396 Mich. 281, 240 N.W.2d 217 (1976)
On the evening of August 26, 1966, eighteen-year-old Richard Farwell and sixteen-year-old David Siegrist drove to a trailer rental lot to return an automobile which Siegrist had borrowed from a friend who worked there. While waiting for the friend to finish work, they consumed some beer.1
Two girls walked by the entrance to the lot. Siegrist and Farwell attempted to engage them in conversation and followed the girls to a drive-in restaurant down the street. The girls complained to their friends, and six boys chased Siegrist and Farwell back to the lot. Siegrist escaped unharmed, but Farwell was severely beaten.2
Siegrist found Farwell underneath his automobile in the lot and applied ice to his head. Siegrist then drove Farwell around for approximately two hours, stopping at four different drive-in restaurants. Farwell went to sleep in the back seat of his car. Around midnight Siegrist drove the car to the home of Farwell’s grandparents, parked it in the driveway, unsuccessfully attempted to rouse Farwell, and left. Farwell’s grandparents discovered him in the car the next morning and took him to the hospital. He died three days later of an epidural hematoma.3
At trial, a neurosurgeon testified that if a person in Farwell’s condition is taken to a doctor before, or within half an hour after, consciousness is lost, there is an 85 to 88 per cent chance of survival. Farwell’s father testified that Siegrist told him that he knew Farwell was badly injured and that he should have done something. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff and awarded $15,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, and the Supreme Court of Michigan reviewed the case.4
Whether the existence of a duty in a particular case is always a matter of law to be determined solely by the Court?5
The existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law. However, there are factual circumstances which give rise to a duty. The existence of those facts must be determined by a jury.6
No. The jury heard evidence that Siegrist applied ice to Farwell’s head after the beating. He then drove Farwell around for two hours while stopping at restaurants. Those actions raised a factual question whether Siegrist had attempted to aid the victim. Therefore, the existence of facts giving rise to a duty had to be resolved by the jury rather than by the court as a matter of law.7
The existence of a duty in a particular case is not always a matter of law to be determined solely by the Court.8
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Coleman, J.
Justice Fitzgerald dissented on the ground that the existence of a duty is always a question of law for the court.9 He emphasized that whether a relation exists between the parties imposing a legal obligation is entirely a question of law to be determined by reference to statutes, rules, principles and precedents. Fitzgerald noted that Michigan recognizes the question of duty is to be resolved by the court rather than the jury.10
He would have affirmed the Court of Appeals because the facts within defendant’s knowledge in no way indicated that immediate medical attention was necessary and the relationship between the parties imposed no affirmative duty to render assistance.11
Whether, on the facts of this case, the trial judge should have ruled, as a matter of law, that Siegrist owed no duty to Farwell?12
No. Siegrist and Farwell were companions on a social venture who had spent the evening together. After Farwell was beaten, Siegrist applied ice to his head, drove him around for two hours, and attempted to rouse him at his grandparents’ home. The evidence supported a finding that Siegrist knew or should have known of Farwell’s peril. Siegrist could have obtained help without danger to himself.
Therefore, the trial judge could not rule as a matter of law that no duty existed.15
The trial judge should not have ruled as a matter of law that Siegrist owed no duty to Farwell.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Coleman, J.
Justice Fitzgerald concluded that Siegrist did not voluntarily assume any duty to care for Farwell.17 He observed that testimony revealed only a qualified physician would have reason to suspect that Farwell had suffered an injury requiring immediate medical attention.18 The decedent never complained of pain and had expressed a desire to retaliate against his attackers.19
Fitzgerald further noted that the inability to arouse the decedent did not permit an inference that defendant knew or should have known of serious injury.20 He maintained that the relationship between the two teenagers imposed no affirmative legal obligation to render assistance and would have affirmed the Court of Appeals.21