177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949)
The plaintiff Gregoire brought this action against five federal officials: two successive Attorneys-General of the United States, two successive Directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit of the Department of Justice, and the District Director of Immigration at Ellis Island.1 On January 5, 1942, these officials arrested Gregoire on the pretense that he was a German and therefore an enemy alien.2 After a hearing, the Enemy Alien Hearing Board ruled that he was a Frenchman.3 Nevertheless, the officials kept him in custody until September 18, 1946.4
On that date, Judge Knox of the District Court found that Gregoire was a Frenchman and ordered his release in a proceeding reported at 69 F.Supp. 889.5 This court affirmed that order on November 6, 1947, in United States ex rel. Gregoire v. Watkins.6 Gregoire's complaint in the present action alleged that the arrest and imprisonment were without any authority of law and without any reasonable or colorable cause.7 It further alleged that the defendants conspired together and maliciously and willfully entered into a scheme to deprive the plaintiff of his liberty contrary to law.8
The second count reiterated these allegations. It added that the defendants subjected the plaintiff to the deprivation of his liberty and of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.9 It also claimed that the defendants deprived him of equal protection of the law in violation of Sections 43 and 47 of the Civil Rights Act.10 The district judge held that the defendants had an absolute immunity from liability even though their unlawful acts had been induced only by personal ill-will. The judge therefore dismissed the complaint for that reason under Rule 12(b)(6), and Gregoire appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.11
Whether federal executive officers are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for acts within the scope of their official duties even when those acts are alleged to have been performed maliciously and without legal authority?12
Officers of the Department of Justice when engaged in prosecuting private persons enjoy the same absolute privilege as judges.13 The immunity is absolute and is grounded on principles of public policy. The public interest requires that persons occupying such important positions and so closely identified with the judicial departments of the Government should speak and act freely and fearlessly in the discharge of their important official functions.14
Yes. The five defendants held high executive positions within the Department of Justice and related immigration functions when they arrested Gregoire on January 5, 1942, and maintained his custody until September 18, 1946, despite the Enemy Alien Hearing Board ruling. The complaint expressly alleged that these officials acted maliciously and willfully from personal spite with full awareness they lacked legal warrant.15 Under the rule from Yaselli v. Goff, which granted absolute immunity to a Special Assistant to the Attorney General for malicious prosecution, these officials receive the same protection because the occasion was one that would have justified the act if power had been used for its intended public purposes.16
The balance of policy favors leaving unredressed wrongs by dishonest officers rather than exposing all officials to the dread of retaliation that would dampen discharge of duties.17
Federal executive officers are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability even when acts are alleged to have been performed maliciously and without legal authority.18
Whether a complaint alleging that federal officials conspired to arrest and detain a person maliciously and willfully states a claim for relief under the common law?19
The decisions have always imposed as a limitation upon the immunity that the official's act must have been within the scope of his powers. What is meant by saying that the officer must be acting within his power cannot be more than that the occasion must be such as would have justified the act. This applies if he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him.20
No. Although the complaint alleged that the arrest and imprisonment was without any authority of law and without any reasonable or colorable cause, and that the defendants conspired together and maliciously and willfully entered into a scheme to deprive Gregoire of his liberty, the absolute immunity doctrine bars recovery.21 The officials' positions as Attorneys-General, Directors of the Enemy Alien Control Unit, and District Director of Immigration placed their actions on an occasion that would have justified the detention if undertaken for proper public purposes.22 The policy justification is that submitting all officials to trial would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute in the unflinching discharge of their duties. It is better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to constant dread of retaliation.23
A complaint alleging that federal officials conspired to arrest and detain a person maliciously and willfully does not state a claim for relief under the common law because absolute immunity applies.24
Whether Sections 43 and 47 of the Civil Rights Act create a cause of action against federal officials for conspiring to deprive an individual of liberty and equal protection of the laws?25
Section 43 is so plainly limited to acts done under color of some state or territorial law or ordinance that no discussion can make it clearer than appears from its reading. Neither the first nor second subdivisions of § 47 cover the situation at bar. They concern attempts to deprive persons of public office or of access to courts or other tribunals. The first clause of the third subdivision of § 47 does declare that if two or more persons conspire to deprive any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, the injured party may recover damages. But to construe the words to create a claim against any two persons who conspire to injure another for spite would require breaking them from a context which shows their more limited meaning. It would also destroy their validity constitutionally.26
No. The second count alleged that the defendants subjected Gregoire to deprivation of liberty and rights secured by the Constitution. It alleged they deprived him of equal protection in violation of Sections 43 and 47 of the Civil Rights Act.27 Section 43 applies only to acts under color of state law, which is absent here because the defendants were federal officials acting under federal authority. The subdivisions of § 47 address deprivations of public office or court access and do not reach this conspiracy to detain an individual.28
Interpreting the equal protection clause of § 47 to cover any spiteful injury by two persons would both detach the language from its context and render the statute constitutionally invalid.29
Sections 43 and 47 of the Civil Rights Act do not create a cause of action against federal officials for conspiring to deprive an individual of liberty and equal protection of the laws.30