504 U.S. 71 (1992)
In 1984, Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.1 Two medical doctors were appointed to conduct a pretrial examination of Foucha.2 The doctors initially reported that Foucha lacked mental capacity to proceed, but four months later the trial court found Foucha competent to stand trial.3 The doctors reported that Foucha was unable to distinguish right from wrong and was insane at the time of the offense.4
On October 12, 1984, the trial court ruled that Foucha was not guilty by reason of insanity.5 The court found that Foucha was unable to appreciate the usual, natural and probable consequences of his acts, that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong, that he was a menace to himself and others, and that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crimes and presently insane. Foucha was committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility until such time as doctors recommend that he be released and until further order of the court.6 In 1988, the superintendent of Feliciana recommended that Foucha be discharged or released.7
A three-member panel was convened at the institution to determine Foucha's current condition and whether he could be released or placed on probation without being a danger to others or himself.8 On March 21, 1988, the panel reported that there had been no evidence of mental illness since admission and recommended that Foucha be conditionally discharged.9 The trial judge appointed a two-member sanity commission made up of the same two doctors who had conducted the pretrial examination. Their written report stated that Foucha is presently in remission from mental illness but that they cannot certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if released.10
One of the doctors testified at a hearing that upon commitment Foucha probably suffered from a drug induced psychosis but that he had recovered from that temporary condition.11 The doctor testified that Foucha evidenced no signs of psychosis or neurosis and was in good shape mentally. The doctor also testified that Foucha had an antisocial personality, a condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable. The doctor further testified that Foucha had been involved in several altercations at Feliciana and that he would not feel comfortable in certifying that Foucha would not be a danger to himself or to other people.12 After it was stipulated that the other doctor would give essentially the same testimony, the court ruled that Foucha was dangerous to himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental institution.13 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Foucha had not carried the burden placed upon him by statute to prove that he was not dangerous.14 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because the case presents an important issue and was decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court in a manner arguably at odds with prior decisions of this Court.15
Whether the Louisiana scheme for the continued commitment of insanity acquittees violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?16
Under Jones v. United States, a criminal defendant who is acquitted by reason of insanity may be committed to a mental institution until he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.17 The Jones Court did not address whether a person who has regained his sanity may be held indefinitely on the basis of his dangerousness alone. Once the acquittee is no longer mentally ill, the State has no constitutional basis for confining him on the basis of dangerousness alone.18
Yes. Terry Foucha was charged in 1984 with aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm.19 He was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed to the East Feliciana Forensic Facility.20 In 1988 the superintendent recommended release.21 A hospital panel reported no evidence of mental illness since admission and recommended conditional discharge.22 The sanity commission doctors testified that Foucha had recovered from his drug-induced psychosis.23 They showed no signs of psychosis or neurosis and stated that Foucha was in good shape mentally, although he retained an antisocial personality disorder that is not a mental disease.
The trial court nevertheless found Foucha dangerous based on altercations at the facility.24 It ordered his return to the institution under the Louisiana statute that mandates continued commitment when an acquittee is dangerous but no longer mentally ill.25 This application of the statute permits indefinite confinement in a mental facility without any finding of current mental illness.26 It severs the required reasonable relation between the commitment and its therapeutic and protective purposes.27
The Louisiana scheme violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor joins the Court’s opinion but writes separately to emphasize that the decision addresses only Louisiana’s broad statutory scheme permitting indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees in psychiatric facilities.29 States retain considerable latitude to develop commitment and release procedures that protect the public from dangerous individuals while respecting the constitutional rights of those individuals.30 A finding of criminal conduct supplies concrete evidence of dangerousness that justifies continued monitoring even after a clinical finding of sanity returns, provided the nature and duration of detention are tailored to concrete public-safety concerns.31
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J.
Justice Kennedy dissents and contends that the majority improperly imports civil-commitment standards into a criminal proceeding.32 He argues that an insanity acquittal under the M’Naghten test establishes both the commission of a criminal act and the defendant’s dangerousness at the time of the offense.33 This supplies a legitimate basis for incapacitative confinement that does not evaporate merely because present mental illness is absent.
The state’s interest in protecting the public therefore survives the restoration of sanity.34
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., And Scalia, J.
Justice Thomas dissents and joins Justice Kennedy's opinion.35 He maintains that the Court's decision is inconsistent with the traditional understanding of the police power of the States. The police power includes the authority to protect the public from dangerous individuals, and that authority is not limited to those who are mentally ill.36
The Louisiana statute represents a reasonable exercise of that power and should be upheld.37 He emphasizes that the distinction between insanity acquittees and civil committees remains valid even after sanity returns.38 This is because the acquittee has already been found to have committed a criminal act.39
The scheme reasonably prevents abuse of the insanity defense by requiring dangerous acquittees to demonstrate they no longer pose a threat before release can be granted.40
Whether the Louisiana statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?41
The Equal Protection Clause forbids treating insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill differently from other persons who have committed crimes but were never found not guilty by reason of insanity.42 Once the acquittee is no longer mentally ill the state must justify any continued disparate treatment by a particularly convincing reason.43
Yes. After the 1988 hearing established that Foucha was no longer mentally ill, Louisiana continued to confine him solely because he could not prove he was not dangerous.44 State law provides no comparable indefinite confinement for convicted criminals who have completed their sentences.45 It also provides no such confinement for other dangerous persons who were never acquitted by reason of insanity.46
The statute therefore discriminates against sane insanity acquittees by imposing a burden of proof and an indefinite institutionalization regime that does not apply to similarly situated individuals who committed criminal acts but lack an insanity acquittal.47
The Louisiana statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48