430 U.S. 787 (1977)
Three sets of plaintiffs brought suit in the Eastern District of New York in July 1974 challenging provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.1
Ramon Martin Fiallo, a United States citizen residing in the Dominican Republic, sought to obtain an immigrant visa for his illegitimate son Ramon Fiallo-Sone, a citizen of the Dominican Republic.2 Cleophus Warner, a naturalized United States citizen, petitioned to classify his illegitimate son Serge Warner, born in 1960 in the French West Indies, as his child for immigration purposes.3 Trevor and Earl Wilson, permanent resident aliens, sought an immigrant visa for their father Arthur Wilson, a citizen of Jamaica.4
Ingrid and Sylvia Weitzner, United States citizens, sought to have their father, a citizen of France, admitted as a parent.5 The plaintiffs had been informed that they were ineligible for immigrant visas unless they qualified under the general numerical limitations and, in the case of the alien parents, received the requisite labor certification.6
The Act, as amended in 1957, defined a "child" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) to include an illegitimate child only when the relationship was with the natural mother.7 It defined "parent" under § 1101(b)(2) solely on the basis of the relationship with a "child" as so defined.8 As a result, the natural fathers of illegitimate children who were United States citizens or permanent resident aliens were not entitled to preferential treatment as parents.9 Illegitimate children could not obtain preference through their natural fathers.10
A three-judge District Court was convened and, after noting Congress' broad power over the admission of aliens, upheld the statutory provisions in 1975, with one judge dissenting.11 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 1976.12
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 originally defined "child" without reference to illegitimate children.13 The Attorney General concluded that neither illegitimate children of citizen mothers nor mothers of citizens born out of wedlock qualified for preferential status.14 This prompted the 1957 amendment focused on the mother-child relationship.15
The special preference immigration status provided for those who satisfy the statutory parent-child relationship depends on whether the immigrant's relative is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien.16 A United States citizen is allowed the entry of a parent or child without regard to numerical quota or labor certification.17 A permanent resident alien receives the entry subject to numerical limitations but without labor certification.18
Whether sections 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by distinguishing between mothers and fathers of illegitimate children?19
Congress possesses exceptionally broad power over the admission of aliens, a power that is plenary and largely immune from judicial control.20 Gender-based classifications in immigration statutes survive review if they are substantially related to an important governmental objective such as ensuring that preferential status is granted only where close family relationships are objectively verifiable.21
No. In Fiallo v. Bell the statutory definition in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) limits the term child to an illegitimate child seeking preference through the natural mother. Section 1101(b)(2) defines parent solely by reference to that child definition. This directly affects plaintiffs Ramon Martin Fiallo seeking admission for his son Ramon Fiallo-Sone and Cleophus Warner petitioning for his son Serge Warner. The distinction rests on Congress's reasonable conclusion that the mother-child bond is more likely to be verifiable than the father-child bond.22
Because the classification is substantially related to the important objective of limiting preferences to relationships with demonstrable family ties, the provisions satisfy even the exacting scrutiny applied to gender classifications outside the immigration context.23
The challenged provisions do not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the ground that the gender distinction is an overbroad stereotype that fails the substantial-relationship test of Craig v. Boren because many fathers maintain close relationships with their illegitimate children.25 The majority's extreme deference constitutes abdication of the judicial duty to protect citizens' equal-protection rights when Congress grants family-reunification privileges to some citizens but not others.26 The statute interferes with fundamental interests in family unity without substantial justification.27
Whether sections 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment by distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate children?28
Congress possesses exceptionally broad power over the admission of aliens, a power that is plenary and largely immune from judicial control. Legitimacy-based classifications in immigration statutes survive review if they are substantially related to an important governmental objective such as ensuring that preferential status is granted only where close family relationships are objectively verifiable.29
No. In Fiallo v. Bell the Act as amended in 1957 excludes illegitimate children from obtaining preference through their natural fathers while granting it to legitimate and legitimated children. This directly bars Trevor and Earl Wilson from securing visas for their father Arthur Wilson. It also prevents the other father plaintiffs from qualifying as parents. Congress could reasonably conclude that illegitimate children are less likely to share the requisite close ties with their fathers.30
The distinction is substantially related to the important objective of confining preferences to demonstrably close family units and therefore passes constitutional muster.31
The challenged provisions do not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.
Whether the scope of judicial review of congressional immigration legislation requires heightened scrutiny when the provisions affect the rights of United States citizens on the basis of sex and legitimacy?32
Congress possesses exceptionally broad power over the admission of aliens, a power that is plenary and largely immune from judicial control, so that even when immigration classifications affect the interests of citizens the judiciary applies only limited review and will not probe the wisdom of the legislative line-drawing.33
No. In Fiallo v. Bell the three-judge district court and the Supreme Court applied the traditional deferential standard to the 1952 Act provisions as amended in 1957. They rejected appellants' argument that the sex-and-legitimacy classifications required strict or intermediate scrutiny simply because United States citizens such as the Weitzners and the natural fathers were denied family-reunification preferences. The Court held that the political character of immigration policy and the sovereign authority to exclude aliens preclude more searching review even when citizens' associational interests are implicated.34
Heightened scrutiny is not required; the traditional deferential standard governs.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented on the ground that when Congress grants a privilege to some citizens but denies it to others on the basis of gender and legitimacy the usual equal-protection standards must apply.36 The statute directly burdens citizens' fundamental interest in family unity.37 The majority's refusal to conduct meaningful review is an abdication that would be intolerable outside the immigration setting.38
The discrimination among citizens cannot escape traditional constitutional scrutiny simply because it occurs in the context of immigration legislation.39