510 U.S. 16 (1993)
Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equipment rental company, from April 1985 until October 1987.1 Charles Hardy was Forklift's president.2 Throughout Harris's time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.3 Hardy told Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, that she was a woman who did not know anything and that the company needed a man as the rental manager, and at least once called her a dumb ass woman.4 Hardy suggested that the two of them go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate Harris's raise.5 Hardy occasionally asked Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket, threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women and asked them to pick the objects up, and made sexual innuendos about Harris's and other women's clothing.6
In mid-August 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct.7 Hardy said he was surprised that Harris was offended, claimed he was only joking, and apologized.8 He also promised he would stop, and based on this assurance Harris stayed on the job.9 But in early September, Hardy began anew by asking Harris, again in front of other employees, what she had done to secure a deal with a customer and implying she had promised the customer sex on Saturday night.10 On October 1, Harris collected her paycheck and quit.11
Harris then sued Forklift in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, claiming that Hardy's conduct had created an abusive work environment for her because of her gender.12 The district court, adopting the report and recommendation of the Magistrate, found this to be a close case but held that Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive environment.13 The court found that some of Hardy's comments offended Harris and would offend the reasonable woman, but that they were not so severe as to be expected to seriously affect Harris's psychological well-being or interfere with her work performance, and that Harris was not subjectively so offended that she suffered injury.14
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished decision.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be actionable as abusive work environment harassment, must seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or lead the plaintiff to suffer injury.16
Whether conduct must seriously affect an employee's psychological well-being or cause injury to be actionable as abusive work environment harassment under Title VII?17
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.18 This language includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.19 When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.20 This standard takes a middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.21 So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.22 Whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.23
No. The District Court erred in relying on whether the conduct seriously affected plaintiff's psychological well-being or led her to suffer injury.24 The court found that some of Hardy's comments offended Harris and would offend the reasonable woman, but that they were not so severe as to be expected to seriously affect Harris's psychological well-being or interfere with her work performance, and that Harris was not subjectively so offended that she suffered injury.
Under the correct standard from Meritor, the environment created by Hardy's repeated gender-based insults and sexual innuendos was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Harris's employment and create an abusive working environment, even without proof of psychological injury.25 The District Court's application of these incorrect standards may well have influenced its ultimate conclusion that this was a close case but not actionable.26
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia joined the opinion of the Court.28 Abusive or hostile does not seem to him a very clear standard. Clarity is not increased by adding the adverb objectively or by appealing to a reasonable person's notion of what the vague word means.29
The Court's list of factors adds little certitude.30 The holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in or permitted by an employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages.31 Scalia saw no basis for limiting the test to whether work has been impaired rather than whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered.32
He knew of no test more faithful to the inherently vague statutory language than the one the Court today adopts.33
Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion of the Court.34 The critical issue under Title VII's text is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.35 The adjudicator's inquiry should center on whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work performance.36
It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find that the harassment so altered working conditions as to make it more difficult to do the job.37