405 U.S. 518 (1972)
Appellee Johnny Wilson was convicted in Superior Court, Fulton County, Georgia, on two counts of using opprobrious words and abusive language in violation of Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303.1 The statute provided that any person who shall, without provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence, opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.2 The incident also produced convictions on two counts of assault and battery and federal offenses arising out of the same incident.3
Wilson appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which rejected his constitutional challenge and sustained the conviction in Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S. E. 2d 446 (1967).4 He then sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.5 Because Wilson had failed to exhaust state remedies on other grounds, only the facial constitutionality of the statute was ripe for decision.6
The District Court held the statute facially unconstitutional and set aside the conviction in 303 F. Supp. 952 (1969).7 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in 431 F. 2d 855 (1970).8 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the State's appeal in 403 U. S. 930 (1971).9
The Georgia appellate courts had considered the reach of the statute in several earlier decisions.10 In Lyons v. State, 94 Ga. App. 570, 95 S. E. 2d 478 (1956), a conviction was sustained for awakening ten women scout leaders on a camp-out by shouting phrases including "Boys, this is where we are going to spend the night" and "Get the G__ d___ bed rolls out."11 In Fish v. State, 124 Ga. 416, 52 S. E. 737 (1905), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury question was presented by the remark "You swore a lie."12 In Jackson v. State, 14 Ga. App. 19, 80 S. E. 20 (1913), the Court of Appeals held that a jury question was presented by the words "God damn you, why don't you get out of the road?"13
In Elmore v. State, 15 Ga. App. 461, 83 S. E. 799 (1914), the Court of Appeals construed the phrase "tending to cause a breach of the peace" to reach language addressed to a person locked in a prison cell or on the opposite bank of an impassable torrent who could not immediately respond with violence.14 In Samuels v. State, 103 Ga. App. 66, 118 S. E. 2d 231 (1961), the Court of Appeals adopted a textbook definition of breach of the peace that included all violations of public peace, order, or decorum and the offense of disturbing public tranquility.15
Whether Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303, as construed by the Georgia courts, is susceptible of application to speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?16
A statute regulating speech can withstand a facial constitutional attack only if, as authoritatively construed by the state courts, it is not susceptible of application to speech that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.17 The statute must be carefully drawn or authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression.18 First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, and government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.19
Yes. The Georgia appellate decisions have not construed § 26-6303 to be limited in application to words that have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom the remark is addressed.20 The District Court held the statute facially unconstitutional because only the facial claim was ripe after failure to exhaust other grounds.21 The Court of Appeals affirmed that holding.22
In Lyons v. State a conviction was sustained for awakening ten women scout leaders on a camp-out by shouting phrases including "Boys, this is where we are going to spend the night."23 In Fish v. State the Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury question was presented by the remark "You swore a lie."24 In Jackson v. State the Court of Appeals held that a jury question was presented by the words "God damn you, why don't you get out of the road?"25 In Elmore v. State the Court of Appeals construed "tending to cause a breach of the peace" to reach language addressed to a person locked in a prison cell or on the opposite bank of an impassable torrent who could not immediately respond with violence.26 In Samuels v. State the Court of Appeals adopted a textbook definition of breach of the peace that included all violations of public peace, order, or decorum and the offense of disturbing public tranquility.27
These constructions demonstrate that the statute reaches speech that does not tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace and therefore is susceptible of application to protected expression.28
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the Court misapplied the overbreadth doctrine by relying on isolated ancient cases rather than the statute's narrow language aimed at fighting words.31 He argued that the statute prohibits use to or of another in his presence of opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace.32 The early Georgia decisions confirm it targets face-to-face insults likely to provoke violent retaliation.33
Burger contended that the mechanical application of overbreadth here would leave Georgia without a valid statute to deter bullying tactics.34 Normal principles of adjudication should prevent striking the statute on its face when the defendant's own conduct is unprotected.35
Justice Blackmun dissented on the ground that the statute's clear and concise language plainly covers the abusive words Wilson directed at officers attempting to restore access to a public building.36 He argued that the overbreadth rationale developed after the early Georgia cases unfairly condemns the statute because state courts have not had time to adjust to modern theories.37 The result pays only lip service to Chaplinsky while leaving Georgia unable to proscribe fighting words without adding explicit limiting language.38
Blackmun noted that common sense and the facts of the case show the statute is not overbroad in any meaningful way.39