788 P.2d 1189 (Arizona 1990)
In 1978, Loehmann's, Inc. entered into a twenty-year lease with Foundation Development Corporation's predecessor in interest to become the anchor tenant in the Lincoln View Plaza Shopping Center.1 The lease provided for fixed annual rent of approximately forty-five thousand dollars plus common area charges of about five thousand dollars annually.2 Payments were due on the first of each month for rent.3 Loehmann's made estimated quarterly payments for common area charges followed by a year-end adjustment.4 Loehmann's had an option to renew for two five-year terms, potentially extending the lease to 2008.5
Loehmann's customary practice involved paying the final common area charge adjustment thirty days or more after receiving the year-end statement.6 On February 23, 1987, Foundation's agent sent Loehmann's a statement showing a balance due of three thousand five hundred sixty-six dollars and forty-four cents for the lease year ending January 31, 1987.7 After an inquiry and response regarding the calculation, on April 10, 1987, Foundation sent a demand letter requiring payment within ten days.8
Loehmann's received the demand letter at its Phoenix store on April 13, 1987, and it was forwarded to its New York office, arriving on April 17.9 The letter reached the accounting department on April 20, was approved on April 22, and a check was issued on April 24 and mailed on April 25.10 Foundation filed its complaint seeking termination of the lease on April 28, 1987, and received the check the following day.11
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts.12 The trial court ruled that Loehmann's had breached the lease but that the breach was trivial and did not justify forfeiture.13 The court of appeals reversed, and the Arizona Supreme Court granted review.14
Whether a landlord may terminate a commercial lease and obtain forfeiture of the tenant's interest for a trivial or immaterial breach of the obligation to pay common area charges?15
Under A.R.S. § 33-361(A) and equitable principles derived from the common law history of landlord-tenant relations, a landlord possesses the right to re-enter and terminate a commercial lease upon a tenant's violation of any lease provision, yet this statutory authority does not extend to trivial, technical, or immaterial breaches that cause no prejudice to the landlord and that equity will not enforce to produce an unjust forfeiture.16
No. The statute changed the common law by granting landlords a termination right absent from prior doctrine, but Arizona courts have consistently refused to read the enactment as authorizing forfeiture for every breach regardless of magnitude.17 The trial court found that Loehmann's three-day delay in remitting the $3,566.44 year-end adjustment caused Foundation no loss beyond the brief use of funds, a loss fully compensable by damages, while Loehmann's had already cured the default and maintained a decade-long record of timely performance under a lease generating approximately $50,000 annually.18 These facts demonstrate that the breach was inconsequential within the meaning of the equitable limitation recognized in Thomas v. Given and the majority rule followed by the court.19
A landlord therefore may not terminate the lease or obtain forfeiture when the tenant's breach of the payment obligation is trivial or immaterial.20
Whether a time-of-the-essence clause in a commercial lease automatically converts an otherwise trivial delay in payment into a material breach that justifies forfeiture?21
A contractual provision declaring that time is of the essence constitutes only one factor among the circumstances to be weighed under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 when determining whether a breach is material.22 Such a clause does not by itself transform an inconsequential delay into a forfeiture-triggering event when enforcement would produce an excessive penalty or unjust result.23
No. Although the lease contained a time-of-the-essence clause that Foundation sought to reinstate through its April 10 demand letter, the court held that the clause must be evaluated together with the extent of deprivation to the landlord, the adequacy of damages, the tenant's forfeiture exposure, the likelihood of cure, and the parties' good faith.24 Loehmann's customary practice of paying the final adjustment thirty days or more after receipt, the absence of any specified due date in the lease for the fourth-quarter charge, and the minor nature of the three-day delay all indicate that the clause did not elevate the breach to material status.25 The trial court's finding that the breach remained trivial therefore stands.26
A time-of-the-essence clause does not automatically convert a trivial delay into a material breach justifying forfeiture of the leasehold.27
Whether the tenant's three-day delay in paying the year-end common area charge adjustment constituted a trivial breach under the facts of the case?28
A breach is trivial or immaterial when, under the five-factor test of Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241, the landlord suffers only minimal deprivation of expected benefit, can be adequately compensated by damages, the tenant faces substantial forfeiture, cure has already occurred, and the tenant's conduct comports with good faith and fair dealing.29
Yes. Loehmann's received the demand letter at its Phoenix store on April 13, forwarded it to New York where it arrived April 17, reached accounting April 20, approved payment April 22, issued the check April 24, and mailed it April 25. Foundation filed suit April 28 and received the check April 29.30 The resulting two- or three-day delay deprived Foundation solely of the use of $3,566.44 for a few days on a lease producing $50,000 per year, a loss compensable by interest.31
Loehmann's cured immediately, had never previously breached during nearly ten years of occupancy, followed its established internal routing procedures without gross negligence or willfulness, and acted on a reasonable belief that the cure period began upon receipt at its proper New York address.32 These facts satisfy every element of the Restatement test and confirm the trial court's determination that the breach was trivial.33
The tenant's three-day delay constituted a trivial breach that did not justify forfeiture of the lease.34