394 U.S. 111 (1969)
Petitioners Gregory and other demonstrators organized a march to protest the pace of public school desegregation in Chicago under Superintendent Benjamin Willis.1 The march began at 4:30 p.m. near the Chicago Loop in Grant Park, proceeded to city hall, and then continued five miles to Mayor Daley's home on South Lowe Avenue, where the group arrived at approximately 8:00 p.m. Throughout the march, the demonstrators were accompanied by a lieutenant of police, four police sergeants, about forty policemen, and an assistant city attorney.2
Upon reaching the mayor's neighborhood, the demonstrators marched around the block, chanting slogans including "Ben Willis must go, Snake Daley, also" and singing songs such as "We Shall Overcome."3 They had agreed to stop singing at 8:30 p.m. and did so.4 They continued marching quietly thereafter.5
Meanwhile, the crowd of onlookers grew from dozens to between 1,000 and 1,200 people, shouting threats such as "Get the hell out of here or we will break your blankety-blank head open," displaying Ku Klux Klan signs, and throwing rocks and eggs at the marchers.6
At about 9:30 p.m., Commander Pierson informed Gregory that the situation was dangerous and requested multiple times that the marchers leave the area, offering police escorts to those who wished to depart.7 Three marchers accepted the offer, but the remaining demonstrators refused and were arrested.8
Whether the petitioners' convictions for disorderly conduct rested on any evidence that they engaged in disorderly conduct?9
Under the principle established in Thompson v. City of Louisville, convictions totally devoid of evidentiary support violate due process.10
No. The established facts show that petitioners Gregory and the other demonstrators conducted an entirely peaceful and orderly march from Grant Park to city hall and then five miles to Mayor Daley's home.11 They were accompanied throughout by police officers and an assistant city attorney.12 They ceased all singing at 8:30 p.m. as promised.13 Thereafter they marched quietly despite facing jeers, threats, and thrown objects from the crowd.14
No fact in the established facts indicates that the petitioners made any improper noise, created any disturbance, or engaged in conduct amounting to disorderly conduct under the ordinance.15
The convictions violate due process because they rest on no evidence of disorderly conduct by the petitioners and must therefore be reversed.16
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black stressed that the record demonstrated a determined effort by both police and demonstrators to maintain order.17 The petitioners displayed decorum even when provoked by rocks, eggs, and abusive language from onlookers.18 He concluded that the disorderly conduct ordinance was not narrowly drawn to regulate only unprotected conduct.19
The convictions infringed First Amendment rights because the only arguably unlawful act was the refusal to obey a police order to disperse.20 This approach emphasizes the need for narrowly tailored statutes rather than broad ordinances that risk chilling protected speech.21
Whether the trial judge's jury instructions permitted conviction for acts protected by the First Amendment?22
Under Stromberg v. California, a conviction must be reversed if the jury instructions permitted the jury to rest its verdict on a constitutionally impermissible ground.23
Yes. The established facts establish that the petitioners engaged in a peaceful protest march and assembly to petition for school desegregation, activity falling squarely within First Amendment protection.24 The trial judge instructed the jury solely in the broad language of the Chicago ordinance without any limiting construction.25 The instructions allowed conviction for making an improper noise, creating a diversion tending to a breach of the peace, or collecting in a crowd for any purpose that annoyed others.26
Because the instructions did not require the jury to find that the petitioners themselves had engaged in unprotected conduct, the verdict could have rested on the protected aspects of the march.27
The convictions cannot stand because the jury instructions allowed conviction for constitutionally protected conduct.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black explained that the trial judge's charge supplied the jury only with the unadorned language of the ordinance and included an instruction directing the jury to ignore the acts of the hostile crowd.29 He concluded that the jury could therefore have convicted the petitioners simply because their protest displeased onlookers, a ground forbidden by the First Amendment under precedents such as Thornhill v. Alabama and Edwards v. South Carolina.30 This reasoning underscores the fundamental unfairness of permitting conviction on constitutionally invalid grounds.31
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Harlan identified two independent constitutional defects requiring reversal.32 First, the Chicago disorderly conduct ordinance suffered from an ambulatory sweep that threatened protected expression, as illustrated by precedents such as Cantwell v. Connecticut.33 Second, the possibility existed that the jury verdict rested on a constitutionally impermissible ground under Stromberg v. California.34
Harlan expressly joined the portions of Justice Black's opinion addressing both defects.35 This concurrence reinforces the application of Stromberg and highlights the dangers of vague ordinances that sweep in protected expression while emphasizing the need for precise jury instructions.36
Whether the Illinois Supreme Court's narrowing construction of the Chicago ordinance was presented to the jury at trial?37
A narrowing construction of a statute cannot cure constitutional defects in a conviction when that construction was never given to the jury and the instructions permitted conviction on invalid grounds.38
No. The established facts indicate that the petitioners were tried and convicted before the Illinois Supreme Court announced its narrowing construction requiring an imminent threat of violence, reasonable police efforts to protect demonstrators, and a refusal to obey after explanation.39 The trial judge read only the ordinance's broad language to the jury and gave no instruction incorporating the subsequent limiting interpretation.40 As a result, the jury never applied the narrowing construction when deciding guilt.41
Because the narrowing construction was not before the jury, it cannot save the convictions, which must be reversed.42