512 U.S. 415 (1994)
Respondent Karl Oberg was driving a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle manufactured and sold by petitioner Honda Motor Co., Ltd., when the vehicle overturned.1 This caused him severe and permanent injuries.2
Oberg filed suit in Oregon state court alleging that Honda knew or should have known the vehicle had an inherently and unreasonably dangerous design.3 The jury found Honda liable. It awarded Oberg $919,390.39 in compensatory damages together with $5 million in punitive damages.4 The compensatory award was reduced by 20 percent to $735,512.31 because Oberg's own negligence contributed to the accident.5
The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.6 The Oregon Supreme Court likewise affirmed.7 It noted that the Oregon statute governing punitive damages in product liability actions and the jury instructions contained substantive criteria that guided the factfinder.8 Oregon requires plaintiffs to prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.9 The court further observed that a judgment may be vacated if there is no evidence to support the jury's decision and that appellate review is available to test the sufficiency of the jury instructions.10
Article VII, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, as amended in 1910, states that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the state unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict.11 Oregon courts have interpreted this provision to bar review of the amount of a punitive damages award.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Oregon's limited judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards is consistent with due process.13
The jury instructions informed the jury that punitive damages could be awarded only upon proof by clear and convincing evidence of wanton disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of others.14 The instructions directed the jury to consider the likelihood of serious harm, the defendant's awareness of that likelihood, the duration of the misconduct, the defendant's attitude upon notice of the condition, the defendant's financial condition, and a $5 million cap on any punitive award.15
Whether Oregon's constitutional amendment prohibiting judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict, is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?16
No. The rule requires that states retain the common-law safeguard of judicial review over the amount of punitive damages to prevent arbitrary deprivations.20 In the established facts, the Oregon Constitution as amended in 1910 and construed by Oregon courts bars any review of the amount of the $5 million punitive award returned against Honda.21 Courts are limited to checking only whether some evidence supports the verdict at all.22 The common-law practice described in early English cases such as Huckle v. Money and followed by American courts including Justice Story in Blunt v. Little permitted new trials or remittitur when awards appeared excessive.23 Oregon eliminated this protection in 1910 without substituting any equivalent check on amount.24 The jury instructions and clear-and-convincing standard in this case guide the initial decision but supply no post-verdict mechanism to test whether the particular sum of $5 million is excessive.25 This leaves the award unreviewable even though the Oregon Supreme Court itself recognized that the verdict might have been excessive under traditional standards.26
Because the established facts show that Oregon provides no procedure for examining the size of the punitive award returned against Honda, the state's procedure departs from the traditional safeguard that due process incorporates.27
Oregon's constitutional limitation on judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awards violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred separately to emphasize that before the 1910 amendment Oregon courts had applied common-law standards that limited the size of damages awards.29 The amendment changed only the procedures of review by requiring an affirmative statement that no evidence supports the verdict before any re-examination could occur.30 He observed that the Oregon Supreme Court in Van Lom had found the award excessive yet concluded it lacked power to order a new trial.31
This confirmed that the amendment removed an important traditional procedure for enforcing state-prescribed limits on deprivations of property.32 In his view, the elimination of that procedure without a reasonable substitute violates the Due Process Clause.33
Justice Ginsburg dissented, maintaining that Oregon's preverdict controls supply adequate guidance to the jury and satisfy the due-process concerns expressed in Haslip and TXO.34 These controls include the seven statutory criteria in Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.925(3), the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, and the cap tied to the complaint amount.35 She argued that the historical record does not demonstrate that post-verdict review of the amount was invariably required at common law.36 Oregon's direct guidance to the factfinder is at least as protective as the post-hoc excessiveness review used elsewhere.37
In her assessment, the procedures followed in this case therefore meet constitutional requirements and the judgment should be affirmed.38