161 U.S. 519 (1896)
In 1889 Edgar M. Geer was prosecuted in Connecticut under state statutes that set an open season for woodcock, ruffled grouse, and quail from the first day of October to the first day of January.1 Section 2546 of the 1888 revision made it unlawful to kill any of those birds for the purpose of conveying them beyond the state limits or to transport or possess them with intent to procure such transportation.2
Section 2530 separately punished killing the birds outside the open season.3
On October 19, 1889, Geer was charged by information in the police court of New London with unlawfully receiving and having in his possession certain woodcock, ruffled grouse, and quail killed within the state after the first day of October, with the intent to procure their transportation beyond the state limits.4 The information contained no allegation that the birds had been unlawfully killed.5
Geer pleaded not guilty in the police court, was convicted, and appealed to the Criminal Court of Common Pleas for New London County.6 There he demurred to the complaint on grounds that included the claim that section 2546 was unconstitutional insofar as it forbade transportation of lawfully killed birds or possession with intent to transport them out of state.7 The demurrer was overruled. Geer declined to plead further and was sentenced to pay a fine of twenty-five dollars plus costs.8
Geer appealed to the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, which affirmed the judgment.9 He then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. He assigned as error the lower courts' refusal to hold section 2546 unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause insofar as it forbade transportation of lawfully killed birds or possession with intent to transport them out of state. He also challenged their application of the statute to birds that had been lawfully killed and had entered commerce.10
Whether a state statute that prohibits possession of game birds lawfully killed within the state during the open season when the possession is for the purpose of transporting the birds beyond the state violates the Commerce Clause?11
A state has the authority to regulate animals ferae naturae as common property held in trust for its people.12 It may restrict the use of game killed within its borders to persons within the state by prohibiting transportation outside the state.13 This affects only internal commerce and does not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.14
No. In the established facts, Geer was charged in 1889 with possessing woodcock, ruffled grouse, and quail killed during the open season with intent to transport them beyond Connecticut's limits under section 2546.15 The lower courts convicted him after overruling his constitutional demurrer, and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed.16 The U.S. Supreme Court applied the rule by recognizing the state's sovereign power over game as common property, allowing the restriction to in-state use without creating interstate commerce subject to federal control.17
The statute does not violate the Commerce Clause.18
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Justice Field dissented, arguing that the state lacked authority to limit the use of lawfully killed game to in-state consumption.19 He contended that animals ferae naturae, once reduced to possession through lawful killing, become articles of commerce that cannot be confined to citizens of one state.20 The state held no prior property interest in wild game beyond human reach or control.21
Field emphasized that property rights arise only upon subjection to man's labor or skill, after which the owner may freely dispose of the game, including by transportation to other states.22 In his view, the statute directly interfered with the freedom of interstate commerce guaranteed by the Constitution.23
Justice Harlan dissented on the basis that the Connecticut statute unconstitutionally restricted the liberty of citizens and the freedom of interstate commerce.24 He reasoned that a person who lawfully acquires game during the open season obtains full ownership rights, allowing disposition by sale or gift without state interference, just as with other personal property.25 Criminalizing possession with intent to transport out of state imposes arbitrary governmental power inconsistent with property rights.26
Harlan concluded that the law could not validly prohibit sending lawfully killed game to another state, as this encroached on Congress's exclusive authority over interstate commerce.27
Whether a state may regulate the killing of game within its borders so as to confine the use of such game to persons within the state by forbidding its transportation outside the state?28
The state possesses the power to control the taking of game within its borders as common property and may confine its use to the people of the state by forbidding transportation outside the state.29
Yes. The facts show that Connecticut's statute allowed killing during open season but forbade transportation out of state, and Geer was prosecuted for possessing such birds with intent to transport them out.30 The Court upheld this regulation as a valid exercise of the state's authority over game to benefit its own citizens, consistent with historical common law principles.31
A state may so regulate the killing of game.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Field would have held that Connecticut could not confine the use of game to in-state persons after lawful killing.33 Once an individual reduces wild game to possession by killing it during the permitted season, the game becomes the private property of that person.34 The state possesses no special property interest allowing it to restrict subsequent sale or transportation.35
Field maintained that such restrictions exceed the state's authority and improperly limit the rights of ownership in articles that have entered commerce.36 He viewed the birds as subject to full disposition by their owner without state-imposed geographic limits.37
Justice Harlan would have held that such regulation violates the rights of property ownership and interstate commerce.38 He argued that the owner of lawfully killed game may dispose of it freely, including by sending it to another state, without criminal penalty.39 The statute's prohibition on possession with intent to transport out of state arbitrarily interferes with personal liberty and the established freedom of interstate commerce under the Constitution.40
Harlan concluded that the state cannot validly impose such limits on property that has been reduced to lawful possession.41