158 U.S. 564 (1895)
The order of the Circuit Court finding the petitioners guilty of contempt and sentencing them to imprisonment was not a final judgment or decree. The government of the United States has jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acts directly upon each citizen.
While it is a government of enumerated powers, it has full attributes of sovereignty within the limits of those powers, among which are the power over interstate commerce and the power over the transmission of the mails.
The powers thus conferred are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practical exercise by Congressional legislation.
In the exercise of those powers, the United States may remove everything put upon highways, natural or artificial, to obstruct the passage of interstate commerce, or the carrying of the mails.
While it may be competent for the government, through the executive branch and in the use of the entire executive power of the Nation, to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence and the character of any of them, and if such are found to exist or threaten to occur, to invoke the powers of those courts to remove or restrain them, the jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction being recognized from ancient times and by indubitable authority.
Such jurisdiction is not ousted by the fact that the obstructions are accompanied by or consist of acts in themselves violations of the criminal law, or by the fact that the proceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by proceedings in contempt; as the penalty for a violation of such injunction is no substitute for, and no defense to, a prosecution for criminal offenses committed in the course of such violation.
The complaint filed in this case clearly shows an existing obstruction of artificial highways for the passage of interstate commerce and the transmission of the mails, not only temporarily existing, but threatening to continue, and under it, the Circuit Court had power to issue its process of injunction.
Such an injunction having been issued and served upon the defendants, the Circuit Court had authority to inquire whether its orders had been disobeyed, and, when it found that they had been disobeyed, to proceed under Rev. Stat. § 725 and to enter the order of punishment complained of.
The Circuit Court having full jurisdiction in the premises, its findings as to the act of disobedience are not open to review on habeas corpus in this or any other court.
The court enters into no examination of the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, on which the Circuit Court mainly relied to sustain its jurisdiction, but it must not be understood that it dissents from the conclusions of that court in reference to the scope of that act, but simply that it prefers to rest its judgment on the broader ground discussed in its opinion, believing it important that the principles underlying it should be fully stated and fully affirmed.
On July 2, 1894, the United States, by Thomas E. Milchrist, district attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, under the direction of Richard Olney, Attorney General, filed their bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois against these petitioners and others. The bill named twenty-two railroad companies and alleged that they were engaged in interstate commerce and subject to the Interstate Commerce Act and other federal laws relating to interstate transportation of passengers and freight. It alleged that the railroads carried many millions of passengers and large quantities of freight into and out of Chicago, that each road carried the mails and was by statute declared a post road, that many were required by special acts of Congress to carry troops and government supplies, and that two were in the hands of receivers.
The bill averred that four defendants were officers of the American Railway Union and that in May 1894 a dispute between the Pullman Palace Car Company and its employees led many employees to leave the company. It charged that the union officers combined to compel an adjustment by creating a boycott against Pullman cars, that they had prevented certain railroads running out of Chicago from operating their trains, and were combining to extend the boycott by causing strikes among employees of railroads attempting to haul Pullman cars. It charged knowledge by the defendants of the necessity of sleeping cars in interstate operations, of contracts between railroads and the Pullman Company, of obligations to carry the mails, and that the defendants conspired to prevent the railroads and receivers from performing their duties as common carriers.
It alleged that the defendants induced railroad employees to leave service or to refuse to perform their duties, issued orders and notifications to union members to abandon service and prevent operation of trains, and asserted they could tie up, paralyze, and break down any railroad or receiver which did not accede to their demands.
Quoting the bill: "And your orator further charges that said defendants aimed and intended, and do now aim and intend, in and by the said conspiracy and combination, to secure unto themselves the entire control of the interstate, industrial, and commercial business in which the population of the city of Chicago and of the other communities along the lines of road of said railways are engaged with each other, and to restrain any and all other persons from any independent control or management of such interstate, industrial, or commercial enterprises save according to the will and with the consent of the defendants."
Further, the bill alleged that defendants Debs, Howard, Rogers, Keliher and others, as officers of the American Railway Union, issued orders causing numerous employees to refuse to obey their employers and to quit service, preventing the railroads and receivers from operating their lines and from transporting the United States mails.
It charged that defendants and unknown persons, by assembling in large numbers and by threats, intimidation, force and violence at stations, yards and rights of way, prevented the railroads from employing replacements, compelled further employees to quit, and prevented remaining employees from performing their duties.
It further charged that defendants, acting under direction of the union officers, at divers times and places, stopped, obstructed, derailed and wrecked engines and trains engaged in interstate commerce and in transporting the mails, by spiking switches, removing spikes and rails, turning switches, displacing or destroying signals, assaulting and disabling switchmen and other employees, and by other unlawful means sought to obtain control over railroad operations.
The bill alleged the obstruction extended to the Union Stock Yards in Chicago, a national center for receiving and distributing livestock and food products on which many parts of the country depended, and that defendants had ordered employees handling the stock-yards' tracks to abandon service, using menaces and intimidation to prevent replacement employees from being hired.
It alleged that, by reason of the combination and conspiracy and the acts done under it, supplies of coal, grain, breadstuffs, vegetables, fruits, meats and other necessaries had been interrupted, markets rendered largely unavailable, dealers and consumers injured, and interstate trade and commerce restrained, obstructed and largely destroyed. The bill charged that defendants threatened to continue this restraint and would, if necessary, tie up and paralyze the operations of every railway in the United States and the industries dependent thereon.
On presentation of the bill an injunction was ordered commanding the defendants and all persons combining with them to desist and refrain from interfering with the business of the named railroads as common carriers between States, from interfering with or stopping any mail, express, passenger or freight trains engaged in interstate commerce or carrying the mails, from injuring or destroying railroad property used in interstate commerce, from entering railroad premises to interfere with interstate trains or property, from injuring tracks or permanent structures, from displacing or extinguishing signals, from spiking or locking switches, from uncoupling or hampering control of cars or engines engaged in interstate commerce, from compelling or inducing employees by threats, intimidation, force or violence to fail to perform duties connected with interstate business or the carriage of the mails, and from ordering, directing, aiding or abetting any person to commit such acts.
The injunction was made binding on the named defendants upon service of the writ or reading it to them, and on defendants whose names were unknown upon service by reading or publication, and upon all others from the time they severally had knowledge of the order and the existence of the injunction.
The injunction was served upon the petitioners (at least those here present). On July 17 the district attorney filed an information for an attachment against the four union officers, and on August 1 a similar information against the other petitioners. A hearing was had before the Circuit Court, and on December 14 the petitioners were found guilty of contempt and sentenced to imprisonment in the county jail for terms varying from three to six months. Having been committed, they applied on January 14, 1895 to this Court for a writ of error and for habeas corpus. The writ of error was denied January 17 on the ground that the order of the Circuit Court was not a final judgment or decree; the habeas corpus petition is now considered.
The case presented by the bill is this: the United States, finding that interstate transportation of persons and property, as well as the carriage of the mails, is forcibly obstructed and that a combination and conspiracy exists to subject the control of such transportation to the will of the conspirators, applied to a federal court sitting in equity for an injunction to restrain such obstruction and prevent execution of the conspiracy. Two questions arise: first, are the relations of the general government to interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails such as to authorize direct interference to prevent forcible obstruction; second, if such authority exists, has a court of equity jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of the performance of that duty?
First.
What are the relations of the general government to interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails? They are those of direct supervision, control, and management. Under our dual system the powers of government are distributed between the States and the Nation, and although the latter is a government of enumerated powers, within those enumerated powers it has all the attributes of sovereignty and acts directly upon the citizen and not through the States.
The government of the Union acts directly on the people and is not dependent on State governments for execution of the great powers assigned to it. Chief Justice Marshall so declared in McCulloch v. Maryland. Decisions of this Court have repeatedly affirmed that the national government may, by physical force exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it, which involves the power to command obedience to its laws and to keep the peace to that extent. This power does not derogate from State power, except where both cannot be executed at the same time, in which event the Constitution provides which shall prevail.
Among the powers expressly given to the national government are the control of interstate commerce and the establishment of post offices and post roads (Art. I, § 8). Congress has exercised its commerce power in numerous statutes affecting railroad interstate transportation, including the act of June 15, 1866 (Rev. Stat. § 5258), authorizing railroads operated by steam to carry passengers, troops, government supplies, mails and freight between States and to connect with roads of other States to form continuous lines; statutes regulating interstate transportation of livestock (Rev. Stat. §§ 4386–4389); the act of May 29, 1884, banning interstate transport of livestock affected with contagious disease; the Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. 4, 1887, and its amendments, creating the Interstate Commerce Commission and empowering courts to enforce its orders; the arbitration act of October 1, 1888; and the act of March 2, 1893 requiring automatic couplers on interstate trains and empowering the Commission to enforce the requirement.
Congress has also by extensive legislation created and organized the national postal system, defining what the mails shall be and prescribing penalties for offenses against it. These powers were not dormant; Congress had assumed direct control and was in full discharge of its duty to regulate interstate commerce and carry the mails.
If States cannot lawfully obstruct interstate commerce, as this Court's jurisprudence holds, it would be absurd to suppose a private association could do what a State could not. The national government, having power and having assumed control over interstate commerce and the mails, may prevent unlawful and forcible interference therewith. Congress could make such interference a federal crime to be punished by indictment, but that is not the only remedy. Reliance solely on criminal prosecution may be inadequate, especially if a large portion of a State's population were united in obstructing interstate commerce; prosecutions within that community might fail. The Constitution's provision that trials of crimes ordinarily be held in the State where committed underscores the potential futility of relying solely on local criminal prosecutions.
The national government is not left impotent. It may employ the strong arm of the Nation, including the army and militia, to enforce its laws, but there is an alternative to resorting immediately to force. The right to abate a public nuisance by force does not exclude the right to seek judicial relief by injunction. Equity has long intervened to restrain public nuisances and to give more adequate relief than the law when irreparable mischief threatens, even where forcible removal would be possible.
As with private actors and with governmental obstruction of waterways, the judiciary may be invoked to remove obstructions of highways of interstate commerce. Numerous authorities uphold equity jurisdiction to enjoin public nuisances and to provide preventive relief where necessary. The power to regulate commerce supplies the basis for federal jurisdiction over artificial highways such as railroads as well as natural highways, because both are channels of interstate commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden and subsequent cases confirm that where commerce goes, national power to protect and enforce its rights follows.
That courts have seldom exercised such jurisdiction in the past does not negate it; the necessity for such interference has been occasional because local authorities have often obtained relief by indictment or other remedies. But equity jurisdiction exists and may be invoked where an urgent necessity and irreparable public injury are shown.
The bill in this case alleged special facts calling for full exercise of court powers: vast national interests affected, forcible interference with interstate commerce and the mails, attempted exercise by individuals of governmental powers, and threatened continuation of these invasions of public rights. Those allegations disclosed a special exigency demanding that the court do all courts can do to protect interstate commerce and the mails.
The difference between public and private nuisance is that the former affects the public at large; the quality of the wrong is the same, and jurisdiction rests on the same principles. Although equity intervenes reluctantly where indictments suffice, the existence of civil relief does not disappear simply because the acts are also criminal; many acts give rise to both civil and criminal remedies.
Second.
Is there any invasion of the constitutional right to trial by jury if a court of equity issues an injunction and enforces it by contempt proceedings? The power of a court to make an order necessarily carries with it the power to enforce obedience to that order; the inquiry into disobedience has been historically and necessarily the special function of the issuing court. To submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would deprive the proceeding of much of its efficiency. Authorities from early English and American practice have consistently recognized that courts of superior jurisdiction are the final judges of contempts arising therein and may punish for disobedience without a jury trial.
Proceedings for contempt to enforce an injunction are not the execution of the criminal laws but the securing of rights adjudged by the court. The fact that the acts enjoined may also be indictable crimes does not deprive the court of its civil remedial powers. Thus the Circuit Court, having issued and served a valid injunction, had authority to inquire whether it had been disobeyed and, upon finding such disobedience, to proceed under Rev. Stat. § 725 to punish by fine or imprisonment.
Counsel argued that equity should not be used against riot or mob violence because such matters require executive or military power and because injunctions cannot suppress mobs; but that argument goes to the wisdom or expediency of invoking judicial process, not to jurisdiction. The record shows the courts' processes were effective: the union's own testimony before the Strike Commission stated that the federal courts' actions ended the strike, not the army, by restraining the union officers from sending orders or telegrams and thereby demoralizing their organization.
The bill was not an attempt to command peacekeeping generally or to restrain people from abandoning employment; it sought only to restrain forcible obstructions of the highways of interstate commerce and the mails. The complaint's facts sufficiently alleged such obstructions.
The Court has given careful attention to the case because of its national importance. Summing up, the Court holds: the United States has jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory and acts directly upon each citizen; within its enumerated powers it possesses attributes of sovereignty; it has power over interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail; these powers have been assumed and exercised by Congress; the Nation may remove obstructions to interstate commerce and the mail, whether by force or by invoking the civil courts; courts have long exercised jurisdiction to restrain obstructions by injunction; such jurisdiction is not ousted because the acts may also be criminal; enforcement by contempt is civil and not a substitute for criminal prosecution; the complaint in this case showed existing and threatened obstruction of artificial highways for interstate commerce and the mails and authorized issuance of the injunction; after issuance and service, the Circuit Court could inquire into disobedience and, finding it, punish under Rev. Stat. § 725; and the Circuit Court's finding of disobedience is not open to review on habeas corpus in this Court.
The Court declines to examine in this opinion the act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, on which the Circuit Court mainly relied, not because the Court disagrees with the Circuit Court's conclusions as to that act's scope, but because the Court rests its judgment on the broader grounds set forth above and affirms the principles underlying the Circuit Court's decision.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.