471 U.S. 307 (1985)
Raymond Lee Franklin, then 21 years old and imprisoned for offenses unrelated to this case, sought to escape custody on January 17, 1979, while he and three other prisoners were receiving dental care at a local dentist's office.1 The four prisoners were secured by handcuffs to the same 8-foot length of chain as they sat in the dentist's waiting room.2
As another prisoner was being released, Franklin, who had not been reshackled, seized a pistol from one of the two officers and managed to escape.3 He forced the dentist's assistant to accompany him as a hostage.4
Franklin found the dentist's automobile but was unable to unlock the door.5 He fled with the dental assistant across an open clearing, demanded a car from a local resident without harming him, and then came to the home of Collie, a retired 72-year-old carpenter.6 Franklin pounded on the door while pointing the pistol at it.7 As Franklin demanded the car keys, Collie slammed the door and the gun fired, sending a bullet through the door into Collie's chest and killing him.8 Seconds later the gun fired again, with the second bullet traveling upward through the door into the ceiling.9
Franklin later made a formal statement admitting he had shot the victim but claiming the shots were fired accidentally in response to the slamming of the door.10 Franklin was tried in the Superior Court of Bibb County, Georgia, on charges of malice murder and kidnapping.11 His sole defense to the malice murder charge was a lack of the requisite intent to kill, supported by circumstantial evidence including the circumstances of the firing, the trajectory of the second bullet, his immediate confession, and his treatment of other persons encountered during the escape.12
The trial judge instructed the jury with language that included the statements that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will but the presumption may be rebutted, and that a person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but the presumption may be rebutted.13 Approximately one hour after receiving the charge, the jury requested reinstruction on the element of intent and the definition of accident, then deliberated ten more minutes before returning a verdict of guilty.14 Franklin was sentenced to death the next day.15
Franklin appealed unsuccessfully to the Georgia Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction and sentence.16 He then sought state postconviction relief, which was denied.17 Having exhausted state remedies, Franklin filed a federal habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on May 14, 1982.18 That court denied the application without an evidentiary hearing.19 Franklin appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed the district court and ordered that the writ issue.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.21
Whether jury instructions stating that the acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will and that a person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts violate the Fourteenth Amendment?22
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.23 This bedrock principle prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime.24
Yes. The instructions given to the jury in this case are indistinguishable in all relevant respects from the one condemned in Sandstrom v. Montana.25 The jury could have understood the instructions as creating either a conclusive presumption or a burden-shifting presumption on the element of intent.26 The general instructions on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof did not dissipate the error because a reasonable juror could have interpreted the more specific instructions on the presumptions as overriding the general instructions.27
The facts establish that Franklin's sole defense was lack of intent to kill, supported by evidence of accident, and the jury's request for reinstruction shows the issue was contested.28
The jury instructions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell joined the Court's opinion. He wrote separately only to emphasize that the instructions in this case are constitutionally infirm for the reasons stated in his concurring opinion in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S.
510, 527 (1979).30 Powell stressed that the charge created either an irrebuttable direction or a burden-shifting presumption on intent.31 He explained that the instructions could be viewed by reasonable jurors in two ways: either as an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption, or as a direction to find intent upon proof of the facts unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof.32
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He argued that the Court today extends the rule of Sandstrom v. Montana to a set of instructions that are materially different from the one condemned in that case.33 The instructions here were accompanied by repeated explanations that the presumptions could be rebutted and that the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remained on the State.34
In his view, the instructions as a whole did not unconstitutionally relieve the State of its burden of proof.35 He would affirm the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court.36 Rehnquist maintained that general instructions on reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence, along with the instruction that criminal intention may not be presumed, sufficiently clarified the burden remained on the State.37
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. He maintained that the instructions here, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury that the State bore the burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.3839 Burger contended that the majority's decision unduly restricts the ability of trial courts to use traditional instructions on presumptions that have long been part of criminal jurisprudence.40
He argued that the specific language on rebuttable presumptions, when read with the repeated admonitions on the State's burden, did not shift any burden to the defendant. In Burger's view, the charge as a whole properly informed the jury of the prosecution's obligation to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt, and the majority's holding interferes with longstanding practices in criminal trials.
Whether any constitutional error in the jury instructions was harmless?41
This Court has not resolved whether an erroneous charge that shifts a burden of persuasion to the defendant on an essential element of an offense can ever be harmless.42 See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U. S. 73 (1983). We need not resolve the question in this case.
No. The evidence of intent was not so overwhelming that it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the unconstitutional instructions.43 Franklin claimed the shots were fired accidentally in response to the slamming of the door, and the circumstances including the trajectory of the second bullet supported the lack of intent defense.44 The jury's request for reinstruction on the element of intent further indicates that the evidence was not overwhelming.45
The constitutional error in the jury instructions was not harmless.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist would have found no constitutional error in the first place. His dissent maintains that the instructions as a whole did not unconstitutionally relieve the State of its burden of proof and that the general instructions clarified the burden remained on the State throughout.47 He argued that the Court reaches its result even though the judge admonished the jury at least four separate times that they could convict only if they found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.48
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. He maintained that the instructions here, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury that the State bore the burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Burger contended that the majority's decision unduly restricts the ability of trial courts to use traditional instructions on presumptions that have long been part of criminal jurisprudence.
He argued that the specific language on rebuttable presumptions, when read with the repeated admonitions on the State's burden, did not shift any burden to the defendant. In Burger's view, the charge as a whole properly informed the jury of the prosecution's obligation to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt, and the majority's holding interferes with longstanding practices in criminal trials.