sentence.16