196 P.3d 1180 (Kan. 2008)
In October 2003, N.T. informed M.P. in New York that she was pregnant with his child. Shortly before Thanksgiving, N.T. traveled to Wichita, Kansas, to visit her parents and decided to remain there. Although N.T. refused to provide M.P. with her address, the couple maintained telephone contact, with M.P.'s cell phone records documenting calls to Wichita beginning November 25, 2003.1
On January 22, 2004, N.T. falsely told M.P. that she had undergone an abortion. Despite M.P.'s continued expressions of doubt, including statements such as "Why do I have a feeling you're lying to me?" and "I know I have a child, I can feel it," telephone contact resumed and continued through the remainder of the pregnancy. N.T. also deceived her family and the adoption agency by claiming the baby had died at delivery and providing false information about the father's identity.2
A.A.T. was born on June 24, 2004, in Wichita. The day after the birth, N.T. directed that the child be given to the adoptive parents. On July 1, 2004, the adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights. N.T. executed an affidavit falsely identifying the putative father and stating he was unwilling to assist during the pregnancy.3
A guardian ad litem appointed for the putative father received and passed on the incorrect information supplied by N.T.4
Notice was published in the New York Post on July 30 and August 6, 2004, using the inaccurate name provided by N.T. No father appeared, and the adoption decree was finalized on August 24, 2004, terminating the natural father's parental rights.5
In late December 2004, N.T. informed M.P. of the birth and adoption. Within six weeks, M.P. retained Kansas counsel and filed an action to set aside the adoption. DNA testing later confirmed M.P.'s paternity of A.A.T. The district court denied the motion to set aside the decree, and the matter was transferred to the Kansas Supreme Court.6
Whether the natural father possessed a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship with his newborn child that entitled him to notice of the adoption proceedings?7
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an unwed biological father acquires a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his child only when he demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood.8 The mere biological link does not suffice.9 The opportunity must be seized promptly through affirmative actions such as providing support or pursuing legal recognition.10
No. The established facts demonstrate that M.P. learned of the pregnancy in October 2003 yet took no affirmative steps to assume parenting responsibilities after N.T. falsely claimed an abortion on January 22, 2004.11 Although M.P. voiced suspicions during telephone conversations and purchased earrings in December 2004, he provided only minimal financial assistance. He failed to contact N.T.'s mother despite available phone records and addresses. He pursued no legal mechanisms such as a New York paternity action or putative father registry before the adoption decree was entered on August 24, 2004.12
The district court found that M.P. should have known and did suspect the continued pregnancy and birth, but his inaction prevented development of the required relationship.13
The natural father did not possess a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship with his newborn child that entitled him to notice of the adoption proceedings.14
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Nuss dissents on the ground that the mother's year-long abortion lies created a unique circumstance.15 The lies must be viewed through the lens of her exclusive constitutional right to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy under Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth.16 This right caused the father reasonably and justifiably to rely on the deception.17
Therefore the father could not be expected to grasp opportunities such as providing support during the balance of the pregnancy.18 The trial court's unchallenged fraud finding confirms this reliance.19 The father did grasp his opportunity interest sufficiently to create a protected liberty interest.20
This case is distinguishable from Lehr and requires notice before termination of rights.21
Justice Beier dissents on the ground that the father's persistent questioning of the mother demonstrated sufficient efforts.22 He provided small sums of money. He immediately and diligently pursued legal remedies upon learning the truth.23
These actions ripened his inchoate interest into a constitutionally protected liberty interest.24 The mother's elaborate scheme of deception prevented him from doing more.25 The majority's requirement of clairvoyance or expensive investigative steps imposes an impossible and biased standard.26
The standard ignores Kansas precedent on maternal interference and the parental preference doctrine.27
Whether the adoption decree is void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) because the natural father did not receive notice of the proceeding?28
A judgment is void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) if the court lacked jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. This includes failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard to a party possessing a protected liberty interest.29
No. M.P. never developed a constitutionally protected liberty interest through affirmative commitment during the pregnancy. The publication notice using the false information supplied by N.T. satisfied statutory requirements under K.S.A. 59-2136 and did not violate due process.30 The district court and parties acted in good faith based on the information available. The absence of actual notice to M.P. therefore did not render the August 24, 2004, decree void.31
The adoption decree is not void under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(4) because the natural father did not receive notice of the proceeding.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rosen joins Justice Beier's dissent in part and would remand for further findings on the applicability of the statutory termination factors. The best interests of the child A.A.T. must be considered as a paramount factor even though the statute in effect at the time did not expressly require it.33 Treating the child as chattel without independent constitutional interests would be inconsistent with Kansas precedent dating back more than a century.
United States Supreme Court recognition establishes that children possess constitutional rights separate from those of their parents.34 The district court should weigh these interests when deciding whether to set aside the adoption after making complete findings under K.S.A. 59-2136(h).
Whether the adoption decree must be set aside under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3) on the basis of fraud committed by the natural mother?35
Relief from a judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3) for fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct requires that the fraud be committed by an adverse party to the proceeding.36
No. N.T. had already relinquished her parental rights and was not an adverse party in the adoption proceeding. The adoptive parents, who filed the petition and acted in good faith without knowledge of the deception, occupied that role.37 The district court correctly determined that fraud by N.T. therefore could not support setting aside the decree under subsection (b)(3).
The adoption decree need not be set aside under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(3) on the basis of fraud committed by the natural mother.38
Whether the adoption decree must be set aside under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) on the basis of newly discovered evidence of the natural father's identity and paternity?39
Relief under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) for newly discovered evidence requires that the evidence could not have been discovered through due diligence in time to move for a new trial. It must also be so material that its introduction would likely have produced a different result.40
No. The district court found that M.P. should have taken action to verify whether N.T. had an abortion. The established facts confirm that reasonable diligence would have revealed the truth through contact with N.T.'s mother, use of phone records showing Wichita calls, or pursuit of available legal remedies in New York.41 The evidence of M.P.'s paternity therefore could have been discovered with minimal diligence before the decree became final. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.42
The adoption decree need not be set aside under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(2) on the basis of newly discovered evidence of the natural father's identity and paternity.43