777 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. App. 2002)
Lynn Feltmeier and Robert Feltmeier married on October 11, 1986.1 The marriage ended when Lynn obtained a divorce judgment on December 16, 1997, on grounds of mental cruelty.2 The judgment incorporated a December 10, 1997 marital settlement agreement containing mutual release provisions in paragraphs 8(a) and 8(d).3
On August 25, 1999, Lynn filed suit against Robert alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.4 The complaint detailed a pattern of physical and mental abuse that began shortly after the wedding, continued throughout the eleven-year marriage, and persisted after the divorce.5 It alleged at least eleven physical beatings, multiple instances of physical restraint, repeated verbal attacks, objects thrown at her, systematic isolation from family and friends, and post-divorce stalking, for a total of more than forty-five specific episodes.6 Lynn claimed the abuse caused severe emotional distress, including a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, fear of men, and ongoing medical and psychological expenses.7
Robert moved to dismiss the complaint on October 20, 1999, contending that the alleged conduct was not extreme and outrageous and that the statute of limitations barred most of the claims.8 The trial court denied the motion on February 14, 2000.9 Robert then filed an amended motion arguing that the marital settlement agreement released the claims; the court denied that motion on June 23, 2000.10
On April 10, 2001, the trial court certified three questions for interlocutory appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308(a).11 The appellate court also addressed Robert's additional contention that he enjoyed statutory immunity from suit for any conduct occurring before January 1, 1988.12
Whether the plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress?13
To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intent to inflict severe emotional distress or knowledge of a high probability that such distress would result, and (3) actual severe emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff.14
Yes. Lynn Feltmeier's complaint alleged a detailed pattern of more than forty-five episodes of physical beatings, restraints, verbal attacks, thrown objects, isolation, and post-divorce stalking spanning the entire eleven-year marriage and continuing afterward, resulting in a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and ongoing medical expenses.15 The duration and repetitive nature of the abuse elevated the conduct above ordinary marital discord to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior that a reasonable person could not be expected to endure.16
The plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Welch concurs with the majority that Lynn's complaint satisfies the standard necessary to state a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. He notes this agreement explicitly at the outset of his separate opinion but reserves his dissent for the remaining certified questions.18 Welch agrees that the detailed allegations of repeated physical and mental abuse over many years meet the requirements for extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress.19
He joins the majority in finding that the pattern of abuse alleged meets the elements of the tort under Illinois law.
Whether the plaintiff's claims for the intentional infliction of emotional distress based on conduct prior to August 25, 1997, are barred by the two-year statute of limitations?20
The statute of limitations for intentional infliction of emotional distress is two years under 735 ILCS 5/13-202.21 The continuing-tort theory advanced by Lynn looks at the behavior of the defendant as a continuous whole so that the statute of limitations would not start until either the continuing behavior at issue stopped or the last such act occurred.22
No. The complaint alleged an ongoing pattern of domestic abuse that spanned the entire marriage and continued after divorce.23 The psychologist attributed the posttraumatic stress disorder to the cumulative series of acts rather than any single incident.24 Because the conduct formed one continuous tort, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the final acts in 1999.25 This made the August 25, 1999 filing timely as to the entire pattern.26
The plaintiff's claims for the intentional infliction of emotional distress based on conduct prior to August 25, 1997, are not barred by the two-year statute of limitations.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Welch dissents on the statute of limitations issue. He maintains that each alleged act of abuse by Robert resulted in a separate cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.28 Applying the statutory language, he would hold that Lynn's causes of action accrued at the time of the alleged abuse.29
He notes that the supreme court did not adopt a continuing-violation rule of general applicability in all tort cases.30 Moreover, he cannot discern any unjust result because Lynn alleged actionable, noncumulative, tortious conduct within the limitations period.31 Therefore, he believes the circuit court erred by denying Robert's motion to dismiss the allegations of conduct outside the limitations period.32
Whether the plaintiff's claim against the defendant for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has been released by the language of the marital settlement agreement?33
General boilerplate release language in a marital settlement agreement cannot release unknown future claims or claims not specifically contemplated by the parties at the time of execution.34
No. The release provisions in paragraphs 8(a) and 8(d) used broad general language that did not specifically identify or contemplate a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from the pattern of abuse.35 Because the cause of action did not accrue until after the December 1997 agreement was signed, the releases did not bar the suit.36
The plaintiff's claim against the defendant for the intentional infliction of emotional distress has not been released by the language of the marital settlement agreement.37
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Welch dissents on the release issue. He concludes that paragraph 8(d) released all claims Lynn knew or should have known of at the time of the agreement, including her emotional distress claim based on pre-agreement conduct.38 A question of contract construction is reviewed de novo.39
Absent ambiguity, the meaning and intent of a contract must be ascertained by the language utilized in the contract.40 He would give weight to Lynn's argument that specific provisions limit the general only if paragraph 8 of the settlement agreement was cohesive, which it is not.41
Whether the defendant is immune from suit for tortious conduct occurring prior to January 1, 1988?42
Prior to January 1, 1988, interspousal immunity barred tort suits between spouses except for intentional torts causing physical harm; the 1988 amendment removing immunity applies only prospectively.43
No. The continuing-tort theory treats the entire pattern of abuse as a single cause of action. That cause of action did not accrue until after the marriage ended. Therefore, the pre-1988 immunity does not bar recovery for the cumulative injury even though some individual acts occurred before the statutory change.44
The defendant is not immune from suit for tortious conduct occurring prior to January 1, 1988.45
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Welch declines to reach the immunity issue because his resolution of the statute of limitations and release questions disposes of the pre-1988 conduct. He sees no need to address the question based on the analysis he has set forth today.46 Welch believes that once the limitations and release issues are resolved in Robert's favor for pre-agreement acts, the immunity question becomes moot.47
He therefore declines to address the immunity issue in his separate opinion.