493 U.S. 215 (1990)
On June 18, 1986, the city council of the city of Dallas unanimously adopted Ordinance No. 19196 regulating sexually oriented businesses, which was aimed at eradicating the secondary effects of crime and urban blight.1 The ordinance, as amended, defines a "sexually oriented business" as "an adult arcade, adult bookstore or adult video store, adult cabaret, adult motel, adult motion picture theater, adult theater, escort agency, nude model studio, or sexual encounter center." Dallas City Code, ch. 41A, Sexually Oriented Businesses § 41A-2(19) (1986).2 The ordinance regulates sexually oriented businesses through a scheme incorporating zoning, licensing, and inspections. The ordinance also includes a civil disability provision, which prohibits individuals convicted of enumerated crimes from obtaining a license to operate a sexually oriented business for a specified period of years.3
Three separate suits were filed challenging the ordinance on numerous grounds and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as well as declaratory relief.4 Suits were brought by the following groups of individuals and businesses: those involved in selling, exhibiting, or distributing publications or video or motion picture films; adult cabarets or establishments providing live nude dancing or films, motion pictures, videocassettes, slides, or other photographic reproductions depicting sexual activities and anatomy specified in the ordinance; and adult motel owners.5 Following expedited discovery, petitioners' constitutional claims were resolved through cross-motions for summary judgment.6
After a hearing, the District Court upheld the bulk of the ordinance, striking only four subsections. See Dumas v. Dallas, 648 F. Supp. 1061 (ND Tex. 1986).7 The District Court struck two subsections, §§ 41A-5(a)(8) and 41A-5(c), on the ground that they vested overbroad discretion in the chief of police.8 The District Court also struck the provision that imposed a civil disability merely on the basis of an indictment or information.9 Finally, the District Court held that five enumerated crimes from the list of those creating civil disability were unconstitutional because they were not sufficiently related to the purpose of the ordinance.10 The city of Dallas subsequently amended the ordinance in conformity with the District Court's judgment.11
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.12 837 F. 2d 1298 (1988). Viewing the ordinance as a contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation under Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986), the Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance against petitioners' facial attack.13 The Court of Appeals further concluded that the licensing scheme's failure to provide the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman v. Maryland, supra, withstood constitutional challenge.14 Additionally, the Court of Appeals upheld the provision of the ordinance providing that motel owners renting rooms for fewer than 10 hours were "adult motel owners" and, as such, were required to obtain a license under the ordinance.15 Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the civil disability provisions, as modified by the District Court.16
The Supreme Court granted petitioners' application for a stay of the mandate except for the holding that the provisions of the ordinance regulating the location of sexually oriented businesses do not violate the Federal Constitution, 485 U. S. 1042 (1988), and granted certiorari, 489 U. S. 1051 (1989).17
Whether a licensing scheme in a comprehensive city ordinance regulating sexually oriented businesses is a prior restraint that fails to provide adequate procedural safeguards as required by Freedman v. Maryland?18
A licensing scheme that regulates First Amendment-protected businesses constitutes a prior restraint.19 It must include procedural safeguards to prevent indefinite suppression of speech.20 These include a specified reasonable time limit for the licensor's decision while maintaining the status quo and the availability of prompt judicial review.21
No. The Dallas ordinance requires the chief of police to approve a license within 30 days after receipt of an application, but the license cannot issue until the premises pass inspections by the health department, fire department, and building official, and the ordinance sets no time limit for those inspections to occur.22 Petitioners, including adult bookstores, cabarets, and motels, face inspections upon any ownership change or annual renewal even without a change in use of the structure.23 This structure permits indefinite postponement of license issuance and lacks any mechanism for prompt judicial review of a denial, directly suppressing protected speech by adult entertainment businesses that the city concedes engage in First Amendment activity.24
The licensing scheme is unconstitutional as applied to businesses engaged in First Amendment-protected activity because it fails to provide the essential procedural safeguards.25
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment invalidating the licensing provisions for First Amendment-protected businesses.26 He argued that all three Freedman safeguards must apply, including requiring the city to bear the burden of going to court and proving its case before denying a license.27 Brennan noted that Riley v. National Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc. applied the full set of safeguards to a professional licensing scheme.28
He saw no relevant distinction here because the danger of stifling speech arises from the license denial itself regardless of whether the licensor judges content directly.29 Brennan emphasized that the heavy presumption against prior restraints requires placing burdens on the side of speech rather than silence.30
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice White dissented from this portion of the opinion and would have affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding that Freedman is inapplicable.31 He reasoned that the Dallas scheme is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation aimed at secondary effects, analogous to parade permit requirements.32 White explained that the ordinance does not involve the direct censorship of particular expressive material that triggered Freedman.33
The ordinance imposes no undue discretion on the licensor and grants 147 of 165 applications between the District Court and Fifth Circuit decisions without evidence of arbitrary delay.34 White concluded that there is no realistic prospect that the license requirement will have more than an incidental effect on protected materials.35
Justice Scalia dissented from the judgment on this issue and would have upheld the ordinance in full.36 He contended that businesses specializing in hardcore sexual material engage in the unprotected activity of pandering under Ginzburg v. United States.37 Scalia argued that the licensing scheme therefore need not satisfy First Amendment procedural standards at all.38
He maintained that the Constitution does not require a municipality to permit a business that intentionally specializes in and holds itself forth as specializing in performance or portrayal of sex acts, sexual organs in a state of arousal, or live human nudity.39 Scalia viewed the Dallas ordinance as targeting only businesses engaged in unprotected pandering activity.40
Whether any petitioner has standing to address the ordinance's civil disability provisions?41
No. No petitioner alleged that they resided with an individual whose license had been denied or revoked within the preceding 12 months, so no party has standing to challenge the cohabitation provision.44 Only one individual asserted a spouse's conviction under the Texas Controlled Substances Act, but that spouse was not an applicant or party, and the city later deleted the controlled-substances disability after the District Court ruling, mooting any claim.45 Bill Staten alleged three misdemeanor obscenity convictions, yet failed to state the date of his last conviction or release from confinement, leaving it impossible to determine whether the five-year disability period still applied.46 The District Court made no factual findings supporting standing for any petitioner.47
No petitioner has standing to challenge the civil disability or cohabitation provisions, so the courts below lacked jurisdiction over those claims.48
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall And Justice Blackmun
Justice Brennan viewed the standing discussion as unnecessary dictum because the prior-restraint holding already invalidated the licensing scheme for First Amendment-protected businesses.49 He explained that any separate challenge to the civil disability provisions was rendered redundant for those businesses.50 Brennan noted that the civil disability claim was an objection based solely on the First Amendment, so a victory on the merits would benefit only protected businesses.51
Since the Court had already invalidated the entire licensing scheme as applied to First Amendment-protected businesses under Freedman, Brennan concluded that deciding standing was superfluous to the actual holding.52
Justice Stevens dissented on this point and would have remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the standing issues.53 He noted the breadth of the civil disability and cohabitation provisions, the assertions in the Staten and Foster affidavits, and the District Court's understanding of the facts.54 Stevens concluded that dismissal of this portion of the litigation was premature given those circumstances.55
He joined Parts I, II, and IV of the opinion but could not join the decision to direct dismissal without further factual development.56
Whether the city has sufficiently justified its requirement that motels renting rooms for fewer than 10 hours be covered by the ordinance?57
The reasonableness of the legislative judgment, combined with the Los Angeles study, is adequate to support the city's determination that motels permitting room rentals for fewer than 10 hours should be included within the licensing scheme.58
Yes. The city council relied on a 1977 Los Angeles study that cursorily examined the effect of adult motels on surrounding neighborhoods, together with the reasonable supposition that short-term rentals facilitate prostitution.59 The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that this combination adequately supported including motels renting rooms for fewer than 10 hours within the licensing scheme aimed at eradicating secondary effects of crime and urban blight.60
The city sufficiently justified the 10-hour motel provision.61
Whether the ordinance impermissibly infringes on the right to freedom of association?62
No. Even assuming the motel owners have jus tertii standing to assert the associational rights of their patrons, limiting room rentals to 10 hours has no discernible effect on traditional personal bonds.65 Any relationships formed during a stay of fewer than 10 hours lack the deep cultural and traditional significance required for heightened protection under the freedom of intimate association.66
The ordinance does not impermissibly infringe on the right to freedom of association.67