458 U.S. 375, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982)
In 1961, after a ten-week strike, Local 542 of the International Union of Operating Engineers negotiated a collective-bargaining agreement with four construction trade associations in the Philadelphia area that established an exclusive hiring hall.1
Under the agreement, signatory employers were required to hire operating engineers only through referrals from the union's lists, and union members could seek work only through those referrals.2 The system remained in place in subsequent contracts negotiated by the associations and by unaffiliated employers.3
In 1965, Local 542 and the trade associations created an apprenticeship program involving classroom and field training that was administered by the Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee, whose trustees were appointed half by the union and half by the associations.4 Apprentices received referrals for unskilled work, and graduates became journeymen eligible for heavy-equipment jobs.5
In 1971, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and twelve black plaintiffs representing a proposed class of minority operating engineers and would-be engineers filed suit against Local 542, the JATC, the trade associations, and a class of approximately 1,400 construction employers.6 The complaint alleged violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 arising from the union's administration of the hiring hall and apprenticeship program.7
The District Court divided the case into liability and damages phases and certified a plaintiff class of minority workers along with a defendant class of all employers and associations that had contracted with Local 542.8 After trial, the court found that the union had engaged in a pattern of intentional discrimination in operating the hiring hall and that the JATC had similarly discriminated in administering the training program.9 The court further found that the employers and associations, viewed as a class, had neither actual knowledge of the union's discrimination nor intent to discriminate themselves.10
Despite those findings, the District Court held the employers and associations liable under § 1981 for injunctive relief on the ground that they had delegated an important aspect of hiring to the union.11 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of liability against the employers and associations by an equally divided en banc vote.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.13
Whether liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires proof of discriminatory intent?14
Section 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can be violated only by purposeful discrimination.15
Yes. The District Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the associations or contractors viewed simply as a class were actually aware of the union discrimination.16 The court had also failed to show intent to discriminate by the employers as a class. The court nevertheless held petitioners liable under § 1981 for injunctive relief.17
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement Act of 1870, from which § 1981 derives, demonstrates that Congress intended to eradicate intentional discrimination by those whose object was to make former slaves dependent serfs.18 The statute's close connection to the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires discriminatory purpose for equal protection violations, confirms that § 1981 reaches only purposeful discrimination.19 Because the established facts show no intent by the employers and associations as a class, liability cannot be imposed without proof of discriminatory intent.20
Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires proof of discriminatory intent.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissents from the resolution of the intent issue.22 He views the issue as unnecessary to the disposition because intentional discrimination by the union and JATC was undisputed.23 He argues that the plain language of § 1981 focuses on the effects of discrimination rather than the actor's motivation.24
He further argues that the legislative history of the Thirty-ninth Congress reveals an intent to eradicate the badges of slavery, including facially neutral practices that disproportionately burden minorities.25 Even if intent were required, he would still hold the employers injunctively liable on a nondelegable-duty theory.26
Whether, absent proof of discriminatory intent by employers and trade associations, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can be imposed vicariously on them for the discriminatory conduct of a union?27
No. The District Court found that the employers had delegated an important aspect of their hiring procedure to the union.30 The court found that the union hiring hall was the agent for two principals.31 The court therefore imposed vicarious liability under a respondeat superior theory.32
However, the relationship between an employer and the union that represents its employees cannot be accurately characterized as one between principal and agent or master and servant.33 The federal labor laws are structured on the assumption that the parties proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints.34 There is no record basis for finding that petitioners had a right to control the union's administration of the hiring hall.35 The same absence of control defeats application of respondeat superior to the JATC.36 Section 1981 imposes no affirmative nondelegable duty to guarantee that third parties will not infringe the rights it protects.37 The established facts therefore provide no basis for vicarious liability.38
Absent proof of discriminatory intent by employers and trade associations, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 cannot be imposed vicariously on them for the discriminatory conduct of a union.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Justice O'Connor concurs in the holding that § 1981 requires proof of intent.40 She concurs that employers cannot be held vicariously liable for the union's discrimination.41 She concurs that the statute does not impose a nondelegable duty.42
She notes that nothing in the opinion prevents respondents on remand from attempting to prove the traditional elements of respondeat superior, particularly whether the employers maintain control over the JATC.43 She also agrees that a party not subject to liability may not be assessed a proportionate share of remedial costs.44 She emphasizes that incidental or ancillary provisions may still be imposed to effectuate complete relief against the union and JATC.45
Justice Stevens concurs in the judgment and in Parts III and IV of the opinion.46 He notes that he has previously expressed the view that § 1981 contains no requirement that an intent to discriminate must be proved.47 Nevertheless, because the intent requirement tends to define the coverage of the statute in a way that better reflects the basic intent of Congress than would a contrary holding, he concurs in the conclusion reached by the Court on the statutory protection of equal opportunity.48