435 U.S. 291 (1978)
Edmund Foley, a permanent resident alien eligible in due course to become a naturalized citizen, applied for appointment as a New York State trooper.1 The position is filled on the basis of competitive examinations.2 Pursuant to a New York statute, N.Y. Exec. Law § 215(3) (McKinney 1972), state authorities refused to allow Foley to take the examination.3 The statute provides that no person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States.4 Foley then brought this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 After Foley was certified as representative of a class of those similarly situated, a three-judge District Court was convened to consider the merits of the claim.6
The District Court held the statute to be constitutional in an opinion reported at 419 F. Supp. 889.7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.8 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider whether a State may constitutionally limit the appointment of members of its police force to citizens of the United States.910 The statute in question was enacted in 1927, and the State has uniformly complied with this restriction since that time.11
A trooper in New York is a member of the state police force, which exercises broad police authority throughout the State.12 The powers of troopers include the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of suspected criminals, investigation of suspect conduct, execution of warrants, and powers of search, seizure and arrest without a formal warrant under limited circumstances.13 In carrying out these responsibilities, an officer is empowered to resort to lawful force, which may include the use of any weapon that he is required to carry while on duty.14 All troopers are on call twenty-four hours a day and are required to take appropriate action whenever criminal activity is observed.15
The District Court described the role of the New York State trooper as charged with the enforcement of the law, not in a private profession and for the benefit of themselves and their clients, but for the benefit of the people at large of the State of New York.16 Some members of the class, including Foley, were not currently eligible for American citizenship due to waiting periods imposed by federal law.17 State law limits eligibility for trooper positions to those between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-nine years.18
Whether a State may constitutionally limit the appointment of members of its police force to citizens of the United States?19
Classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny, but the right to be considered for public employment is not a fundamental right traditionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.20 When the position involves important nonelective officers who participate directly in the execution of broad public policy, the State need only show a rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification.21 The police function falls within this category because officers exercise discretionary powers in law enforcement, a basic attribute of sovereignty.22
Yes. Edmund Foley, a permanent resident alien eligible in due course to become a naturalized citizen, applied for appointment as a New York State trooper but was refused the opportunity to take the competitive examination under New York Executive Law section 215(3) because he was not a citizen of the United States.23 The trooper position involves broad police authority throughout the State, including the prevention and detection of crime, apprehension of suspected criminals, investigation of suspect conduct, execution of warrants, and powers of search, seizure, and arrest without a formal warrant under limited circumstances, along with authority to resort to lawful force.24 These responsibilities require a high degree of judgment and discretion that can seriously affect individuals in the most sensitive areas of daily life.25
The State may reasonably conclude that limiting such positions to citizens ensures performance by those more likely to be cognizant of and reliably attached to the state's interests in carrying out this sovereign function.26
A State may constitutionally limit the appointment of members of its police force to citizens of the United States.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment of the Court.27 He agreed that the police function is so closely related to the basic concept of sovereignty that the State may constitutionally limit it to citizens.28 He wrote separately only to emphasize that this decision does not signal a retreat from the principles announced in Sugarman v. Dougall and In re Griffiths.29
Those cases involved different functions which did not implicate the State's sovereignty in the same way that the police function does.30 Stewart stressed that the holding remains narrow and does not undermine the close scrutiny applied to non-sovereign roles in prior decisions.31 The decision therefore leaves intact the principles of Sugarman and Griffiths for other contexts.32
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.33 He observed that the Court's prior cases clearly establish the standards to be applied in this one. When the State acts to limit participation in government to those within the basic conception of a political community, it need only show a rational relationship between its interest in preserving the political community and the classification it employs.34
He agreed that New York has vested its state troopers with powers and duties basic to the function of state government.35 The classification therefore satisfies the rational basis standard. Prior precedents confirm that this level of scrutiny governs when the State preserves its political community.36 Blackmun had no difficulty agreeing with the result reached by the Court.37
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented.38 He argued that the statute cannot survive the close scrutiny consistently applied to alienage classifications.39 He contended that characterizing the police function as a basic attribute of sovereignty does not withstand analysis because troopers perform many functions not uniquely sovereign in nature, such as directing traffic and investigating accidents.40
The State's interest in loyalty could be satisfied by less restrictive means such as requiring an oath of allegiance to the United States and to New York.41 Marshall would have reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.42
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Stevens dissented.43 He stated that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause.44 He argued that the State's asserted interest in ensuring loyalty is legitimate but not sufficiently compelling to justify the blanket exclusion of all aliens.45
The Court should not uphold a conclusive presumption that aliens as a class are disloyal or untrustworthy without rejecting its holding in In re Griffiths.46 Stevens would have held the statute unconstitutional.47
Whether the New York statute barring noncitizens from serving as state troopers violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?48
The Equal Protection Clause subjects alienage classifications to close judicial scrutiny, but exceptions exist for positions involving direct participation in the execution of broad public policy.49 For such positions, rational basis review applies, and the classification is valid if it bears a rational relationship to the State's interest in preserving the political community by limiting performance of sovereign functions to citizens.50
No. The New York statute, enacted in 1927 and uniformly applied since that time, bars noncitizens such as Edmund Foley from serving as state troopers.51 Foley, a permanent resident alien, was denied the chance to compete for the position on the basis of competitive examinations solely because of his alienage.52 Troopers are charged with enforcement of the law for the benefit of the people at large of the State of New York.53 They exercise an almost infinite variety of discretionary powers that substantially affect members of the political community.54
The classification bears a rational relationship to the State's interest in ensuring that those entrusted with these sovereign responsibilities owe a fundamental duty of loyalty to the sovereign.55
The New York statute barring noncitizens from serving as state troopers does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment on the ground that the police function is so closely related to sovereignty that limitation to citizens is constitutional.57 He stressed that the holding does not undermine prior decisions involving non-sovereign functions.58 Those earlier cases addressed different roles that did not implicate state sovereignty in the same direct manner.59
Stewart noted that the dissenting opinions convincingly demonstrate that it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the Court's judgment with the full sweep of the reasoning and authority of some of our past decisions.60 It is only because he has become increasingly doubtful about the validity of those decisions that he joins the opinion of the Court in this case.61 The decision therefore leaves intact the principles of Sugarman and Griffiths for other contexts.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. He explained that the State may rationally limit trooper positions to citizens because those officers execute duties basic to state government.62 The classification satisfies the rational relationship standard applicable to such political community positions.63
Prior precedents confirm that this level of scrutiny governs when the State preserves its political community. Blackmun had no difficulty agreeing with the result reached by the Court.
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the police function does not fall within the narrow exception for positions involving formulation or execution of broad public policy.64 Troopers primarily apply existing policy to specific facts rather than set policy.65 He pointed out that there is a vast difference between the formulation and execution of broad public policy and the application of that policy to specific factual settings.66 The judgments required of troopers are factual in nature.67
Less restrictive alternatives exist to protect the State's loyalty interest without a blanket exclusion of aliens.68 Marshall concluded that the statute's exclusion of aliens violates the Equal Protection Clause.69
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that a blanket exclusion of aliens cannot be justified by any group characteristic without repudiating prior holdings.70 The police officer is not a policymaker.71 The transition to citizenship does not alter the constitutional command of equal treatment in access to employment opportunities.72
Stevens emphasized that the Court should draw the line between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions consistently.73 Under the standards announced in Sugarman, a blanket exclusion of aliens from this particular governmental institution is especially inappropriate.74