284 F. Supp. 396 (D.D.C. 1968)
The plaintiff established an irrevocable trust in 1923 under which she was to receive all of the income for her own use and benefit without the power to anticipate, alienate or charge the same.1 Upon her death the corpus was to pass as she appointed by will or if no appointment to her next of kin under District of Columbia intestate succession law.2 The plaintiff as settlor and life beneficiary later sought to modify the terms of this trust.3 The remaining beneficiaries consist of the settlor's heirs who cannot be ascertained until her death.4
In prior litigation the plaintiff argued that under the doctrine of worthier title she was the settlor and sole beneficiary so that the trust terms could be modified.5 The court of appeals rejected this argument and abolished the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of law or construction in the District of Columbia.6 The court of appeals indicated in dictum, however, that a guardian ad litem could be appointed to represent the interests of the unborn heirs so that the trust could be modified.7
Subsequently a guardian ad litem was appointed for the unborn heirs.8 Agreement was reached among the plaintiff, the existing heirs, and the guardian ad litem.9 All parties consented to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment except the Riggs National Bank, the trustee.10
The trustee objected that the court lacks authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for unborn persons without explicit statutory authority and that no such authority exists in the District of Columbia.11 The procedure was implemented at the suggestion of the court of appeals in the prior decision.12
Whether the court has the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for unborn persons without explicit statutory authority?13
A court of equity possesses inherent authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of unborn beneficiaries in trust modification proceedings even in the absence of explicit statutory authorization.14 This power derives from the court's equitable duty to balance the interests of all parties and to fashion appropriate remedies, analogous to the authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) for infants and incompetents.15 The majority of jurisdictions and legal commentators support this view.16
Yes. After the court of appeals abolished the doctrine of worthier title, it suggested in dictum that appointment of a guardian ad litem would allow modification once all interests including those of unborn heirs were represented.17 The district court reviewed decisions from multiple jurisdictions and leading treatises.18 It found that most recognize the court's inherent power to make such appointments in the sound discretion of the court when necessary to protect all parties.19 The same equitable considerations that justify appointment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) for minors and incompetents apply directly to unborn persons whose interests would otherwise prevent any modification.20
The court therefore concluded that equity requires sufficient flexibility to meet the changing needs of the parties.21 The appointment here adequately protected the unborn heirs while allowing the living beneficiaries to reach agreement.22
The district court therefore holds that it possesses authority to appoint a guardian ad litem for unborn persons without explicit statutory authority and properly granted summary judgment approving the trust modification.23