397 U.S. 337 (1970)
Illinois v. Allen arose from the trial of respondent William Allen in an Illinois state court on an armed robbery charge.1
On August 12, 1956, Allen entered a tavern in Illinois, ordered a drink, and took $200 from the bartender at gunpoint.2 A jury convicted Allen and sentenced him to 10 to 30 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.3 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in People v. Allen, 37 Ill. 2d 167, 226 N.E.2d 1 (1967), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1967.4
Allen later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.5 He alleged that the trial judge had wrongfully removed him from the courtroom and thereby deprived him of his constitutional right to remain present throughout his trial. The district court declined to issue the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed in 1969, with Judge Hastings dissenting.6
The disruptions began on the first day of trial, September 9, 1957.7 Allen had refused court-appointed counsel and elected to represent himself, though the judge directed appointed counsel to sit with him and protect the record.8 During voir dire Allen examined the first juror at great length, then argued abusively with the judge when told to limit questions to juror qualifications.9 He proclaimed that appointed counsel would not act for him, threatened that the judge would be a corpse at lunchtime, tore the attorney's file, and threw the papers on the floor.10 After the judge warned that one more outbreak would result in removal, Allen continued, declaring there would be no trial and that shackles, a straitjacket, and tape would do no good.11
The judge ordered Allen removed and the voir dire continued without him.12 After the noon recess Allen was brought back, complained about the fairness of the proceedings, and stated he wanted his sister and friends present to testify.13 When counsel moved to exclude witnesses, Allen again protested that there would be no proceeding and that he would keep talking through the trial. The judge ordered him removed a second time.14 Allen remained out of the courtroom during the State's case-in-chief except for several identification appearances, during one of which he responded to the judge with vile and abusive language.15 After the prosecution rested, the judge reiterated that Allen could return if he agreed to behave properly; Allen gave assurances and was permitted to remain for the rest of the trial, which was conducted by appointed counsel.16
The Court of Appeals opinion set out these events in detail and concluded that the defendant should not have been excluded despite his conduct, stating that the proper course was to restrain him by whatever means necessary, including shackling and gagging.17
Whether a criminal defendant who engages in noisy, disorderly, and disruptive speech and conduct after repeated warnings forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial?18
A defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.19 Once lost, the right to be present can be reclaimed as soon as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings.20
Yes. Allen was repeatedly warned by the trial judge that he would be removed if he persisted in his unruly conduct.21 He nevertheless continued with abusive remarks, threats that the judge would be a corpse, tearing the attorney's file, and declarations that there would be no trial.22 These actions after warnings justify loss of the right under the rule.23
Allen forfeited his Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial by his conduct after repeated warnings.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan emphasizes that the governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going forward.25 He explains that to allow the disruptive activities of a defendant like respondent to prevent his trial is to allow him to profit from his own wrong. The Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented the courts from acting to preserve the very processes that the Constitution itself prescribes.26
Brennan stresses that no action against an unruly defendant is permissible except after he has been fully and fairly informed that his conduct is wrong and intolerable, and warned of the possible consequences of continued misbehavior.27 The record makes clear that respondent was so informed and warned in this case. Thus there can be no doubt that respondent, by persisting in his reprehensible conduct, surrendered his right to be present at the trial.28
Whether a trial judge may remove a disruptive defendant from the courtroom during trial rather than binding and gagging him or citing him for contempt?29
Trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case and there are at least three constitutionally permissible ways to handle an obstreperous defendant: bind and gag him, cite him for contempt, or take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.30
Yes. The Illinois trial judge chose removal after Allen's extreme and aggravated conduct. This included threats and repeated outbursts after warnings. Removal was a method within the judge's discretion as one of the three permissible options. Binding and gagging or contempt were not required because the facts show they would not have dissuaded Allen.31
A trial judge may remove a disruptive defendant from the courtroom during trial rather than binding and gagging him or citing him for contempt.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas agrees with the basic hypothesis that a criminal trial cannot take place where the courtroom is a bedlam. Either the accused or the judge hurling epithets at the other prevents a proper proceeding.33 A courtroom is a hallowed place where trials must proceed with dignity.34
Douglas has difficulty with the use of this stale case to establish guidelines for judicial control. The trial took place nearly thirteen years earlier.35 There is more than an intimation in the present record that the defendant was a mental case.
The passage of time since 1957 makes it impossible to determine what the mental condition of the defendant was at that time.36 We should not reach the merits but should reverse the case for staleness of the record and affirm the denial of relief by the District Court.37