474 U.S. 82 (1985)
In August 1981, Larry Gene Heath hired Charles Owens and Gregory Lumpkin to kill his wife Rebecca Heath, who was then nine months pregnant, for a sum of $2,000.1
On the morning of August 31, 1981, Heath left the family residence in Russell County, Alabama, met Owens and Lumpkin in Georgia just over the Alabama border, led them back to the residence, gave them the keys to the Heaths' car and house, and left the premises.2 Owens and Lumpkin then kidnaped Rebecca Heath from her home.3 The Heath car containing her body was later found on the side of a road in Troup County, Georgia, and the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head.4
Georgia authorities arrested Heath on September 4, 1981.5 He waived his Miranda rights and gave a full confession admitting that he had arranged his wife's kidnaping and murder.6 In November 1981, the grand jury of Troup County, Georgia, indicted Heath for the offense of malice murder.7 On February 10, 1982, Heath pleaded guilty to the Georgia murder charge in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment.8
On May 5, 1982, the grand jury of Russell County, Alabama, returned an indictment against Heath for the capital offense of murder during a kidnaping.9 Before trial, Heath entered pleas of autrefois convict and former jeopardy under the Alabama and United States Constitutions, arguing that his Georgia conviction barred the Alabama prosecution, and he also contested the jurisdiction of the Alabama court on the ground that the crime had occurred in Georgia.10 After a hearing, the Alabama trial court rejected the double jeopardy claims and later rejected the jurisdictional plea at the close of the State's case.11
On January 12, 1983, the Alabama jury convicted Heath of murder during a kidnaping in the first degree.12 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction.13 The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari and also affirmed.14 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the double jeopardy question and the applicability of the dual sovereignty doctrine.15
Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars Alabama from trying petitioner for the capital offense of murder during a kidnaping after Georgia has convicted him of murder based on the same homicide?16
The Double Jeopardy Clause bars successive prosecutions for the same offense only when both prosecutions are brought by the same sovereign.17 Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, different states derive their prosecutorial authority from independent sources and therefore may each prosecute the same conduct without violating the clause.18
No. The court assumes arguendo that the Alabama offense of murder during a kidnaping and the Georgia offense of malice murder constitute the same offense under Brown v. Ohio.19 They are greater and lesser included offenses arising from the identical homicide.20 Nevertheless, the dual sovereignty doctrine permits the second prosecution because Georgia and Alabama each exercise independent sovereignty.21
The Alabama trial court rejected the autrefois convict and former jeopardy pleas after hearing.22 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that prosecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns do not subject an accused twice to prosecutions for the same offense.23
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar Alabama's prosecution of Heath.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissents on the ground that the dual sovereignty doctrine should not extend to successive prosecutions by different states.25 The sovereign concerns each state vindicates are identical, unlike the complementary federal and state interests that originally justified the doctrine.26 He emphasizes that the burden of successive prosecutions cannot be justified as the quid pro quo of dual citizenship when both prosecutors are states.27
Justice Marshall further condemns the collusion between Georgia and Alabama that allowed Georgia officials to testify in the Alabama trial after securing a life sentence in Georgia.28 Such cooperation went far beyond a joint investigation and violated fundamental fairness.29
Justice Brennan joins Justice Marshall's dissent but writes separately to clarify his views on interest analysis.30 Different purposes served by specific statutes cannot justify an exception to established double jeopardy law.31 He adheres to the position taken in Abbate that interest analysis cannot permit successive federal prosecutions under different statutes.32
Justice Brennan agrees that the dissent's use of interest analysis in the state-state context furthers rather than undermines the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.33
Whether the dual sovereignty doctrine applies to successive prosecutions by two States?34
Yes. The court holds that the doctrine applies because each state draws its power to prosecute from distinct sources of authority originally belonging to the states before admission to the Union and preserved by the Tenth Amendment.37
The court rejects any balancing of interests approach and reaffirms that when separate sovereigns prosecute the same act they prosecute distinct offenses within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.38
The dual sovereignty doctrine applies to successive prosecutions by two States.39