345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
Thirteen children were allegedly injured by blasting caps in twelve unrelated accidents between 1955 and 1959.1
The injuries occurred in the states of Alabama, California, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington and West Virginia.2 Plaintiffs are citizens of the states in which their injuries occurred.3
They are now claiming damages against six manufacturers of blasting caps and the I.M.E.4 Federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.5
The complaints alleged that each cap lacked any warning label and could be easily detonated by a child.6 Defendants had actual knowledge that children were frequently injured by blasting caps.7
Through the trade association they kept statistics and other information regarding these accidents.8 Defendants are said to have jointly explicitly considered the possibility of labeling the caps, to have rejected this possibility, and to have engaged in lobbying activities against legislation which would have required such labeling.9
In the related Hall action three families identified specific manufacturers.10 Hercules produced the caps that injured the Hall children in Suffolk County, New York on April 17, 1956 and the Briese children in Bismarck, North Dakota on July 31, 1956.11 Du Pont produced the cap that injured the Ball child in Catón, Ohio on April 23, 1961.12
The original Hall complaint filed in 1969 named fifteen manufacturers and the trade association.13 After amendment the defendants narrowed to Du Pont and Hercules once the trade association was dropped to preserve diversity.14
Defendants moved to dismiss on multiple grounds including lack of identification of specific manufacturers, improper joinder, forum non conveniens, and statutes of limitations barring parental claims for medical expenses.15 After extensive discovery the motions were renewed and addressed in the June 30, 1972 memorandum and order.16
The Chance plaintiffs could not name any particular manufacturer for the caps involved in their accidents while the Hall plaintiffs could identify the producer in each instance.17 The cases therefore presented distinct procedural postures regarding the need for joint liability theories and the appropriateness of litigating all claims in a single New York forum.18
Whether manufacturers and their trade association can be held jointly liable for injuries caused by blasting caps when the specific manufacturer of the injuring cap cannot be identified?19
Under principles of joint control of risk and enterprise liability reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B and cases such as Summers v. Tice, manufacturers who cooperate through a trade association in setting safety standards for a product can be held jointly liable when their collective conduct creates an indivisible risk.20 The specific manufacturer cannot be identified by the plaintiff.21 This shifts the burden of proof on causation to each defendant to show it did not cause the harm.22
Yes. The Chance plaintiffs could not identify any particular manufacturer of the caps that injured the thirteen children in the twelve accidents.23 Yet the six corporate defendants and the I.M.E. dominated the blasting cap industry.24 They collected accident statistics showing 86 to 137 child injuries per year.25
They jointly considered but rejected individual labeling while lobbying against legislation.26 The court applied the enterprise liability rationale because the defendants acted through the trade association on safety features.27 This created a group-created risk that justified shifting the burden of proving causation under section 433B(3).28
The defendants can be held jointly liable on the Chance claims, and the motion to dismiss is denied pending further factual development on choice of law.29
Whether the defendants owed a duty of care to children who might come into possession of blasting caps to provide warnings or child-proof designs?30
A manufacturer owes a duty of reasonable care under negligence and strict liability principles to provide appropriate warnings and safety features.31 This applies when the risk of harm to foreseeable users or bystanders is known or should be known.32 The harm is serious.33 The cost of precautions is not prohibitive.34 These factors are measured by the considerations in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 291-293, 298, 388, 395, and 402A.35
Yes. The defendants had actual knowledge through I.M.E. statistics of 86 to 137 annual child accidents involving unmarked caps between 1955 and 1959.36 The risk of severe injury to children who might find and mishandle the caps was within the range of reasonable probability.37 The feasibility and cost of labeling or child-proofing presented factual questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss.38
The court rejected the intended-use limitation because the manufacturers knew of the specific risk to children and could not ignore probable misuse in the home environment.39
The defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff-children, and the motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.40
Whether the plaintiffs' claims present common questions of law and fact sufficient for joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20?41
Permissive joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) requires a common question of law or fact.42 It also requires a right to relief arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.43 The presence of any common question satisfies the rule even if other questions are not common to all plaintiffs.44
Yes. The Chance and Hall complaints presented common questions of fact regarding whether the defendants exercised joint control over labeling and safety design through the I.M.E. and operated as a joint enterprise.45 They also presented common questions of law regarding the applicability of joint liability theories.46 This holds even though the individual accidents occurred at different times and places and some state-law issues might differ.47
Joinder is proper for the joint-liability issues in Chance, but the Hall claims against non-producer defendants fail and the remaining claims require severance.48
Whether the North Dakota and Ohio claims should be transferred to other districts under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for convenience?49
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) a district court may transfer a civil action to any district where it might have been brought.50 The transfer is for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice.51 The court weighs private interests such as access to proof and public interests such as familiarity with local law.52
Yes. After severance of the Hall claims against non-producer defendants, the North Dakota claims against Hercules and the Ohio claims against Du Pont involve local questions of fact and law that predominate.53 They should be transferred to the districts where the accidents occurred.54 This preserves discovery already conducted in New York.55 The New York claims remain.56
Whether parents' claims for medical expenses are barred by statutes of limitations?59
Whether New York choice-of-law principles govern the multi-state diversity claims?68
In diversity cases a federal court applies the choice-of-law principles of the state in which it sits.69 Under New York law the law of the jurisdiction with the greatest concern and strongest interest in the particular issue is applied under the flexible Babcock v. Jackson approach rather than the traditional place-of-injury rule.70
No. The court could not finally determine choice of law on the present record.7172 The locus of defendants' joint activity was at least partly in New York through the I.M.E.73 Yet the injuries occurred in ten other states.7475 The parties were directed to brief the issue before any ruling on which state's law governs duty, causation, or limitations.76