578 U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016)
Jeffrey Heffernan worked as a police officer in the office of Paterson, New Jersey's chief of police in 2005.1 Mayor Jose Torres, who had appointed both the chief and Heffernan's supervisor, ran for reelection against Lawrence Spagnola, a friend of Heffernan's.2
Heffernan's bedridden mother asked him to pick up a large Spagnola campaign yard sign to replace one stolen from her front yard.3 Heffernan went to a Spagnola distribution point, obtained the sign, and spoke with campaign staff while holding it.4 Other police officers observed him in these activities, and word spread through the force.5
The next day, Heffernan's supervisors demoted him from detective to patrol officer and assigned him to a walking post.6 They punished him for what they believed was his overt involvement in Spagnola's campaign, although Heffernan had no actual involvement and had only helped his mother.7
Heffernan filed a lawsuit in federal district court claiming that the demotion deprived him of a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. §1983 based on the supervisors' mistaken perception.8 The district court dismissed the claim after finding that Heffernan had not engaged in any First Amendment conduct.9 The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that such a claim requires the employee's actual exercise of rights.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Third Circuit's decision.11
Whether a government employee may challenge a demotion under the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §1983 when the employer acted on a mistaken belief that the employee had engaged in protected political activity?12
The First Amendment prohibits a government employer from discharging or demoting an employee because the employee supports a particular political candidate.13 When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in protected political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment and §1983.14 This holds even if the employer’s actions are based on a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior.
Yes. In this case, Heffernan was demoted based on the supervisors' mistaken belief that he had engaged in protected political activity by supporting Spagnola's campaign.15 Although Heffernan had only picked up the sign to help his mother and had not actually participated in the campaign, the employer's motive in demoting him was to punish what they perceived as protected activity. As the Court explained in Waters v. Churchill, the employer's motive and the facts as the employer reasonably understood them are what matter in determining whether a First Amendment violation occurred.16
Therefore, Heffernan can challenge the demotion under the First Amendment and §1983 despite the factual mistake.
A government employee may challenge such a demotion even when based on a mistaken belief.17
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Alito
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, dissented.18 He argued that §1983 provides a cause of action only when a constitutional right has actually been violated, not when the government merely attempts to do so.19 Thomas noted that Heffernan conceded he did not engage in any protected speech or assembly by picking up the sign for his mother.20
Therefore, the City's mistaken belief that he had supported the campaign could not ripen into an actual deprivation of his First Amendment rights.21 This approach diverges from the majority by emphasizing the need for an actual violation rather than focusing on the employer's motive or perceived activity.22 Thomas concluded that no §1983 claim was available under these circumstances.23
Whether the lower courts should decide in the first instance whether respondents acted under a neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign and whether such a policy complies with constitutional standards?24
The lower courts should decide in the first instance whether respondents may have acted under a neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign and whether such a policy, if it exists, complies with constitutional standards.25
Yes. The Court relaxed its assumption that the policy violated the Constitution.26 There is some evidence suggesting that Heffernan's employers may have dismissed him pursuant to a different and neutral policy prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign.27 The Court held that whether that policy existed, whether Heffernan's supervisors were following it, and whether it complies with constitutional standards are matters for the lower courts to decide in the first instance.28
The lower courts should decide these matters in the first instance.29